Verifiable Privacy Protection for Vehicular Communication Systems

verfasst von: David Förster

Enthalten in: Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" , Springer Professional "Technik" , Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

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Über dieses Buch

David Förster examines privacy protection for vehicular communication under the assumption of an attacker that is able to compromise back-end systems – motivated by the large number of recent security incidents and revelations about mass surveillance. The author aims for verifiable privacy protection enforced through cryptographic and technical means, which safeguards user data even if back-end systems are not fully trusted. Förster applies advanced cryptographic concepts, such as anonymous credentials, and introduces a novel decentralized secret sharing algorithm to fulfill complex and seemingly contradicting requirements in several vehicle-to-x application scenarios. Many of the concepts and results can also be applied to other flavors of internet of things systems.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter

Chapter 1. Introduction

Abstract

Advances in information technologies have brought dramatic changes in the last few decades. Some years ago the Internet has changed the way we communicate, consume and publish information, and do business. Now, the emergence of “Smart Devices” and their increasing connectivity, often called the Internet of Things (IoT), is bringing more changes to many aspects of our lives.

David Förster

Chapter 2. Background

Abstract

In this chapter, we give an introduction to vehicular communication and provide background information on privacy. We introduce the notion of verifiable privacy protection, before we describe the specific privacy threats that arise in vehicular communication systems.

David Förster

Chapter 3. Evaluation of Pseudonym Strategies

Abstract

Changing pseudonym certificates are the standard approach for privacy-friendly authentication in vehicular networks [71, 108]. The recent SAE J2945/1 standard defines a maximum pseudonym change interval of 5 minutes [163]. But it is unclear how this value was determined, whether it provides adequate privacy protection in practice, and which pseudonym change strategy should be used.

David Förster

Chapter 4. A Pseudonym System with Strong Privacy Guarantees

Abstract

In Chapter 3, we examined the effectiveness of pseudonym changes for protecting driver’s privacy against tracking attacks by other participants of the V2X system or outsiders. In this chapter, we go one step further and examine privacy protection against back-end systems such as the certificate authorities (CAs). In the basic pseudonym scheme, the CAs record the assignment of pseudonyms to be able to resolve the holder of a given pseudonym in case of misbehavior.

David Förster

Chapter 5. Decentralized Enforcement of k-Anonymity for Location Privacy Using Secret Sharing

Abstract

In Chapter 3, we evaluated privacy protection in the context of V2X-based safety applications, and in Chapter 4, we proposed a pseudonym system with strong privacy guarantees. These protection mechanisms on the lower layers are the precondition for privacy-friendly applications on higher layers. In this chapter, we examine a scenario where privacy protection must be balanced with application requirements.

David Förster

Chapter 6. Conclusion and Outlook

Abstract

In this dissertation, we examined privacy protection for vehicular networks with an emphasis on inter-vehicular communication. There is a significant body of previous research on the topic and privacy protection is considered in upcoming standards, but several points remain unaddressed. Motivated by the large number of high profile security breaches in the recent past and revelations about massive governmental surveillance, we assumed a powerful attacker that is able to compromise or control back-end systems.

David Förster

Backmatter

Titel: Verifiable Privacy Protection for Vehicular Communication Systems
verfasst von: David Förster
Verlag: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden
Electronic ISBN: 978-3-658-18550-3
Print ISBN: 978-3-658-18549-7
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-18550-3