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Erschienen in:
2005 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Two-Server Password-Only Authenticated Key Exchange
verfasst von : Jonathan Katz, Philip MacKenzie, Gelareh Taban, Virgil Gligor
Erschienen in: Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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Typical protocols for password-based authentication assume a single server which stores all the information (e.g.), the password necessary to authenticate a user. Unfortunately, an inherent limitation of this approach (assuming low-entropy passwords are used) is that the user’s password is exposed if this server is ever compromised. To address this issue, a number of schemes have been proposed in which a user’s password information is shared among multiple servers, and these servers cooperate in a threshold manner when the user wants to authenticate.
We show here a two-server protocol for this task assuming public parameters available to everyone in the system (as well as the adversary). Ours is the first provably-secure two-server protocol for the important
password-only
setting (in which the user need remember only a password, and not the servers’ public keys), and is the first two-server protocol (in any setting) with a proof of security in the standard model.