Women’s Work in the World Economy

Several studies on the promotion of ‘non-traditional’ exports in LDCs have examined the deleterious consequences on the predominantly female workers in export-processing zones.² There has been less systematic research, however, on the effects of agricultural-export expansion on women.³ This is despite the fact that the majority of women in developing countries live in rural areas where the push for export-oriented growth is taking place as well (Quisumbing, 1988; Heyzer, 1986). This paper attempts to fill this gap in the literature by examining how agricultural commercialisation, as a result of export cropping, has affected rural women — both as workers and as family members.

During the past decade, the literature on women and development as well as the literature on the new international division of labour have frequently emphasised the growing share of female employment in manufacturing under export-led industrialisation. Many authors have documented the often repressive conditions of women’s employment (Elson and Pearson, 1981; Nash and Fernandez-Kelly, 1983), some characterising this industrialisation strategy as ‘female-led industrialisation’ (Joekes, 1982), others as a process of ‘bloody taylorization’ (Lipietz, 1987, pp. 75-6). Beyond an appreciation of the repressive working conditions, these conceptualisations include widely accepted characterisations of women’s location in manufacturing employment. It is held as a near-axiomatic truth that in the current phase of the international division of labour, Third World countries specialise in labour intensive production of commodities with low skill content, and women constitute a high proportion of the labour force in these sectors. Such characterisations of women’s employment raise the question of whether these characteristics are peculiar to export-led industrialisation or are more general features of women’s employ-ment in the industrialisation process.

There is growing evidence not only of a substantial increase in woman-headed households all over the world but also of the severely disadvantaged economic condition of these households. These women are amongst the poorest of the poor — belonging to what may be termed a ‘Fifth World’. In the urban areas, they are concentrated in the informal sector which serves as a catchment area and source of identification of such household heads as well as other poor women desperate for some income to eke out a living in urban areas. The main characteristics of woman-headed households are reported to be extreme poverty, large-sized families, the need for all family mem-bers to work, and low levels of education and skills.

As fundamental problems in Africa’s food sector intensify under the strains of structural adjustment policies, African governments and international donors have become increasingly concerned about the political and economic implications of declining household food security and rising malnutrition (UNICEF, 1985; World Bank, 1988). As a result, we have witnessed a shift in the analysis of food problems from a focus on aggregate production and macroeconomic price policy (analyses which tend to advocate policies of primary benefit to large farmers and capitalist agro-enterprises) to a focus on the pro-duction and marketing problems of resource-poor smallholders, the overwhelming majority of Africa’s rural population. Pinstrup-Andersen, for example, argues that policies which improve the access of small farmers to land, modern technology, fertilisers, credit and markets can both raise aggregate food supplies and minimise scarcity pressure on food prices (Pinstrup-Andersen, 1989).

Feminisation of poverty has become a catch phrase of political discussion in many countries. That is to say, there is a gender bias in poverty and a tendency towards the impoverishment of women. The term itself — feminisation of poverty — was first coined by sociologist Diane Pearce (1978), since when many studies have described the factors which make women particularly prone to economic victimisation.

Women’s participation in the labour market in the Netherlands has always been low. But in the 1970s and 1980s the percentage of women, especially married women, performing work in the labour market rose. In 1960 25.6 per cent of the relevant female population of 15–65 years of age participated in the labour market, in 1971 the participation rate was 30 per cent, in 1981 38.6 per cent and in 1987 it reached 50 per cent, at least if a person working for pay for at least one hour a week is counted as economically active (van der Wal, 1985, p. 41; Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 1989, p. 11). At first sight one might suppose the economic independence of Dutch women is growing. This supposition leads many policy makers to assume that no further steps are necessary to advance women’s economic emancipation. But is women’s participation in the labour market a good criterion for measuring their economic inde-pendence? What is the difference between labour market participa-tion and economic independence? Why is economic independence important and what criteria can we use to measure it? First and foremost, how do we define economic independence?

Arguably the most important impact on the UK labour market over the next decade will be the so-called demographic time-bomb — the most salient feature of which is the sharp fall in the number of young people in the population.² Allowing for this cohort’s increased participation in voluntary education, the labour force aged under 25 is projected to fall by 1.2 million, or approximately 20 per cent, between 1987 and 1995.³ Not surprisingly, increased labour force participation by women is perceived to be the most likely way to maintain the overall size of the labour force at some sort of steady state.

The drive to improve wages and working conditions which ac-companied the industrial revolutions in democratic countries has primarily been a men’s movement. In virtually all countries, the vast majority of strikes have been in industries in which men predominate and union leadership has tended to be a male prerogative. In part this is explicable in terms of the greater importance of wage work to men than to women since the early stages of the industrial revolution. In a number of countries women’s employment was crucial in the early stages of industrialisation, yet many women tended to see wage work as occupying brief periods in their lives rather than as a lifetime commitment.

At a session of the Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance in Istanbul in the summer of 1988, a gentleman from a small oil-producing country in the Middle East asked me: ‘Was there any effective governmental means of keeping wives at home?’ I was taken by surprise and didn’t know how to respond. However, I later realised that Japanese tax laws implicitly do just that. Designed to give a tax break to married taxpayers, they discourage housewives from taking jobs. Further, many private companies have adopted wage structures that also discourage housewives from working out-side their homes.

A brief comparison of the female labour force participation rates in France and Great Britain shows that their level and evolution are very similar. Nevertheless, this similarity conceals substantial differences between the two countries in the structure of female employment and its distribution between full-time and part-time work. Almost one half of working women in Great Britain work part-time compared with one fifth of French working women. This widespread part-time work in Great Britain is primarily attributable to young married people, especially those who have dependent children (Leicester, 1982). Two surveys initiated at about the same time (1980–81) in Great Britain and in France, and covering similar samples (women with dependent children), made it possible to compare the employment situations of mothers of families in the two countries, specifically the socio-demographic characteristics of their family and their economic situation. The results of these two surveys lead us to conclude that the considerable differences in the labour force participation patterns of women in the two countries are due mainly to differences in social and economic policies.

In Britain, part-time employment is very important among women, but in such employment they tend to receive lower hourly pay. For example, according to the 1980 Women and Employment Survey (WES) reported on by Martin and Roberts (1984), 44 per cent of employed women worked part-time (their own assessment), and the mean hourly wage for part-time women workers was £1.60 compared wtih £1.90 for women in full-time jobs. In the late 1980s, a similar percentage of women were in part-time employment, and it continues to attract lower average pay than full-time employment. One purpose of the analysis in this paper is to estimate whether the lower average pay in part-time employment arises primarily because women who take part-time jobs have less human capital, or because wage offers are lower for part-time jobs, thereby giving women a lower return on their human capital in these jobs. A second purpose is to measure the contribution of differential returns in part-time employment to the average pay gap between men and women.

Following the steep rise in female labour force participation over the last 20 years, part-time employment has increased in most Western countries.¹ This paper compares Sweden and the EC countries with respect to the trends in female part-time work and the extent of job security and social benefits for part-time workers. For Sweden I report my findings and explanations for the trends and discuss the effects on women’s economic position. This comparison is of interest since Sweden has had, for a long time, a high proportion of part-time workers who work rather long hours and enjoy full social benefits, and because Sweden aspires to a closer association to the EC.

After carrying out research for a number of years and writing technical papers on various issues related to the position of women in the labour market in Greece, I decided to do some more practical work about some of the problems that I had encountered.² In my research I found that among the most serious problems for women in Greece were those faced by non-working educated women who wanted to re-enter the labour market after some years of absence from it because of family obligations. Under present circumstances this is extremely difficult because of extensive unemployment among university graduates, the drastic changes during recent years in the types of knowledge and skills required by the business world, and the prejudices that exist in the labour market against women and particularly against those who have not worked for some time.

During the last 15 years significant, and in some cases dramatic, changes have taken place in the status of women in higher education in the United States. Under the pressure of the women’s movement the issue of equal opportunity was brought under growing scrutiny by academic women and civil rights groups during the 1970s. Widespread practices of sex discrimination, both overt and subtle, moved on to the research agenda of scholars and became subjects for legal redress.

Most of the literature on family policy in Eastern Europe has focused on the impact of population policies on birth rates and fertility rates.² However important this question may be, it narrows unnecessarily the analysis of the impact of family policy. Feminist theory suggests that this restrictive approach reflects a patriarchal bias which sees women only as instruments in achieving optimal growth rates. In this paper I develop a broader economic approach which includes the impact of family policy on women’s economic position in society, and, in addition, considers the impact of factors not usually considered part of family policy, including housing policy and male/female wage differentials. This analysis is within the context of Eastern European family policies in general but focuses chiefly on the German Democratic Republic.