Introduction
Background
Contributions made
Methods
Participants
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Client (C)/User (U): Client (C)/User (U) possesses Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC) in a mobile phone.
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UICC: It acts as a reader in our proposed framework.
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Banking community (BC): BC is a community cloud catering the needs of Banking Community containing issuing bank (IB) (Client’s bank), acquiring bank (AB) (merchant’s bank) and payment gateway (PG). PG acts as an adjudicator.
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Mobile network operator (MNO): MNO provides mobile network connectivity.
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Traceable anonymous certificate (TAC): TAC is used in this framework for ensuring anonymity of client.
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Trusted service manager (TSM): certification authority (CA) plays the role of TSM in addition to its normal functions. TSM acts as a neutral middle man and aggregator in our proposed framework. Roles of TSM in our proposed framework include: MNO management, Over The Air (OTA) provisioning and personalization, application testing and certification, and OTA provisioning.
Personalization of secure element (i.e. UICC) by TSM and client
TSM issued certificates
UICC personalization
Notation | Meaning | Notation | Meaning |
---|---|---|---|
C | Client | TID | Transaction identifier |
IB | Issuing bank | Item no | Item number of the goods |
AB | Acquirer/acquiring bank | Success | Success |
MNO | Mobile network operator | PI | Payment information |
TSM | Trusted service manager |
\( DS_{{X_{Y} }} \)
| Digital signature generated by ‘X’ for ‘Y’ |
CA | Certifying authority | MS | Message |
Amt | Amount |
\( N_{X} \)
| Nonce generated by entity ‘X’ |
\( Cert_{X} \)
| Certificate of the participant ‘X’ |
\( T_{X} \)
| Timestamp generated by ‘X’ |
OI | Order information | POS | Point of sale |
\( K_{XY} \)
| Symmetric key shared between ‘X’ and ‘Y’ participants | HOI | Hashed order information |
Authentication and transaction protocol
Authentication proof of SPPMC protocol based on BAN logic
Assumptions
Formal verification of SPPMC protocol using BAN logic
Results
AVISPA tool (Armando 2005) | |
---|---|
High level protocol specification language (HLPSL) is used | Security protocol description language (SPDL) is used |
Multi-protocol attacks are not verified | Multi-protocol attacks are verified |
Attack graphs are not generated | When attacks are found, attack graphs are generated |
Verification of protocols is done using only bounded number of sessions | Verification of protocols is done by bounded/unbounded number of sessions |
Assumes that every protocol runs in isolation | Assumes that each protocol runs with other protocols in the same network |
Security analysis
Assumptions
Threat model
Security proof
Comparison of SPPMC with related works
Features | Protocols | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Eun et al. (2013) | Ashrafi and Ng (2009) | Google’s host card emulation (HCE) (https://www.securetechalliance.org/publications-host-card-emulation-101/) | Soft card’s NFC payment (https://www.mobilepaymentstoday.com/companies/media/isis/, https://www.gosoftcard.com/) | SPPMC (our proposal) | |
Authentication | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
Confidentiality | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
Integrity | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
Non-repudiation | N | N | N | N | Y |
Credentials are generated and stored in tamper-resistant hardware | N | N | N | N | Y |
QES (qualified electronic signature) | N | N | N | N | Y |
Does the framework ensure secrecy of payment information | Y | N | N | N | Y |
Does the framework ensure secrecy of order information | Y | N | N | N | Y |
Does the framework ensure anonymity of client (C/U) from POS, AB and eavesdropper | Y | N | N | N | Y |
communication privacy | Y | N | N | N | Y |
Does the framework ensure information privacy | Y | N | N | N | Y |
Avoids double spending and over spending | Y | N | N | N | Y |
Does the framework withstand replay attack | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
Does the framework withstand impersonation attack | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
Does the framework withstand MITM (man-in-the-middle attack) attack | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
Does the framework withstand multi-protocol attack | N | N | N | N | Y |
Is the framework/protocol verified with formal logic or formal tool | N | N | N | N | Y |