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2015 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

2. Uncertainty in Economic Theory from the Perspective of New Institutional Economics

verfasst von : Rudolf Richter

Erschienen in: Essays on New Institutional Economics

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Keynes accused “… classical economic theory of being itself one of these pretty, polite techniques which tries to deal with the present by abstracting from the fact that we know very little about the future.” Keynes concedes classical economics would not rule out change; they would assume, however that risks are “capable of an exact actuarial computation.” As a result, the calculus of probability would “…be capable of reducing uncertainty to the same calculable status as that of certainty itself; …” (loc. cit. 112 f.). Arrow (1953) with his time-state-preference theory, developed a model of this type, which Debreu (1959) later integrated into his axiomatic presentation of general equilibrium theory. In the perfect futures economy of Arrow and Debreu each can maximize the present value of its expected utility. Assumed is perfect foresight, meaning all individuals know from now on to the Last Day all possible states of the economy and their stochastic properties. No surprises can happen. Of course, these are extreme assumptions.

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Vorheriges Kapitel The New Institutional Economics: Its Start, Its Meaning, Its Prospects

Nächstes Kapitel New Economic Sociology and New Institutional Economics

Keynes (1937/1973, p. 115).

More precisely: its expected Von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility.

North et al. (2009, p. 133). More general, Hayek (1945, p. 524) emphasized: The “economic problem of society is mainly one of adaptation to changes in particular circumstances of time and place.”

Schlicht (1998).

Eucken (1952), Richter (2012).

Hume ([1739/40], 536 f.).

Hume (loc. cit., 542; emphasis in the original).

“…that the sense of interest has become common in all our fellows, …” (Hume ibid.).

Hayek (1967, p. 111): Our moral beliefs “… are neither natural in the sense of innate, nor a deliberate invention of human reason, but an ‘artefact’ … that is, a product of cultural evolution…”

Henrich et al. (2010, p. 1480).

“… as to a salient way in which the game is repeatedly played.” Aoki (2001, p. 10)—e.g., the prisoner dilemma game. The approach is especially popular among political scientists such as Calvert (1995) or economic historians like Greif (1997).

In the same way works bankruptcy law: “The law in effect requires creditors to assume the risks of the debtor, it does not leave him free to negotiate a risk-free investment, and it provides for an inalienable limitation of risks to the debtor. The law then steps in and forces a risk shifting not created in the market place.” (Arrow 1970, pp. 139–140).

Cf. Richter and Furubotn (2010, p. 265).

Organized futures markets are, e.g., the London Metal Exchange, the New York Board of Trade and the New York Mercantile Exchange.

Riccaut de la Marliniere in Lessing’s play “Minna von Barnhelm”.

The entrepreneur-coordinator does not compete with traders on commodity future markets but with entrepreneur-coordinators of other firms (see Richter 2010, p. 460).

Freixas and Rochet (2008, p. 10).

All exchange contracts are concluded today spot and forward, i.e., for now and the time to come; thereafter all are met to the letter.

See Scott and Taylor (2013) in US-Edition of The Wall Street Journal, May 16, 2013, p. A15.

Williamson (1996, 104 f.), for a general discussion see Ménard (2004).

Williamson’s transaction cost economics is supported by a large number of empirical studies (overview: Shelanski and Klein 1995).

In the sense that “economic action takes place within the networks of social relations that make up the social structure.” DiMaggio (1990) adds “economic action is embedded not only in social structure but also in culture.”

Draghi’s statement contradicts the principle of the Maastricht Treaty that each country alone is responsible for its government debts. On this point see the opinion of the German Federal Constitutional Court of 7. February 2014 regarding the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program of the European Central Bank.

According to Sinn, the 3 % deficit criterion of the Stability and Growth Pact has been unpunished broken in 88 cases (Sinn 2012, p. 144).

See Aoki (2001, p. 42): The legislator cannot create by a stroke of the pen whatever order they wish to have. “The legislator’s law must be able to create stable expectations among the agents …”.

According to Mayer (2013, p. 37), Mitterand demanded from Genscher to agree to the start of serious negotiations on a common European currency, otherwise Germany would risk the formation of a Three Partite Alliance between France, Greater Britain and Russia, which would isolate Germany as before World War I.—It is hard to believe that Genscher really understood that as a credible threat. The years around 1914 are thoroughly gone. The alleged threat of Mitterand sounds more like an apology from Genscher or other German officials towards a deutschmark loving German public—whereas numerous German politicians and economists of that period of time were much in favour of an European currency union (see Richter 1999, p. 129).

Biological heredity seems to play also a role in this case (see Shane 2010, 166 ff.).

Baron and Hannan (2001, p. 37) stress the role social risk plays: “Suppose…the salient risks to entrepreneurs are primarily social: fear of the reputational consequences of failing in their ventures. What seems to be distinctive about Silicon Valley in this respect is the almost complete absence of any social stigma attached to failure. Indeed, it has been sometimes suggested that the next best outcome to an audacious success is an audacious failure (or, perhaps, a well-managed and dignified failure). More generally we suspect that the traditional sources of status in a community affect the perceived reputational risks associated with entrepreneurship. …”

Castilla et al. (2000, p. 218) “The most crucial aspect of Silicon Valley is its networks.”

Powell concludes that “certain kinds of institutional contexts, that is, particular combinations of legal, political, and economic factors, are especially conducive to network arrangements …” (Powell 1990, p. 326). They involve a distinctive combination of factors: “skilled labor, some degree of employment security, salaries rather than piece rates, some externally-provided mechanisms for job training, relative equity among the participants, a legal system with relaxed antitrust standards, and national policies that promote research and development and encourage linkages between centers of higher learning and industry—which seldom exist in sufficient measure without a political and legal infrastructure to sustain them.” (1990, 326 f.)

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Titel: Uncertainty in Economic Theory from the Perspective of New Institutional Economics
verfasst von: Rudolf Richter
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Essays on New Institutional Economics
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-14153-4

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-14154-1

Copyright-Jahr: 2015
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-14154-1_2