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Journal of Logic, Language and Information

Erschienen in:

21.09.2023

A Logical Theory for Conditional Weak Ontic Necessity Based on Context Update

verfasst von: Fengkui Ju

Erschienen in: Journal of Logic, Language and Information | Ausgabe 5/2023

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Abstract

Weak ontic necessity is the ontic necessity expressed by “should/ought to” in English. An example of it is “I should be dead by now”. A feature of this necessity is that whether it holds at the present world is irrelevant to whether its prejacent holds at the present world. In this paper, by combining premise semantics and update semantics for conditionals, we present a logical theory for conditional weak ontic necessity based on context update. A context is a set of ordered defaults, determining expected possible states of the present world. Sentences are evaluated with respect to contexts. When evaluating the conditional weak ontic necessity with respect to a context, we first update the context with the antecedent, then check whether the consequent holds with respect to the updated context. We compare this theory to some related works. The logic’s expressivity is studied.

Vorheriger Artikel A Computational Algebraic Analysis of Hindi Syntax

Nächster Artikel Graph Grammar Formalism with Multigranularity for Spatial Graphs

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In this case, the sentence seems odd. We do not have clear ideas about the reason. It is possible that “should” can be both an ontic modal and an epistemic modal, and the oddness is related to the ambiguity. It is actually a controversial issue in the literature whether “should” can be an epistemic modal. We refer to Copley (2006) and Yalcin (2016) for some discussions.

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Titel: A Logical Theory for Conditional Weak Ontic Necessity Based on Context Update
verfasst von: Fengkui Ju
Publikationsdatum: 21.09.2023
Verlag: Springer Netherlands
Erschienen in: Journal of Logic, Language and Information / Ausgabe 5/2023
Print ISSN: 0925-8531
Elektronische ISSN: 1572-9583
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10849-023-09403-3

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