17. Africa and the International Criminal Court

As of April 2017, the ten are: Georgia, the Central African Republic (twice: first regarding the 2002–03 conflict, and second regarding the atrocities committed in the renewed violence starting in 2012), Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, Kenya, Darfur, Sudan, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo. See International Criminal Court, “Situations and Cases”, http://​www.​icc-cpi.​int/​en_​menus/​icc/​situations%20​and%20​cases/​Pages/​situations%20​and%20​cases.​aspx

Farouk Chothia, “Fatou Bensouda Is the New ICC Chief Prosecutor”, 12 December 2011, http://​www.​bbc.​co.​uk/​news/​world-africa-16029121

See for example Oraib Al Rantawi, “A Step Forward or Backward?”, Bitter Lemons, Issue number 32 (14 August 2008), http://​www.​bitterlemons-international.​org/​inside.​php?​id=​982

See also David Bosco, “Why Is the International Criminal Court Picking Only on Africa?”, Washington Post, 29 March 2013, http://​articles.​washingtonpost.​com/​2013-03-29/​opinions/​38117212_​1_​international-criminal-court-african-union-central-african-republic

William Schabas, quoted in “Ten Years In, ICC’s Acquittal Rate Is Extraordinarily High”, Global Insider, 19 March 2013, http://​www.​worldpoliticsrev​iew.​com/​trend-lines/​12798/​global-insider-ten-years-in-icc-s-acquittal-rate-is-extraordinarily-high

Statement made by the former chairperson of the African Union, Ethiopia’s prime minister Hailemariam Desalegn During the press conference at the conclusion of the African Union summit, the chairperson of the Assembly. See “African Leaders Slam ICC ‘Race-Hunt’ in Africa”, Xinhua, 27 May 2013, http://​news.​xinhuanet.​com/​english/​africa/​2013-05/​28/​c_​132412222.​htm

Mahmood Mamdani, “Darfur, ICC, and the New Humanitarian Order”, Pambazuka News, 17 September 2008, http://​www.​pambazuka.​org/​en/​category/​comment/​50568%20​

Solomon Dersso, “The International Criminal Court’s Africa Problem”, 11 June 2013 http://​www.​aljazeera.​com/​indepth/​opinion/​2013/​06/​201369851918549.​html

The decision to pursue DRC opposition leader Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo has provoked accusations that the ICC Prosecutor was swayed by political bias or, potentially, excessive pragmatism, since other Congolese and CAR politicians accused of similar abuses have not been pursued to date.

Phil Clark, quoted in Patrick Smith, “Slow Progress for African Cases”, African Report, no. 51 (June 2013), p. 27.

See also Alexis Arieff, Rhoda Margesson, Marjorie Browne, and Matthew Weed, “International Criminal Court Cases in Africa: Status and Policy Issues”, Congressional Research Service, p. 9, http://​www.​fas.​org/​sgp/​crs/​row/​RL34665.​pdf

“The ICC and Africa: Dim Prospects”, The Economist, 17 February 2011, http://​www.​economist.​com/​node/​18176088?​utm_​source=​Africa+Center+fo​r+Strategic+Stud​ies+-+Media+Review+fo​r+September+9%2C+2013&​utm_​campaign=​9%2F9%2F2013&​utm_​medium=​email

Max du Plessis, “Implications of the AU Decision to Give the African Court Jurisdiction over International Crimes”, Institute for Security Studies, Paper no. 235 (28 June 2012), http://​www.​iss.​co.​za/​pgcontent.​php?​UID=​31600. See also Centre for Conflict Resolution, “The African Union: Regional and Global Challenges”, seminar report (August 2016), p. 24, http://​www.​ccr.​org.​za

Kofi A. Annan, “Justice vs. Impunity”, New York Times, 30 May 2010, http://​www.​nytimes.​com/​2010/​05/​31/​opinion/​31iht-edannan.​html?​_​r=​0

Arieff, Margesson, Browne, and Weed, “International Criminal Court Cases in Africa: Status and Policy Issues”, p. 27.

See Solomon Dersso, “Africa’s Challenge to the ICC”, Opinion Africa, 12 November 2016, http://​www.​aljazeera.​com/​indepth/​opinion/​2016/​11/​africa-challenge-icc-161109120331097.​html

See for example Amnesty International, “Africa: Malabo Protocol: Legal and Institutional Implications of the Merged and Expanded African Court, https://​www.​amnesty.​org/​en/​documents/​afr01/​3063/​2016/​en/​

At its 23rd Ordinary Session, held on 26–27 June 2014, the AU Assembly adopted the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. The jurisdiction of the proposed court will be broader than that of its predecessor, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in that it will include atrocity crimes—genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

Article 46A bis of the Protocol on Amendments provides that “no charges shall be commenced or continued before the Court against any serving [AU] Head of State or Government, or anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity, or other senior state officials based on their functions, during their tenure of office”. See AU Summit, “Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights”, http://​summits.​au.​int/​en/​23rdsummit. See also Betty Waitherero, “Immunities Clause at the African Court of Justice and Human Rights Is Outrageous”, Daily Nation, 4 July 2014, http://​mobile.​nation.​co.​ke/​blogs/​-Heads-of-state-Immunities-clause/​-/​1949942/​2369696/​-/​format/​xhtml/​-/​7lahgiz/​-/​index.​html

Mireille Affa’a-Mindzie, “Leaders Agree on Immunity for Themselves During Expansion of African Court”, Global Observatory, http://​theglobalobserva​tory.​org/​analysis/​788-leaders-agree-immunity-expansion-african-court.​html

“Regina v. Bartle and Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others Ex Parte Pinochet and Regina v. Evans and Another” (on appeal from a divisional court of the Queen’s Bench Division), http://​www.​publications.​parliament.​uk/​pa/​ld199899/​ldjudgmt/​jd990324/​pino2.​htm

Waitherero, “Immunities Clause at the African Court of Justice”.

AU, Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, 20, http://​www.​african-court.​org/​en/​images/​documents/​Court/​Statute%20​ACJHR/​ACJHR_​Protocol.​pdf

Coalition for the International Criminal Court, “A Step Towards Impunity: AU Approves Immunity for Those in Power”, Coalition Bulletin, http://​ciccglobaljustic​e.​wordpress.​com/​2014/​07/​03/​a-step-towards-impunity-for-grave-crimes-au-approves-immunity-for-those-in-power/​?​utm_​source=​CICC+Newsletters​&​utm_​campaign=​062cc04932-Coalition_​Bulletin_​June_​2014_​ENGLISH&​utm_​medium=​email&​utm_​term=​0_​68df9c5182-062cc04932-356527553

Dan Kuwali, “Article 46 bis: A Step Backward in Ending Impunity in Africa”, Kujenga Amani, http://​forums.​ssrc.​org/​kujenga-amani/​2014/​09/​22/​article-46a-bis-a-step-backward-in-ending-impunity-in-africa

See also Coalition for the International Criminal Court, “Africa and the International Criminal Court”, http://​www.​iccnow.​org/​documents/​Africa_​and_​the_​ICC.​pdf

The pro-Hague group included the current deputy president, William Ruto, who indicated that the cases at the ICC would take as long as 40 years. The political calculation in 2009 was that a tribunal formed in Kenya would move faster than ICC. This is why the then ICC chief prosecutor, Louis Moreno Ocampo, became involved and exercised his proprio motu (right of initiative) to open an investigation. See Tom Maliti, “Acknowledgement for Those Killed, Displaced, and Maimed”, African Report no. 51 (July 2013), p. 24.

Catherine Wambua-Soi, “How the ICC Became Kenya’s State Enemy”, Al Jazeera, 5 September 2013, http://​blogs.​aljazeera.​com/​blog/​africa/​how-icc-became-kenyas-state-enemy?​utm_​source=​Africa+Center+fo​r+Strategic+Stud​ies+−+Media+Revi​ew+for+September​+9%2C+2013&​utm_​campaign=​9%2F9%2F2013&​utm_​medium=​email

ICC, “Situations and Cases”.

du Plessis, Maluwa, and O’Reilly, “Africa and the International Criminal Court”, p. 2.

Coalition for the International Criminal Court, “A Step Towards Impunity: AU Approves Immunity for Those in Power”, p. 1.

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted at a diplomatic conference in Rome on 17 July 1998 and came into force on 1 July 2002. For the statute, see http://​www.​icc-cpi.​int/​en_​menus/​icc/​legal%20​texts%20​and%20​tools/​official%20​journal/​Pages/​rome%20​statute.​aspx

ICC, “The States Parties to the Rome Statute”, https://​www.​icc-cpi.​int/​

On 14 January 1999, Senegal’s national assembly authorised its national government to ratify the Rome Statute. See International Commission of Jurists, “Senegal: Senegal Is the First State to Ratify the International Criminal Court’s Statute”, http://​www.​icj.​org/​default.​asp?​nodeID=​349&​sessID=​&​langage=​1&​myPage=​Legal_​Documentation&​id=​21822

ICC, “The States Parties to the Rome Statute”.

ICC, “Structure of the Court”, https://​www.​icc-cpi.​int/​

Chothia, “Fatou Bensouda Is the New ICC Chief Prosecutor”.

United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, fact sheet, http://​www.​un.​org/​en/​peacekeeping/​documents/​bnote0213.​pdf. See also Stale Ulriksen and Giovanna Bono, “Conclusion: Economic and Diplomatic Tools vs. Military Might”, International Peacekeeping 11, no. 3 (2004), p. 561.

CCR, “Towards a New Pax Africana: Making, Keeping, and Building Peace in Africa”, concept paper for research seminar, 28–30 August 2013, Stellenbosch, p. 6, http://​www.​ccr.​org.​za

As of April 2017, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and the Central African Republic. See United Nations Association in Canada, “UN Peacekeeping: From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding”, http://​www.​unac.​org/​peacekeeping/​en/​un-peacekeeping/​fact-sheets/​from-peacekeeping-to-peacebuilding

du Plessis, Maluwa, and O’Reilly, “Africa and the International Criminal Court”, p. 11.

African Union, 15th AU Summit, Press Release no. 104, Decisions of the 15th AU Summit, Addis Ababa (29 July 2010), p. 5, http://​www.​coalitionforthei​cc.​org/​documents/​pr_​eng_​decisions_​15th_​au_​summit_​29-07-10_​REV2.​pdf See AU, Decision on the Meeting of the African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XIII), 1–3 July 2009, para. 10, http://​www.​au.​int/​en/​sites/​default/​files/​assembly_​en_​1_​3_​july_​2009_​auc_​thirteenth_​ordinary_​session_​decisions_​declarations_​%20​message_​congratulations_​motion_​0.​pdf

15th AU Summit, Press Release no. 104, para. 10.

The AU justifies its decision not to cooperate with the ICC as “a logical consequence of the stated position of the AU on the manner in which the prosecution against President Bashir has been conducted, the publicity-seeking approach of the ICC Prosecutor, the refusal by the UN Security Council to address the request made by the [AU] and other important International groupings for deferment of the indictment against President Bashir”. See AU, Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of ICC, press release, 14 July 2009, http://​www.​africa-union.​org/​root/​.​.​.​/​Press%20​Release%20​-%20​ICC.​doc

See “Addis Ababa Office Opening Still on Hold”, 4 February 2011, http://​www.​rnw.​nl/​international-justice/​print/​292628

AU, Decision on International Jurisdiction, Justice, and the International Criminal Court, Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XXI), http://​iccnow.​org/​documents/​AU_​decisions_​21st_​summit_​May_​2013.​pdf

Mark Kersten, “Backing the ICC: Why Botswana Stands Alone Amongst AU States”, http://​justiceinconflic​t.​org/​2013/​06/​13/​backing-the-icc-why-botswana-stands-alone-amongst-au-states

AU, Decision on International Jurisdiction, Justice, and the International Criminal Court.

AU, Decision on International Jurisdiction, Justice, and the International Criminal Court, para. 5. See also Mark Kersten, “Impending Disaster? On the ICC in Kenya and Africa”, 29 July 2013, http://​www.​una.​org.​uk/​magazine/​summer-2013/​impending-disaster-mark-kersten-icc-kenya-and-africa?​utm_​source=​CICC+Newsletters​&​utm_​campaign=​5651732857-Kenya_​AUG13_​ENG&​utm_​medium=​email&​utm_​term=​0_​68df9c5182-5651732857-356527553#sthash.​8pMf0LyR.​dpuf

The parliamentary resolution will be followed by a bill seeking to repeal the International Crimes Act of 2008. If that bill is passed within 30 days of the original resolution, the president can then sign it into law. It is only once President Kenyatta has signed it that the process of withdrawal actually begins. The UN Security Council needs at least a year’s notice from a member country planning to withdraw. See Article 127 of the Rome Statute. See also International Crimes Act of 2008, http://​www.​issafrica.​org/​anicj/​uploads/​Kenya_​International_​Crimes_​Act_​2008.​pdf

du Plessis, Maluwa, and O’Reilly, “Africa and the International Criminal Court”, p. 6.

See generally Leila Nadya Sadat, The International Criminal Court and the Transformation of International Law: Justice for the New Millennium (Ardsley: Transnational, 2002), p. 250. See also Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2008), p. 116.

CCR, United Nations Mediation Experience in Africa (Cape Town, October 2006), p. 8, http://​www.​ccr.​org.​za

Okechukwu Oko, “The Limits of Prosecutions”, Oxford Transitional Justice Research: Debating International Justice in Africa—OTJR Collected Essays, 2008–2010, http://​www.​academia.​edu/​1328517/​Oxford_​Transitional_​Justice_​Research_​Debating_​International_​Justice_​in_​Africa, p. 21.

Oko, “The Limits of Prosecutions”, p. 22.

See also Dan Kuwali, “Clash of Law and Politics: Why Kenyatta Won’t Be Prosecuted”, The Star, 25 April 2013, p. 35.

du Plessis, Maluwa, and O’Reilly, “Africa and the International Criminal Court”, p. 6.

The irrelevance of official capacity before international criminal courts is also entrenched in international legal instruments, including the Convention Against Torture, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which recognise the imperative of accountability for individuals who have committed serious crimes, irrespective of their positions. See Article 27(1) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; Article 7(2) of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; and Article 6(2) of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. See generally Micaela Frulli, “Some Reflections on Immunity of State Officials”, offprint from Italian Yearbook of International Law 19 (2009), http://​www.​academia.​edu/​1996792/​Some_​Reflections_​on_​the_​Functional_​Immunity_​of_​State_​Officials (accessed July 30, 2014). See also Andrea Bianchi, “Immunity Versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case”, European Journal of International Law 10 (1999), pp. 237–77, http://​www.​ejil.​org/​pdfs/​10/​2/​581.​pdf

Heads of state and high officials do usually enjoy a degree of immunity by virtue of their positions, however. They have immunity from national courts when they are on the territory of a foreign state, and former heads of state and senior officials enjoy immunity for official duties carried out while they were in office.

William A. Schabas, “Genocide Convention at Fifty”, in United States Institute of Peace Special Report (1999), p. 4, http://​www.​usip.​org/​sites/​default/​files/​sr990107.​pdf

Furthermore, several domestic courts in Africa reject immunity for serious crimes in violation of international law. For example, Article 143(4) of the Kenyan constitution provides that immunity of the president shall not extend to a crime for which the president may be prosecuted under any treaty to which Kenya is party and that prohibits such immunity. Likewise, Section 4(2)(a) of South Africa’s International Criminal Court Act adopts the Rome Statute’s hard line on rejecting immunity for government officials, including heads of state or government, as defence for a crime or grounds for any possible reduction of a sentence for a crime under the jurisdiction of the ICC; see Republic of South Africa, Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act, Act 27 of 2002. See also International Justice Resource Centre, “African Union Approves Immunity for Government Officials in Amendment to the African Court of Justice and Human Rights Statute”, 2 July 2014, http://​www.​ijrcenter.​org/​2014/​07/​02/​african-union-approves-immunity-for-heads-of-state-in-amendment-to-african-court-of-justice-and-human-rights-statute

Phil Clark, “Do War Crimes Trials Really Help Victims?”, CNN News, 30 May 2012, http://​www.​cnn.​com/​2012/​04/​26/​opinion/​charles-taylor-victims/​index.​html

du Plessis, Maluwa, and O’Reilly, “Africa and the International Criminal Court”, p. 8. See also Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Not the Court of First Resort”, Washington Post, 21 December 2003, http://​www.​princeton.​edu/​~slaughtr/​Commentary/​WPCourtResortdoc​.​pdf

Africa Legal Aid, “Cairo-Arusha Principles on Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross Human Rights Offences: An African Perspective”, 20 October 2002, principle 6, www.​africalegalaid.​com/​.​.​.​/​4321_​366498_​OvQ1_​Policy_​Document.​pdf. See also Princeton Project on Universal Jurisdiction, “Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction”, Programme in Law and Public Affairs (2001), principle 11, http://​lapa.​princeton.​edu/​hosteddocs/​unive_​ jur.​pdf

Dersso, “The International Criminal Court’s Africa Problem”.

Clark, “Do War Crimes Trials Really Help Victims?”

See also UN Security Council Resolution 1593, adopted 31 March 2005, UN Doc. S/RES/1593(2005), para. 2. See generally ICC, Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case no. ICC-02/05-01/09, 12 December 2011, http://​www.​icc-cpi.​int/​iccdocs/​doc/​doc1287184.​pdf

See International Law, “The African Union’s Response to the ICC’s Decisions on Bashir’s Immunity: Will the ICJ Get Another Immunity Case?”, http://​www.​dipublico.​com.​ar/​english/​the-african-unions-response-to-the-iccs-decisions-on-bashirs-immunity-will-the-icj-get-another-immunity-case. See also du Plessis, Maluwa, and O’Reilly, “Africa and the International Criminal Court”, p. 5, in the Arrest Warrant case, the ICJ held that ministers of foreign affairs enjoy full immunity from criminal prosecution and inviolability while in office because this immunity is important for the exercise of their duties; see Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000: DRC v. Belgium, 2002 I.C.J. 3; Tachiona v. United States, 386 F.3d 205, 2d Cir. 2004.

For example Article IX of the 1948 Genocide Convention provides for a general right of all parties to institute ICJ proceedings in response to breaches of the convention. Likewise, the virtual universal ratification of the 1949 Geneva Conventions ensures that the conduct of hostilities renders the rules there under as norms of customary law opposable against all states (erga omnes), and that the prohibition of grave breaches probably forms part of jus cogens (peremptory norms). Serious war crimes and crimes against humanity might be covered as erga omnes obligations following the advisory opinion of the ICJ in the Israeli Wall case of 1994 that international humanitarian law obligations apply against all states. Evidence abounds that the relevant rules prohibiting torture, genocide, serious war crimes, and crimes against humanity are peremptory in nature.

See for example “Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia) [Genocide case], ICJ Reports 1996, 625 and 631 26 February 2007; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory [Israeli Wall case], Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, General List no. 131, paras. 155–7, http://​www.​icj-cij.​org. See also “Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, ICJ Judgment, General List no. 9, 26 February 2007; Lyal S. Sunga, International Responsibility in International Law for Serious Human Rights Violations (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992), p. 131; Jennifer M. Welsh, “The Responsibility to Protect: Securing the Individual in International Society”, in Oliver Jütersonke and Keith Krause (eds.), From Rights to Responsibilities: Rethinking Interventions for Humanitarian Purposes (Geneva: Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies, 2006), pp. 23–44, and p. 67; Christian J. Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law, 2005), pp. 74–5, and p. 145.

See Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, “International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes”, Law and Contemporary Problems 59, no. 9 (1996), pp. 63–74. See also Andrew Clapham, “Rights and Responsibilities: A Legal Perspective”, in Oliver Jütersonke and Keith Krause (eds.), From Rights to Responsibilities: Rethinking Interventions for Humanitarian Purposes, pp. 78 and 82. Commission of such international crimes can be more offensive to the international community when committed under the colour of office. R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrates Court and Others, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte, no. 3, 2 ALL ER 97, 1999, p. 289.

Attorney General of Israel v Adolf Eichmann [Eichmann case], 36 I.L.R. 277 (S.Ct), p. 294, 11 December 1961. See also Jonathan H. Marks, “Mending the Web: Universal Jurisdiction, Humanitarian Intervention, and the Abrogation of Immunity by the Security Council”, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper no. 03-7, 2004, p. 28.

Bamu, “Head of State Immunity and the ICC”, pp. 85–6.

Mamdani, “Darfur, ICC, and the New Humanitarian Order”.

Dersso, “The International Criminal Court’s Africa Problem”.

See also Comfort Ero, “Understanding Africa’s Position on the International Criminal Court”, Oxford Transitional Justice Research, 2008–2010, p. 13.

Ero, “Understanding Africa’s Position on the International Criminal Court”.

Annan, “Justice vs. Impunity”.

See Union of South American Nations, “Special Declaration of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Union of South American Nations”, tenth anniversary of the entry into force of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Bogota D.C., 11 June 2012, http://​www.​iccnow.​org/​documents/​Unasur_​ICC_​2012.​pdf. See also UN General Assembly Resolution 2840 (XXVI), 26 UN GAOR Supp. (no. 29), UN Doc. A/8429 (1971), para. 88. See also UN General Assembly Resolution 3074 on “Principles of International Co-operation in the Detention, Arrest, Extradition, and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity”, G.A. Res. 3074 (XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (no. 30), UN Doc. A/9030 (1973), p. 78.

Avocats Sans Frontières, “Africa and the International Criminal Court: Mending Fences” (July 2012), pp. 15–16, http://​issuu.​com/​avocatssansfront​ieres/​docs/​asf_​ug_​africa_​and_​the_​icc_​new

An essential element of providing justice to the victims of atrocities is the provision of reparations. The right to reparation covers all injuries suffered by victims, including measures of restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, and satisfaction as provided by international law. Velasquez-Rodriguez v Honduras. (Merits; 29 July 1988; Series C No 4) IACtHR, judgement of 29 July 1999, para. 134; Amnesty International, “Sierra Leone: Ending Impunity and Achieving Justice”, AI Index: AFR 51/004/2005.

Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case no. ICC-01/04-01/06, 1 December 2014. See also ICC, “Lubanga Case: Trial Chamber I Issues First ICC Decision on Reparations for Victims”, press releases, 7 August 2012, http://​www.​icc-cpi.​int/​en_​menus/​icc/​situations%20​and%20​cases/​situations/​situation%20​icc%20​0104/​related% 20cases/​icc%20​0104%20​0106/​press%20​releases/​Pages/​pr831.​aspx

Clark, “Do War Crimes Trials Really Help Victims?”.

Principle 18 of the Updated Principles on Impunity. See also Peter Malcontent, “Human Rights and Peace: Two Sides of the Same Coin”, in Ramesh Thakur and Peter Malcontent (eds.), From Sovereign Impunity to International Accountability: The Search for Justice in a World of States (Paris: United Nations University Press, 2004), pp. 1–12.

Full and effective exercise of the right to the truth also provides a vital safeguard against the recurrence of violations. Apart from criminal prosecutions, states should establish parallel mechanisms for victims to act as a civil party (partie civile) to ensure reparations for victims where criminal prosecutions prove problematic. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “Combating Impunity: Some Thoughts on the Way Forward”, Law and Contemporary Problems 59, no. 4 (1996), p. 100.

UN, “Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict”, UN Doc. S/1999/957 (8 September 1999), para. 38. According to Michael Scharf, not only do these mechanisms constitute a “second best approach” when prosecution is impracticable, but also in many situations they may be better suited to achieving justice; Michael P. Scharf, “Trading Justice for Peace: The Contemporary Law and Policy Debate”, in Edel Hughes, William Schabas and Ramesh Chandra Thakur (eds.), Atrocities and International Accountability: Beyond Transitional Justice (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2007), p. 250. See also ASF, “Africa and the International Criminal Court”, p. 16.

Annan, “Justice vs. Impunity”.

Oko, “The Limits of Prosecutions”, p. 22.

Mamdani, “You Cannot Solve Political Problems Through the Courts”, p. 25.

Oko, “The Limits of Prosecutions”, p. 22.

See Obasi Okafor-Obasi, International Law Students Association Journal of International and Comparative Law 12, no. 1 (2005), pp. 87–97.