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2016 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

6. Unequal Representation by Parties: Explanations Based on the Elites’ Side of the Representation Process

verfasst von : Jan Rosset

Erschienen in: Economic Inequality and Political Representation in Switzerland

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

This chapter explores the link between the economic resources of candidates and their policy preferences, as well as their relative position within party structures. The analyses show that representatives’ own experience shape their political views, as candidates with higher incomes tend to be less favourable to redistribution than their party colleagues. As political parties tend to recruit their members and potential candidates from among the high income strata, this result indicates that descriptive representation of income groups might explain why the preferences of low income groups are not reflected well in the parliament. An analysis of ballot position and campaign spending shows, however, that personal wealth does not seem to matter much for advancing one’s interest within a party.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Unequal Representation in Switzerland

Nächstes Kapitel The Structure of Party Competition and Electoral Choice: Explanations Based on the Electoral Behaviour of Citizens

55 % of respondents to the Selects 2007 candidate survey say they would follow their party stand while 45 % say they would follow their constituency opinion (n = 1707).

The other important factor for the specificity of politicians’ attitudes is their socialization in party structures.

For instance, Pilotti et al. (2010) document that in 2000 28 % of Swiss parliamentarians sit on the administrative board of one of the country’s 110 largest companies. This number certainly grows if one also considers relatively smaller enterprises.

The exact wording of the question in French was the following: “De manière générale, vous sentez-vous proche d’un parti politique?”.

The exact categories in the case of citizens are the following: l = “Less than 2000”; 2 = “ 2001–3000”; 3 = “ 3001–4000”; 4 = “ 4001–5000”; 5 = “ 5001–6000”; 6 = “ 6001–7000”; 7 = “ 7001–8000”; 8 = “ 8001–9000”; 9 = “ 9001–10,000”; 10 = “ 10,001–12,000”; 11 = “ more than 12,000”. For candidates, the seven categories correspond to the intervals: l = “Less than 2000”; 2 = “ 2001–4000”; 3 = “ 4001–6000”; 4 = “ 6001–8000”; 5 = “ 8001–10,000”; 6 = “ 10,001–12,000”; 11 = “ more than 12,000”.

I am grateful to Georg Lutz for having shared his data on party lists which includes information on whether they are organized in an alphabetical order (see Lutz 2010).

These variables have been computed based on the declared total campaign budget and on the share of this budget coming from each of these three sources. Candidates were first asked about their total campaign budget for the 2007 election and then about the proportions of this budget coming from the party, from private donations and from their own private funds. These three sources of funding seem to summarize reasonably well the different types of funding used for the campaign, as only in the case of less than 1 % of respondents did the sum of these various sources amount to less than 99 % of their campaign budget.

These numbers are based on the whole Selects sample which also includes smaller cantons and all party lists. These averages are very similar when only the subsample analysed is taken into consideration.

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Titel: Unequal Representation by Parties: Explanations Based on the Elites’ Side of the Representation Process
verfasst von: Jan Rosset
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Economic Inequality and Political Representation in Switzerland
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-27115-6

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-27117-0

Copyright-Jahr: 2016
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27117-0_6