Skip to main content
Fachgebiete
Automobil + Motoren Bauwesen + Immobilien Business IT + Informatik Elektrotechnik + Elektronik Energie + Nachhaltigkeit Finance + Banking Management + Führung Marketing + Vertrieb Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe Versicherung + Risiko
DE
EN
Themenseiten
Organisationspsychologie Projektmanagement Marketing Smart Manufacturing
Bücher
Zeitschriften
Weitere Formate
Podcasts Webinare Technik Webinare Wirtschaft Kongresse Veranstaltungskalender Awards
Jetzt Einzelzugang starten
Zugang für Unternehmen
Referenzkunden
ATZ-Fachkongress

Chassis.tech plus 2024


4 Kongresse in einer Veranstaltung

Treffen Sie in München die Fachleute von Chassis, Lenkung, Bremsen sowie Reifen/Räder.
Erweiterte Suche
Anmelden
nach oben
Erschienen in:
Introduction: The Evolution of Economic and Innovation Systems Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

2015 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

A History-Friendly Model of the Internet Access Market: The Case of Brazil

verfasst von : Marcelo de Carvalho Pereira, David Dequech

Erschienen in: The Evolution of Economic and Innovation Systems

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

This paper presents a simulation model of the internet access services market. The model is based on neo-Schumpeterian evolutionary theory, as well as on the contemporary institutional theory. One key driver of the internet sector has been the significant technological opportunities. However, competition in the internet access services market has proved less intense than in other technology-driven industries in most countries, including other segments of the internet sector itself. Usual theoretical approaches do not adequately explain this empirical observation. Our hypothesis is that institutional mechanisms were determinant for the dynamics of competition. Institutions are broadly understood as socially shared, formal or informal, recurring rules of behaviour or thought. To test this hypothesis, a sectoral agent-based simulation model is proposed, modelling with some detail both demand and supply agents’ behaviours. Model parameters and initial conditions were calibrated using empirical data from the Brazilian market. The competitive mechanisms unveiled by simulation were clearly dependent on institutional processes, particularly at user preferences setting and informal business rules adoption. Institutional phenomena were strong enough to produce results that are significantly different from other technologically dynamic industries.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren
Vorheriges Kapitel A Dynamical Model of Technology Diffusion and Business Services for the Study of the European Countries Growth and Stability
Nächstes Kapitel Micro, Macro, and Meso Determinants of Productivity Growth in Argentinian Firms
Anhänge
Nur mit Berechtigung zugänglich
Fußnoten
1
Segments of the internet sector include: access services, equipment manufacturing, systems development, and content provision.
 
2
Internet access services provide bi-directional transport of information (data, sound and images) between the end-user location and the final destination service or person, within the worldwide internet.
 
3
Internet access technology usually presents low cumulativeness and tacitness at the IASP level, given that network equipment suppliers lead most of the innovation. This is reinforced by the extensive technical support available from those suppliers to all IASPs.
 
4
Following Dequech (2013), “institutions are broadly understood here as socially shared rules of behaviour or of thought. They include legal norms, which have a formal character, together with conventions and informal social norms, which do not”.
 
5
As defined by the relevant technological features, like the available opportunities, the appropriability conditions, the knowledge cumulativeness profile and the nature of the knowledge base (Dosi 1982).
 
6
Uncertainty in services hiring is aggravated, among other issues, by the high human-asset specificity, considering the start-up costs usually associated with replacing service providers (DiMaggio and Louch 1998).
 
7
For details on empirical data presented in this section, as well as the respective sources, see Pereira (2012).
 
8
Brazil is subdivided into 26 states plus the federal capital district. The original telecom monopoly was split in 4 regional operators.
 
9
GVT, an aggressive challenger firm, succeeded in entering the Brazilian IASM, acquiring more than 6 % national market share in less than 5 years. It was a unique case, as all other entrants remain with national market shares well below 1 %.
 
10
Research pointed to other interesting stylized facts (see Pereira 2012) but we have chosen to focus on the three most relevant here.
 
11
The suspicion that multiple causal mechanisms may be in place comes from the analysis of data from different national IASMs. There seems to be no support to the case that a unique form of correlation between the three stylized facts exists among countries.
 
12
ANATEL has a good record of transparency and adequate governance. In more than 15 years of existence, no legal case of bribery/corruption was open against any ANATEL officer/manager. Cases of “denunciation” in the press have been very rare and never proved. In this sense, ANATEL’s track record is well above the average federal government administration in Brazil.
 
13
At least among same tier IASPs (Faratin et~al. 2009), but anecdotal evidence at the national level is that interconnection (“peering”) costs may not be significant barriers for domestic competition in most countries, even for smaller players (Besen and Israel 2012). However, this may not be the case for international interconnection (“transit”) in smaller countries, despite the steadily dropping costs (Internet Society 2010). For a discussion on internet interconnection models, see Dodd et~al. (2009)
 
14
Once all networks are directly or indirectly interconnected, it is irrelevant to the majority of users whether they access the internet from a large or small IASP, provided that both adopt the prescribed technical and quality standards for the access networks.
 
15
Model was coded in C++ using the Laboratory for Simulation Development (LSD) version 6.1, created by Marco Valente (2002).
 
16
Indicators used: concentration indexes (HHI, CR4), number of operating IASPs, market size, profitability, average age of competitors, and weighted averages and variances of market price and quality.
 
17
Further details about parameter and initial conditions selection and sensibility analysis are available in Pereira (2012).
 
18
Only some key equations are presented next. The full set of equations is reviewed in Pereira (2012). In what follows, the subscript t represents the t-th time step, the superscript i represents the i-th IASP, j, the j-th technology generation, and k, the k-th user.
 
19
Considering the full interconnection of the competing access networks, as it is generally the case as discussed before.
 
20
Our argument here involves two of the several explanations for conformity with a shared rule of behavior or thought discussed in Dequech (2013): uncertainty; and the possibility that others have better information.
 
Literatur
Akerlof GA (1970) The market for “lemons”: quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Q J Econ 84:488–500CrossRef
Arthur WB (1989) Competing technologies, increasing returns, and lock-in by historical events. Econ J 99:116–131CrossRef
Arthur WB (2000) Cognition: the black box of economics. In: Colander D (ed) The complexity vision and the teaching of economics. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham
Battilana J, Leca B, Boxenbaum E (2009) How actors change institutions: towards a theory of institutional entrepreneurship. Acad Manag Ann 3:65–107CrossRef
Baumol WJ, Panzar JC, Willig RD (1982) Contestable markets and the theory of industry structure. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, San Diego
Beckert J (1999) Agency, entrepreneurs, and institutional change: the role of strategic choice and institutionalized practices in organizations. Organ Stud 20:777–799CrossRef
Besen SM, Israel MA (2012) The evolution of internet interconnection from hierarchy to “Mesh”: implications for government regulation. SSRN 30
Birke D, Swann P (2006) Network effects and the choice of mobile phone operator. J Evol Econ 16:65–84CrossRef
Bowles S (2004) Microeconomics: behavior, institutions, and evolution. Princeton University Press, New York, p 584
Breschi S, Malerba F, Orsenigo L (2000) Technological regimes and Schumpeterian patterns of innovation. Econ J 110:388–410CrossRef
Colander D (2005) The future of economics: the appropriately educated in pursuit of the knowable. Camb J Econ 29:927–941CrossRef
Davies A (1996) Innovation in large technical systems: the case of telecommunications. Ind Corp Chang 5:1143–1180CrossRef
Denzau A, North DC (1994) Shared mental models: ideologies and institutions. Kyklos 47:3–31CrossRef
DiMaggio PJ (1988) Interest and agency in institutional theory. In: Zucker LG (ed) Institutional patterns organization: culture and environment. Ballinger, Cambridge, MA, pp 3–21
DiMaggio PJ, Louch H (1998) Socially embedded consumer transactions: for what kinds of purchases do people most often use networks? Am Sociol Rev 63:619–637CrossRef
DiMaggio PJ, Powell WW (1983) The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. Am Sociol Rev 48:147–160CrossRef
DiMaggio PJ, Powell WW (1991) Introduction. The New institutionalism in organizational analysis. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Dodd M, Jung A, Mitchell B et al (2009) Bill-and-keep and the economics of interconnection in next-generation networks. Telecommun Policy 33:324–337CrossRef
Dosi G (1988) Sources, procedures, and microeconomic effects of innovation. J Econ Lit 26:1120–1171
Dosi G (1982) Technological paradigms and technological trajectories: a suggested interpretation of the determinants and directions of technical change. Res Policy 11:147–162CrossRef
Dosi G, Malerba F, Marsili O, Orsenigo L (1997) Industrial structures and dynamics: evidence, interpretations and puzzles. Ind Corp Chang 6:3–24CrossRef
Dosi G, Nelson RR (2010) Technical change and industrial dynamics as evolutionary processes. In Hall BH, Rosenberg N (eds), Handbook of the economics of innovation, vol 1. North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp 51–128
Edquist C (2004) The fixed internet and mobile telecommunications sectoral system of innovation: equipment production, access provision and content provision. In: Malerba F (ed) Sectoral system of innovation: concepts, issues and analyses of six major sectors in Europe Cambridge Press, Cambridge, pp 155–192
Faratin P, Clark DD, Bauer S et al (2009) The growing complexity of internet interconnection. Commun Strateg 72:51–71
Fligstein N (2001) The architecture of markets. An economic sociology of twenty-first-century capitalist societies. Princeton University Press, p 274.
Fligstein N, Dauter L (2007) The sociology of markets. Annu Rev Sociol 33:105–128CrossRef
Granovetter M (2005) The impact of social structure on economic outcomes. J Econ Lit 19:33–50
Hodgson GM (1988) Economics and institutions. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia
Internet Society (2010) An introduction to internet interconnection concepts and actors. Internet Society Brief Paper 8.
Jonard N, Yildizoğlu M (1998) Technological diversity in an evolutionary industry model with localized learning and network externalities. Struct Chang Econ Dyn 9:35–53CrossRef
Kavassalis P, Solomon RJ, Benghozi P-J (1996) The internet: a paradigmatic rupture in cumulative telecom evolution. Ind Corp Chang 5:1097–1126CrossRef
Klepper S (1996) Entry, exit, growth, and innovation over the product life cycle. Am Econ Rev 86:562–583
Laffont J, Rey P, Tirole J (1998) Network competition: II. Price discrimination. RAND J Econ 29:38–56CrossRef
Laffont J-J, Marcus S, Rey P, Tirole J (2003) Internet interconnection and the off-net-cost pricing principle. RAND J Econ 34:370–390CrossRef
Laffont J-J, Tirole J (2000) Competition in telecommunications. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, p 331
Malerba F, Nelson RR, Orsenigo L, Winter SG (1999) “History-friendly” models of industry evolution: the computer industry. Ind Corp Chang 8:3–40CrossRef
Malerba F, Orsenigo L (2000) Knowledge, innovative activities and industrial evolution. Ind Corp Chang 9:289–314CrossRef
McAfee RP, Mialon HM, Williams MA (2004) What is a barrier to entry? Am Econ Rev 94:461–465CrossRef
Metcalfe JS (1998) Evolutionary economics and creative destruction. Routledge, New YorkCrossRef
Nelson RR (1995) Recent evolutionary theorizing about economic change. J Econ Lit 33:48–90
Nelson RR (2005) Physical and social technologies, and their evolution. In: Nelson RR (ed) Technology, institutions and economic growth. Harvard Press, Cambridge, MA, pp 195–209
Nelson RR, Sampat B (2001) Making sense of institutions as a factor shaping economic performance. J Econ Behav Organ 44:31–54CrossRef
Noam EM (1994) Beyond liberalisation: from the network of networks to the system of systems. Telecommun Policy 18:286–294CrossRef
North DC (1990) Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge Press, CambridgeCrossRef
Orléan A (2003) Réflexion sur les fondements institutionnels de l’objectivité marchande. Cah d’ Économie Polit 44:181–196CrossRef
Pavitt K (1984) Sectoral patterns of technological change: towards a taxonomy and a theory. Res Policy 13:343–374CrossRef
Pereira MC (2012) O setor de internet no Brasil: Uma análise da competição no mercado de acesso. Universidade Estadual de Campinas
Pereira P, Ribeiro T (2011) The impact on broadband access to the internet of the dual ownership of telephone and cable networks. Int J Ind Organ 29:283–293CrossRef
Pyka A, Fagiolo G (2005) Agent-based modelling: a methodology for neo-Schumpeterian economics. Working Paper 27.
Schmalensee R (2004) Sunk costs and antitrust barriers to entry. Am Behav Sci 94:471–475
Schmidt S, Missler-Behr M (2010) Importance of consumer preferences on the diffusion of complex products and systems. In: Locarek-Junge H, Weihs C (eds) Classification as a tool for research studies in classification, data analysis, and knowledge organization. Springer, Berlin, pp 725–733
Scott WR (2008) Institutions and organizations: ideas and interests, 3rd edn. Sage, Los Angeles, p 280
Shy O (2001) The economics of network industries. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p 331CrossRef
Stigler GJ, Becker GS (1977) De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum. Am Econ Rev 67:76–90
Teece DJ, Pisano G, Shuen A (1997) Dynamic capabilities and strategic management. Strateg Manag J 18:509–533CrossRef
Tesfatsion L (2006) Agent-based computational economics: a constructive approach to economic theory. In Tesfatsion L, Judd KL (eds) Handbook of computational economics, volume 2: agent-based computational economics, handbooks in economics series. North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp 831–880
Tolbert PS, Zucker LG (1996) The institutionalization of institutional theory. In: Clegg SR, Hardy C, Nord WR (eds) Handbook of organization studies. Sage, Thousand Oaks, pp 175–190
Tordjman H (2004) How to study markets? An institutionalist point of view. Rev d’Économie Ind 107:19–36CrossRef
Tscherning H, Damsgaard J (2008) Understanding the diffusion and adoption of telecommunication innovations: what we know and what we don’t know. In: León G, Bernardos A, Casar J et al (eds) Open IT-based innovation: moving towards cooperative it transfer and knowledge diffusion. Springer, Boston, pp 39–60CrossRef
Valente M (2002) Simulation methodology: an example in modeling demand. Mimeo, p 35.
Varian HR (2002) Market structure in the network age. In: Brynjolfsson E, Kahin B (eds) Understanding the digital economy: data, tools and research. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp 137–150
Varian HR (2001) High-technology industries and market structure. University of California, Berkeley, p 33
Viscusi WK, Vernon JM, Harrington JE Jr (2005) Economics of regulation and antitrust, 4th edn. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, p 928
Williamson OE (2000) The new institutional economics: taking stock, looking ahead. J Econ Lit 38:595–613CrossRef
Windrum P, Fagiolo G, Moneta A (2007) Empirical validation of agent-based models: alternatives and prospects. J Artif Soc Soc Simul 10:8–37
Metadaten
Titel
A History-Friendly Model of the Internet Access Market: The Case of Brazil
verfasst von
Marcelo de Carvalho Pereira
David Dequech
Copyright-Jahr
2015
Buch
The Evolution of Economic and Innovation Systems

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-13298-3

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-13299-0

Copyright-Jahr: 2015

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13299-0_22

Premium Partner

    Bildnachweise