Accountants in family firms—a systematic literature review

The articles in the final sample are published in 23 journals, except for one article that is a working paper. The quality of the journals based on the rankings provided by the Chartered Association of Business Schools (ABS) range from 3 to unranked (see Table 1). The journal with the most interest in the topic is the 3-star journal Family Business Review, with five publications, followed by the 2-star Journal of Family Business Strategy and the 2-star Qualitative Research in Accounting and Management, with four published articles each. The impact, measured through Google Scholar citations, ranged from 2 to 591 citations. Gallo, Tápies and Cappuyns’s (2004) investigation of family businesses’ peculiar financial logic using a Spanish sample of 315 firms was the most cited paper, with 591 citations (see Table 1).

The earliest publication in the sample was Gallo and Vilaseca’s (1998) examination of differences between family businesses with family or nonfamily CFOs. From 1998 to 2004, a mere three articles were published, and from 2005 to 2010, only four articles were published. However, the field experienced an increase in output after the publication of Salvato and Moores’ (2010) review dealing with the accounting function in family firms, and 32 articles were published between 2011 and 2021 (see Table 2).

An overwhelming percentage of the analyzed articles are empirical (n = 32; 82%), of which 17 are quantitative and 15 are qualitative. The remaining articles are reviews (n = 4; 10.3%) or conceptual articles (n = 3; 7.7%). Notably, 14 out of the 15 qualitative articles were published after 2010, possibly as a consequence of Salvato and Moores’ (2010) call for papers that would provide a more in-depth understanding of the role of accounting in family firms (see Table 3).

The articles included in the sample adopt different definitions of family businesses, but the most common approach, used by a total of 19 articles (n = 48.7%), is to offer no clear definition. Moreover, closely related definitions are one family member by blood or marriage owns equity, and the family is involved in the governance and/or management of the firm in addition to the intent of succession within the family. The levels of equity holding considered are 5%, 20%, or a majority. The remaining studies are scattered in their definition of family business, and the multitude of definitions offered could arguably be connected to the heterogeneity of family firms covered in detail by previous reviews (see Songini et al., 2013; Prencipe et al., 2014), leaving the issue outside the scope of this review.

The most common theory used is agency theory (n = 13), followed by the socioemotional wealth (SEW) theory (n = 9). The use of the resource-based view of the firm (n = 8) and stewardship theory (n = 7) is also prevalent. Institutional theory (n = 5), upper echelons theory (n = 3), and organizational life cycle theory (n = 3) are used less frequently. Eight papers do not explicitly mention a specific theory. Notably, theories are combined in articles published in later years. Between 2000 and 2004, both published articles used a single-theory approach. From 2005 to 2010, four articles were published, and a total of three theories were used. For the following two time periods, 2011–2015 and 2016–2020, 16 published articles used 34 theories and 12 published articles used 17 theories, respectively (see Table 3). The trend is clear as more theories, in combination, are used to provide a more nuanced explanations on how ownership dimensions are related to accounting (see Table 3).

The trend toward a more diverse approach to understanding the intricacies of accounting in family firms expanded from Spain (accounting for both published articles with specified countries of origin from 1995 to 2004) to Italy, Germany, Finland, Latvia, and Lithuania in the 2005–2010 period. In the following periods, the research interest spread across the world to Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Sweden, and the USA. The most dominant is research with samples from Italy (n = 7), Germany (n = 5), and Austria (n = 4) (see Table 4). The sample sizes range from single-case studies (n = 6) (e.g., Stergiou et al., 2013) to multiple-case studies (six firms in Huerta et al., 2017) to 2004 firms in Barbera and Hasso (2013) (see Table 5).

To map the field, we analyzed the final sample to find commonalities and differences in influencing factors and outcomes (see Table 5) leading to Fig. 2 (see below). Family firm characteristics, accounting change, management control/accounting systems, the recruitment of professional managers, professionalization, accounting choices, and performance are key concepts and areas on which the articles base their research. Value and knowledge transfer and their effects on succession are also considered. The arrows in Fig. 2 are not intended to represent causal effects but rather correlation, as the sample articles suggest that these relationships are qualitative, suffer from small n-numbers, or are simply not suited or claim to be suited for generalization in the statistical sense.

The review of the literature revealed that an accountant in family-owned firms is involved in the introduction of management control systems (MCSs) and management accounting systems (MASs), which are key to the formalization of accounting and the professionalization process in a family-owned firm (Giovannoni et al., 2011; Hiebl, 2013d; Songini et al., 2015; Dello Sbarba & Marelli, 2018; Hiebl & Mayrleitner, 2019). Accounting change (i.e., the development and introduction of MCSs and MASs) in a family-owned firm is used to radically break and revitalize understandings of control and performance (Dello Sbarba & Marelli, 2018; Gottlieb et al., 2021). In addition, the literature suggests that accounting change signifies a shift towards economic rationality (El Masri et al., 2017) and is crucial for family-owned firms’ survival, growth, and successful succession (Dello Sbarba & Marelli, 2018). However, the level of sophistication of the products and techniques used in family-owned firms differs based on firms’ age, external board members, CFOs (i.e., accountants), or shareholders and whether actors external to the family are present in the firm, i.e., nonfamily managers/accountants or board members (Di Giuli et al., 2011; Filbeck & Lee, 2000). The literature suggests that older firms with external influence (e.g., an external accountant) are more financially sophisticated (Di Giuli et al., 2011; Filbeck & Lee, 2000).

The family owners and the accountant are presented with a set of important tools for transferring values and knowledge between generations and within the family-owned firm once the accounting change is initiated (i.e., the development and introduction of MCSs and MASs) and accounting practices are formalized (Giovannoni et al., 2011). The literature revealed that the codification involved and the stability of accounting formalization introduced by the owner and accountant can be used to launch the succession process of a family-owned firm (Giovannoni et al., 2011), as this allows for clearly defined priorities, values, and knowledge in times of uncertainty (Brück et al., 2018; Giovannoni et al., 2011). Furthermore, a proactive use of management accounting practices is suggested to better prepare the family firm for succession, external capital, and a fact-based decision-making culture (Hiebl, 2013c). In addition, family-owned firm’s professionalization and adoption of nonbasic financial products result in better connections to banks, subsequently offering more advanced products and techniques and thus providing the firm with more options and opportunities (Caselli & Di Giuli, 2010), as financial institutions can provide a “higher level of care and attention, less credit constraints and, consequently, to higher growth opportunities” (Di Giuli et al., 2011 p. 2931).

The literature shows that a family-owned firm’s ability and willingness to professionalize its accounting practices are important for their decision on whether an externally recruited nonfamily accountant should lead accounting change (i.e., the development and introduction of MCSs and MASs) (Hiebl & Mayrleitner, 2019). Whether the family-owned firm initiates the accounting change independently of a professional external actor such as a nonfamily accountant present in the firm is discussed in terms of the problems associated with loss of control and potential misbehavior of the external nonfamily accountant responsible for the accounting change (e.g., Stergiou et al., 2013). However, family accountants are shown in the literature to also be “professional,” as there is no barrier to a well-educated (in relevant fields) family member shouldering the change agent position and no barrier to the family’s aptitude for accounting information (Gurd & Thomas, 2012; Hiebl & Mayrleitner, 2019).¹ Nuancing the discussion on the importance of whether professional managers (e.g., accountants) are family members or external nonfamily members, the literature suggests that it is contingent on firm size, as smaller family firms do not care as much for formal accounting information in decision-making because managers “tend to make ad hoc decisions ‘in the back of their minds’ or even ‘on the back of an envelope’” (Huerta et al., 2017, p. 115). In addition, the decision-making processes of small family-owned firms run by the first generation tend to incorporate a management style characterized by gut decisions (Filbeck & Lee, 2000). Family-owned firms simply prioritize differently than nonfamily firms, and their business logic is often discussed in terms of SEW theory (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011; Lohe et al., 2021). However, the literature reports that formalized accounting practices (e.g., MCSs) can counterbalance the affective logic induced by SEW and the family ownership dimension by embodying economic rationality in decision-making (El Masri et al., 2017). The codification process offered by formalized accounting systems and the recruitment of a professional accountant are suggested to be the reasons for the particular family firm business logic; SEW can be preserved and transferred from generation to generation (cf. Giovannoni et al., 2011; Hiebl, 2013c). Moreover, the literature indicates that external/nonfamily influence (e.g., by an accountant) results in the use of more sophisticated financial products and techniques in family-owned firms (Di Giuli et al., 2011; Filbeck & Lee, 2000). Furthermore, a professional manager (e.g., an accountant) is shown to affect the development, introduction and use of MCSs and MASs (i.e., accounting change), value and knowledge transfer, succession, accounting choices and performance in a family-owned firm (Gallo & Vilaseca, 1998; Filbeck & Lee, 2000; Klein & Bell, 2007; Caselli & Di Giuli, 2010; Di Giuli et al., 2011; Giovannoni et al., 2011; Hiebl, 2012; Lutz & Schraml, 2011; Hiebl, 2013d; Stergiou et al., 2013; Senftlechner & Hiebl, 2015; Gordini, 2016; Dello Sbarba & Marelli, 2018; Hiebl et al., 2019; Bauweraerts et al., 2020; Glaum, 2020; Pagliarussi & Leme, 2020; Gottlieb et al., 2021).

A family-owned firm’s recruitment of a professional manager (i.e., an external nonfamily accountant) and the subsequent effects are contingent on the family’s goals (Lutz et al., 2010; Lutz & Schraml, 2011; Hiebl, 2013a; Hiebl, 2013d). The goals discussed in the literature are related to independence, control, financial risk, succession, enterprise value growth, and financial flexibility (Lutz & Schraml, 2011; Lutz et al., 2010). In addition to goals, the compatibility of a recruited manager’s mindset, personality, values, and culture with the owning family (or owner) is suggested to be important when choosing a manager (Hiebl, 2013a, 2013d). An accountant can be a part of the TMT (e.g., Chadwick & Dawson, 2018) and be a family or nonfamily member (e.g., Moilanen, 2008; Songini et al., 2015).

An accountant is suggested by the literature to often be the first professional manager (i.e., an external nonfamily accountant) recruited in family-owned firms (Klein & Bell, 2007; Hiebl, 2013a, 2013b, 2013d). An accountant is referred to as second-in-command (Gao et al., 2019; Hiebl, 2013a) and the second most powerful actor within a family firm (Stergiou et al., 2013) or as the coleader with the CEO, as accountants are “the internal strategic leaders [that are] most directly responsible for a firm’s financial health” and “as important as the CEO for major decisions” (Chadwick & Dawson, 2018, p. 243). Furthermore, accountants are characterized as “[…] the key persons in their company’s financial reporting process, holding significant influence on the firm’s financial performance and accounting choices” (Gao et al., 2019 p. 2). In addition, the literature indicates that accountants in family-owned firms face a different environment with special demands from those of nonfamily firms (Gurd & Thomas, 2012; Hiebl, 2012, 2013a; Lutz & Schraml, 2011; Lutz et al., 2010; Pagliarussi & Leme, 2020; Salvato & Moores, 2010), where some of the tasks at hand are to “bring the family ‘back down to earth’” while acting as the “economic or financial conscience of the family” (Hiebl, 2013d, p. 47).

An accountant’s successful integration into a family-owned firm is argued in the literature to be contingent on personal characteristics, thus indicating that the family ownership dimension restricts the potential candidates eligible for the position (Hiebl, 2013a, 2013b, 2013d). The level of ambition is emphasized in the literature, as an accountant cannot be overly ambitious (Gurd & Thomas, 2012) or a “job-hopper” (Hiebl, 2013d p. 48), should have a long-term orientation, and harbour values similar to those of the controlling family (Hiebl, 2013a, 2013b, 2013d). Moreover, an accountant should be willing to accept the firm’s culture represented by the centralization of power and knowledge (Hiebl, 2013a, 2013b). In addition to personal characteristics, knowledge and technical skills are argued to be specific to family-owned firms, where an accountant should be well versed in tax, law, and wealth management in addition to traditional accounting skills because the potential overlap between family and business requires these specialized skills (Hiebl, 2013b, 2013d). Interestingly, education is not described as an important selection or success factor for accountants in family-owned firms as is customary in nonfamily firms (Hiebl, 2013a, 2013b). The mastery and understanding of a family-owned firm operation can be acquired by working in the same family firm for multiple years (Klein & Bell, 2007; Hiebl, 2013a). In addition to experience in the specific family-owned firm, experience in the business of family-owned firms is deemed important by the literature discussing social fit (Klein & Bell, 2007; Hiebl, 2013a, 2013b) and embeddedness (Klein & Bell, 2007; Hiebl, 2013a). Social fit, a certain degree of embeddedness within the family ownership dimension, and an understanding of family ownership’s effect on accounting are stressed as important resources in an individual accountant’s arsenal (Klein & Bell, 2007; Hiebl, 2013a, 2013b).

An accountant’s influence on accounting change (i.e., the development and introduction of MCSs and MASs), accounting choices, and performance are argued in the literature to be contingent on an accountant’s embeddedness within the firm, the trust and control given and exercised by the owners, whether the CEO is a family member, whether the TMT is led by a female, and the level of influence in decision-making granted to an accountant (see Fig. 2). The component of trust in relation to an accountant’s influence on both accounting change and accounting choices is stressed as a key component in the literature (Hiebl, 2013d, 2015; Senftlechner & Hiebl, 2015). For example, Stergiou et al. (2013) showed that as trust grows between the accountant and owners, the discretion given to the accountant becomes larger. Stergiou et al. (2013) nuanced this view by showing that too much trust and admiration for an accountant can result in a rogue agent within the firm and that this agent is granted power in tasks such as performance assessments of other employees, thus enlarging their discretion and influence in the organization, resulting in agency conflicts. The literature consequently suggests that control mechanisms, such as incentive payments and/or management control mechanisms designed to restrict discretion, family involvement in TMTs (mutual monitoring by several individuals), and CEO monitoring efforts, restrain the accountant and align principal and agent (Ferramosca & Allegrini, 2018; Gao et al., 2019; Hiebl, 2013d).

An accountant’s influence on accounting choices is broadly defined in the literature as choices related to policies and practices. More specifically, financial reporting, tax aggressiveness, strategic planning, and the use of sophisticated (and unsophisticated) products and techniques are examples of choices allotted to an accountant (see Fig. 2). The accounting choices in family-owned firms are asserted to affect performance, and the effect is revealed to be contingent on the combination of the individual characteristics of actors in prominent executive suite positions (Caselli & Di Giuli, 2010; Gordini, 2016). The highest performance is shown to occur with the combination of a nonfamily accountant and a family CEO (Caselli & Di Giuli, 2010; Gordini, 2016). The results are stable across generations. However, contradictory findings exist in the literature, as performance is also shown to be contingent not on the family or nonfamily status of an accountant but rather on the ability to influence decision-making and the hierarchical level of the accountant (Gallo & Vilaseca, 1998). It is further argued that if an accountant has the ability to influence decision-making and resides in the upper echelons of a family-owned firm, a nonfamily accountant will achieve the highest performance (Gallo & Vilaseca, 1998). Furthermore, it is revealed that family-owned firms with a family accountant are smaller, younger, and less industry-dominant than family-owned firms with a nonfamily accountant (Gallo & Vilaseca, 1998). In addition to nonfamily accountants utilizing more sophisticated financial products and techniques (Di Giuli et al., 2011; Filbeck & Lee, 2000), an accountant is argued to drive family-owned firms’ performance (Gordini, 2016; Hiebl, 2017).

An accountant’s influence on family-owned firms’ performance is measured through return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA), return on investment (ROI), nonfinancial performance, sales growth, survival, internationalization, and bank rating in the literature. Counterintuitively, it is suggested that firms with an external accountant (i.e., nonfamily) have a lower bank rating (Lutz et al., 2010). However, the reason is problematized, as a family-owned firm recruits a nonfamily accountant to improve its bank rating (Lutz et al., 2010). The literature further argues that the relation between the accountant and banks is important because accountants initiate more bank connections and thus aid family-owned firms in developing relationships with banks (Di Giuli et al., 2011; Lutz et al., 2010). Survival rate and sales growth are also argued to be higher when a highly embedded external accountant is present in a family-owned firm (Barbera & Hasso, 2013). Embeddedness is further stressed in relation to accountants’ influence on family-owned firms’ performance (cf. Gallo & Vilaseca, 1998) in terms of ROI, ROA (Caselli & Di Giuli, 2010; Gordini, 2016), and ROE (Gallo & Vilaseca, 1998). The literature asserts the importance of embeddedness because family owners might not even consider the proposed accounting change if the change agent (i.e., the accountant) is not deemed a sufficiently competent and an influential actor (e.g., Huerta et al., 2017). However, despite the key roles suggested for accountants and the influence of these roles indicated in the literature, accountants are seldom the sole focus of research (Songini et al., 2013).

An accountant’s role can be aggregated into four separate roles based on the reviewed literature.² First, an accountant is presented as a traditional metaphorical bean counter, responsible only for accounting tasks and overseeing the production of accounting information; they do not exercise executive power. Second, an accountant occupies the role of a decision-maker, ruling on policies and developing systems designed to enable and constrain behavior. An accountant is also depicted as a coleader (with the CEO) and an internal strategic leader in this role. Third, an accountant serves an advisory role. An accountant is portrayed as an independent informant and knowledge bank advising the family, providing useful decision-making information, and influencing and proposing, but not deciding on, policies and practices. Acting as an economic and financial conscience, a sounding board and an institutional carrier is also a part of the role. Fourth, an accountant is a protector, a mediator, a safe guardian, a key liaison, and a procurer of resources. The four roles are intertwined and are seldom present entirely in solitude (see Table 6).

Our review reveals that only 13 out of 39 articles reviewed particularly focused on accountants or their role in family firms (see Table 6). The remaining 26 studies in the sample focused on systems and aggregates such as managers or owners in relation to accountants. Even if the accountants were somewhat “hidden” in most of these studies, they argue for an individual accountant’s importance in accounting change, accounting choices and decision-making in the family ownership context. Thus, the reviewed literature recognizes the accountant’s importance in shaping and operating the systems (MCS/MAS) but nonetheless primarily emphasizes the systems (MCS/MAS) and their significance to the succession, value transfer, and professionalization of a family-owned firm (e.g., Giovannoni et al., 2011). By emphasizing the systems rather than the individual accountant, the research stream might be missing the opportunity to further explore how individuals (accountants) shape and engage with these systems. This might be of specific relevance in the family context where individual actors have been shown to be of importance for organizational outcomes (Hiebl, 2017; Hiebl & Li, 2018). Placing the accountant in the center of future studies could thus provide answers to questions such as how accountants shape MCS/MAS in family firms as well as how these systems shape the role of accountants in these firms?

Like suggestions voiced by Hiebl (2017) in the review on finance managers in family firms, our systematic review highlights the lack of a coherent picture of the accountant’s role in family firms. The studies relying on qualitative methodology tend to be clear about the family and nonfamily accountants’ roles (e.g., Hiebl, 2013a, 2013b), while studies relying on quantitative methodology tend to be less specific as to what positions, function and/or roles accountants play in the firm (with the exception of the studies specifying “family accountants” or “family CFOs,” e.g., Caselli & Di Giuli, 2010; Gordini, 2016; Hiebl & Mayrleitner, 2019; Songini et al., 2015). It appears that the primary interest of research lies in distinguishing between family and nonfamily accountants rather than being explicit about what roles accountants actually play in family firms. Here, the field might be missing the opportunity to move beyond the dichotomy adopted by family business research and instead rely on the research in the accounting domain acknowledging the different roles accountants might play in organizations vis-à-vis accounting and organizational outcomes (e.g., Ge et al., 2011; Ginesti et al., 2021). Nonetheless, implicitly, the reviewed literature alludes to a number of roles that the accountant plays in these family firms. The roles are the bean counter, the decision-maker, the advisor, and the protector and mediator. These roles tend to overlap, and an accountant can embody multiple roles. The reason could be that the accountant shifts between the roles depending on the context, and the roles might also change over time. This assumption is partly reflected in a discussion in the accounting literature (e.g., Wolf et al., 2020) that has yet to reach scholars studying accountants in family-owned firms. The unique features of family-owned firms’ accounting (Salvato & Moores, 2010) and the remaining gaps in research on the role accountants play in family-owned firms (cf. Gao et al., 2019; Hiebl, 2012, 2013a, 2013b; Songini et al., 2013) provide scholars with ample ground for exploring questions such as the following: How is an accountant’s role and identity shaped? Is this role and identity formation specific to the family ownership context? What are the consequences of an accountant’s role and identity for family-owned firm-specific outcomes?

In addition, future studies could explore the role of the owner in shaping the accountant’s role in the family firm (cf. Gurd & Thomas, 2012; Hiebl, 2015). By acknowledging the central role accountants might play in family firms, scholars interested in the relation between family firm characteristics and organizational outcomes could further their inquiry by seeking an answer to the question of how is the fit or misfit between family firm characteristics and the characteristics of the accountant reflected in organizational outcomes? To answer this question and to explore the fit/misfit aspects, a further focus might need to be directed toward the accountants’ individual characteristics, such as years of experience in family/nonfamily firms and in an industry, as well as their general career trajectory vis-à-vis the needs and characteristics of the family firm that employs them (cf. Gurd & Thomas, 2012).

The empirical articles utilizing qualitative methods show low levels of dispersion, as 14 out of 15 qualitative articles rely on semi structured interviews as the main data collection technique. However, as the field of accounting in the context of family ownership moves into a more mature stage of development (Prencipe et al., 2014), novel approaches might allow new insights and a possibility to tap into existing research gaps. Gao et al. (2019) lead by example with their use of vignette-based surveys to examine differences in individual accountants’ reactions to a specific case scenario with the goal of estimating the contextual factors affecting earnings management and unethical reporting in family-owned firms. Applying this type of methodology to explore the role of accountants in family-owned firms could bring insights into situational aspects of the role and help to answer questions such as how are accountants’ actions in different roles related to accounting/organizational outcomes and is, and if so how, this relationship contingent on the ownership structure of these firms?

The use of extended or in-depth case studies that include different sources of data, e.g., interviews, observations, and documents, combined with longitudinal designs could further advance the understanding of an individual accountant’s role in family-owned firms, thus providing access to the previously discussed research void related to the development of an accountant’s role over time (c.f. Chadwick & Dawson, 2018; Hiebl, 2013b, 2015). This research design would serve well to answer broader questions such as how, when, and why accountants’ roles change in family firms and what the consequences of such changes are for these firms?

Finally, storytelling and narrative approaches have gradually entered the family business literature (e.g., Arteaga & Uman, 2020; Fletcher et al., 2016) and have been well represented in the field of accounting (e.g., Beattie, 2014; Beattie & Davison, 2015). While our review suggests that the field has advanced an understanding of the role, few studies delve into the accountant’s subjective experiences of recruitment and subsequent employment, being employed, or ceding their employment in family firms. Storytelling and narrative approaches could allow accountants’ “life-world perspective” to be explored and answer questions such as how do accountants experience employment in family firms and how do these experiences shape their role in these organizations?

The empirical articles utilizing quantitative methods show low dispersion, as 16 of 17 articles rely on surveys as the main data collection technique and use regressions (ordinary least squares, generalized least squares, multivariate, univariate, or logistic) to perform analyses. Reliance on surveys as a primary method of data collection might have advantages, but this type of design usually suffers from respondent biases and endogeneity (cf. Maine et al., 2022). One way forward and a partial remedy to the aforementioned issues associated with surveys could be the use of a survey in combination with archival data (Grafton et al., 2011). Reliance on mixed methods of inquiry could thus provide an opportunity to explore more complex research questions such as how accountants and their role in family firms (self- or externally assessed) are reflected in (archival data sourced) accounting outcomes?

Further methodological advancements in the field could be achieved by introducing structural equation modelling (SEM) and qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). Used to explain the relationships between multiple different variables (constructs) and to examine structural interrelations (Hair, 2019), SEM has been successfully utilized in operations management and management accounting research (e.g., Peng & Lai, 2012 and Nitzl, 2016). SEM could be useful for examining the intervening processes taking place between individual accountants and other members of organizations, particularly owners. This type of inquiry could answer questions such as how an individual accountant’s characteristics impact his/her relations with the firm owner and how such a relationship in turn is reflected in the family firm’s accounting choices.

Finally, the application of QCA offers researchers the possibility to identify causal patterns (different combinations of sufficient and necessary conditions generating the same outcome) across cases using both crisp sets and fuzzy sets of small- to medium-sized samples (n = 5–50) (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Introducing this method to explore an accountant’s role in family-owned firms could answer questions such as how different ownership structures in family firms’ interplay with an individual accountant’s characteristics and how ownership structure impact role specifications and, ultimately, organizational outcomes.

The literature between 2011 and 2015 primarily relied on agency and stewardship theories. In later years, the resource-based view was used, followed by an increasingly dominant SEW theory in subsequent years. This indicates a change in theoretical paradigms, as the economic rationale partially subsided in favor of the family rationale. Furthermore, the emphasis on the individual level of analysis highlighting accountants’ agent and steward roles shifted toward the organizational level of analysis, where accountants are merely viewed as a part of the organizational function. This shift means that the possibility of understanding accounting in the family ownership context has been greatly reduced given that organizational systems and individual actors operate in a reciprocal manner, constantly adapting to one another rather than remaining in a steady state. Thus, we urge researchers to operate with different theories and consider the interaction between individual actors and the accounting function in order to understand decision-making processes in family-owned firms and their impact on accounting and organizational outcomes.

One way forward for the field would be to capitalize on the recent interest in upper echelons theory (e.g., D’Allura, 2019), which applies a team level of analysis and views an accountant as a member of an executive team; individual accountant characteristics are considered in relation to the executive group characteristics, which are consequently explored vis-à-vis organizational outcomes. Upper echelons theory has been gaining momentum in family firm research (e.g. Röd, 2019; Sciascia et al., 2013) and has been instrumental in gaining an understanding of processes and power structures in TMTs composed of family and nonfamily members. This stream of research has usually combined upper echelons theory with agency (e.g., Minichilli et al., 2010) and/or stewardship perspectives (e.g., Segaro, 2012). Relying on these streams of research, future studies on an accountant’s role might consider investigating this role in the TMT context and seeking to answer questions such as how an individual accountant’s differences or similarities with respect to other TMT members are reflected in the accounting choices of family-owned firms or questions related to the dyadic relations in the TMT context such as how the relation between an accountant and other TMT members, including the CEO, are related to accounting choices and other firm-specific outcomes.

The core assumption in the literature that a family firm is a unique business setting does not necessarily exclude the potential use of traditional accounting theories such as institutional theory, contingency theory, and positive accounting theory (PAT), which have been relatively salient in the field (as our review has shown). To develop an understanding of how transcendent the family firm business setting is, family business specific SEW theory could be combined with the core assumption of institutional theory (cf. Gottlieb et al., 2021). While institutional theory has become increasingly popular for understanding the institutional context in which family firms operate (see Soleimanof et al., 2018), its application in studies of accountants in family-owned firms remains scant, and there is limited insight on how formal and informal institutions impact the different roles individuals take or are assigned in family firms. Combining two theoretical approaches might aid researchers in finding the answers to questions such as how formal and informal institutions influence the role of accountants in family firms.

Moreover, the limited use of contingency theory in the literature indicates another opportunity for future research. Given an accountant’s important role in introducing and developing MCS and MAC in family-owned firms, as revealed in this review, studies can explore to what extent an accountant’s work and role represent a contingency in the relationship between family-owned firms’ strategy and performance. Given the heterogeneous nature of family-owned firms (Ponomareva et al., 2019), there might be not one but several optimal roles that accountants might embody in a firm, and these roles need to be considered in conjunction with both strategic and structural dimensions of firms if we are to gain a holistic picture of an accountant’s role in a family-owned firm (cf. Hiebl, 2017). Thus, future studies could seek answers to the question of the extent to which different roles of the accountant impact the relationship between strategy and structure in a family firm.

Furthermore, PAT, one of the most dominant accounting theories, is not utilized in the reviewed literature, which leaves the accounting related outcomes undertheorized. This represents yet another opportunity for furthering the field, especially given the theory’s explanatory and predictive focus on accounting practices (Deegan & Unerman, 2011). Relying on PAT can help to answer questions such as how an individual accountants’ abilities, understanding and knowledge of accounting contribute to the process of choosing and applying accounting policies in family firms or how an individual accountant’s discretion, influence and role emerge in family-owned firms and how these aspects are related to accounting choices in these firms. Moreover, relying on PAT could answer the calls for research (e.g., Senftlechner & Hiebl’s, 2015) to examine how particular positions of executive power or leadership influence accounting change/professionalization and accounting choices in family-owned firms, as well as help to explore the underlying reasons, drivers, and promotors of accounting change (cf. Hiebl et al., 2013) by answering the question of what role individual accountants might or might not play in these matters.

Finally, to better understand the role an individual (accountant) plays in family firms, it might be necessary to introduce theories that recognize and focus on bounded rational individual actors within family-owned firms (cf. Chrisman et al., 2014) rather than on individuals merely being part of a team or an organization or positioned within a context. The shift of focus toward the individual accountant has also been voiced in a number of reviewed studies that called for research on individual actors’ characteristics and features in relation to accounting change, accounting choices and performance (e.g., Gallo et al., 2004; Senftlechner & Hiebl, 2015, Hiebl, 2017, Dello Sbarba & Marelli, 2018; Chadwick & Dawson, 2018), and contextual factors (e.g., Hiebl, 2017). To achieve such a shift in focus, future studies could consider relying on cognitive theories, such as person-organization fit (P-O fit) theory or the theory of work adjustment (TWA), which could further the understanding of how the role of an individual accountant evolves vis-à-vis the family business context and provide an answer to questions such as whether an organization is a good fit for an individual accountant rather than the reverse, which is usually what the literature considers (e.g., Hiebl, 2013d). By utilizing these theories, future studies could explore recruitment, selection, and remuneration practices in family firms with a focus on the accountant, an area of research that remains to be underdeveloped (cf. Klein & Bell, 2007; Songini et al., 2013). By tapping into such practices, future research would be able to answer questions such as which criteria to use in the selection and recruitment of an accountant in family-owned firm, which characteristics of an accountant the owners find most important in the recruitment process, and what role family firm values play in the recruitment decision, thus responding to the calls for further inquiry into the black-box of recruitment practices for the accounting function in family firms (cf. Gurd & Thomas, 2012). Table 7 offers an overview of the suggestions for future research in the reviewed articles that contain such suggestions.