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2021 | Buch

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American Democracy in Crisis

The Case for Rethinking Madisonian Government

verfasst von: Jeanne Sheehan

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

Enthalten in: Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" , Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

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Über dieses Buch

Public disenchantment with and distrust of American government is at an all-time high and who can blame them? In the face of widespread challenges—everything from record levels of personal and national debt and the sky high cost of education, to gun violence, racial discrimination, an immigration crisis, overpriced pharmaceuticals, and much more—the government seems paralyzed and unable to act, the most recent example being Covid-19. It’s the deadliest pandemic in over a century. In addition to an unimaginable sick and death toll, it has left more than thirty million Americans unemployed. Despite this, Washington let the first round of supplemental unemployment benefits run out and for more than a month were unable to agree on a bill to help those suffering. This book explains why we are in this situation, why the government is unable to respond to key challenges, and what we can do to right the ship. It requires that readers “upstream,” stop blaming the individuals in office and instead look at the root cause of the problem. The real culprit is the system; it was designed to protect liberty and structured accordingly. As a result, however, it has left us with a government that is not responsive, largely unaccountable, and often ineffective. This is not an accident; it is by design. Changing the way our government operates requires rethinking its primary goal(s) and then restructuring to meet them. To this end, this book offers specific reform proposals to restructure the government and in the process make it more accountable, effective, and responsive.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter

Choices

Frontmatter

Chapter 1. The Dispersion of Power: Choice I

Abstract

Part I of the text includes four chapters, each of which focus on a critical choice the Framers of the United States made as it pertains to the dispersion of power in our governmental system. To this end, Chapter 1, entitled “The Dispersion of Power: Choice I” analyzes their thinking as it pertains to the allocation of power at the federal level. On the heels of the Revolutionary War, the Framers were reluctant to empower the federal government too much for fear they would once again find themselves subject to a tyrant like King George. By the same token, they were equally reluctant to recreate their experience under the first Constitution, the Articles of Confederation, in which a weak federal government left them vulnerable to insurrection within, attack from abroad, and increasingly tyrannical state legislatures. With these lessons fresh in their minds, the Framers went to Philadelphia determined to construct a new government with enough power to protect their liberties and guard against tyranny from the “top,” as well as “bottom.” In order to make this case, the chapter includes two continua on which all governments can be placed. In addition, it uses examples of current issues (i.e., immigration reform, health care, and gun control) to illustrate the impact of these choices—both positive and negative—on our political lives today.

Jeanne Sheehan

Chapter 2. A Republic—If You Can Keep It: Choice II

Abstract

This chapter “A Republic —If you Can Keep It: Choice II” considers the second most critical choice the Framers made, what type of democracy they would adopt. The Framers were committed to creating a democratic state in which the people were sovereign. At the time, the type of democracy familiar to most people was the pure/direct variety that had been used in and by the Greek city-states. Fewer people were familiar with the alternative, a republic or representative democracy. This chapter delves into the Framers decision to adopt the latter and focuses particular attention on James Madison’s defense of and argument for Republican democracy in Federalist #10. In addition, it addresses the positive and negative aspects of this choice, including the critical issues of scale, exclusivity, and ignorance; focusing not just on their historical but current implications. The chapter ends by focusing on the so-called bouillabaisse of ignorance problem that is frequently leveled against Americans and asks whether the problem is that Americans are ignorant or that we are working with an unrealistic concept of democracy which does not meet or match the times in which we are living? It is an issue which we circle back to again in Part III.

Jeanne Sheehan

Chapter 3. “Trias Politica”: Choice III

Abstract

This chapter (Chapter 3) entitled “‘Trias Politica’: Choice III” focuses on the third choice the Framers, how power should be dispersed at the federal level. The Father of the US Constitution, James Madison, was heavily influenced in this regard by Montesquieu’s greatest and final work, The Spirit of the Laws, in which he coined the phrase “Trias Politica [tp]” or, separation of powers and argued that political authority should be divided into three part (legislative, the executive, and the judicial) each of which must possess different powers and responsibilities. Montesquieu’s work had a profound impact on Madison who, adopted this structure and brought it with him to the constitutional convention. Like Madison, most Framers agreed with Montesquieu that the goal of government should be first and foremost to protect liberty. Moreover, they agreed that this type of structure, coupled with Madison’s additional safeguard of checks and balances, was the best way to do that. The chapter also considers the implications of this structure in the modern era, including the fact that not everyone today agrees that the goal of government should be solely to protect liberty. In addition, the chapter makes the case that as a result of this decision, the Framers helped ensure that the US government is not as responsive, accountable, or efficient as it should be, something that has had profound implications on the governments’ ability to address key challenges in the twenty-first century.

Jeanne Sheehan

Chapter 4. A Most Unsure Grip: Choice IV

Abstract

This chapter “A Most Unsure Grip: Choice IV” focuses on the Framers final critical decision regarding the allocation of power—the design and structure of the executive branch. For all our focus on James Madison’s brilliance as a strategist and political thinker, as well as the careful design and arrangement of the system, the executive branch is one area in which his otherwise keen abilities seemed to have faltered and ultimately failed him. Like many of his fellow delegates, he was torn between the need to empower the federal government under the executive branch and the need to protect liberty by ensuring against tyranny. Madison’s uncertainty regarding the construction of Article II played out at the Convention as the delegates struggled to come to an agreement on everything from the number of executives the state should have to issues regarding the presidents’ tenure, term, selection, and powers. As James MacGregor Burns writes, what is astounding is that the US Constitution is often used as an “example of audacious and effective political planning”—yet when it comes to “its most creative element, the Presidency” that was the one area “on which the Framers’ grip was most unsure.” We are still living with the results of the Framers discomfort regarding how to construct and empower an executive in a democratic republic today.

Jeanne Sheehan

Paradoxes & Semi-Solutions

Frontmatter

Chapter 5. The Object of the Government or Systems Failure: Paradox I

Abstract

This chapter entitled “The Object of the Government or Systems Failure: Paradox I” is the first chapter in Part II of the text. Whereas Part I focused on four key choices the Framers made as it pertained to the dispersion of power, this section is devoted to diagnosing the problems that have resulted, as well as examining some early attempts to mitigate and guard against their impact. To this end, this chapter looks at the object or goal of the Framers in designing the system—the preservation of liberty and by extension property. Moreover, the chapter asks whether this goal one that Americans today continue to value and share? Building on the work of business guru Peter Drucker, the chapter argues that one of the reasons Americans are so frustrated with their government today is that the theory, or object, of the government, whatever its merits in 1787, must be re-examined in light of the world in which we now live. In making this case, this chapter highlights the first of four paradoxes of our system, the fact that by design the Constitution, which has long stood as a bastion of freedom and democracy, undermines the ability of people to get control of their government. This is not an accident; it is a result of a system which was constructed with one goal in mind, to protect liberty. If Americans have a different goal today (i.e., responsiveness, accountability, effectiveness, etc.), then we need to consider restructuring the system to meet a new or changed objective.

Jeanne Sheehan

Chapter 6. A Necessary Evil: Paradox II and Semi-Solution I

Abstract

This chapter, entitled “A Necessary Evil: Paradox II and Semi-Solution I,” focuses on the difficulties the Framers faced when they turned from establishing to running the government. Very early in American history public officials recognized how difficult it would be to govern in the Madisonian system. As a result, they looked to parties for assistance, an institution largely ignored in the Constitution and much-maligned throughout early American history. This chapter explores the duality of the Framers views regarding political parties, beginning with the second great paradox of our Constitution: While those who framed the government were openly critical of parties, very shortly after the birth of the republic these same individuals realized the institution was essential to its existence. In addition, the chapter addresses the fact that as critical as they were (and are), parties are not a panacea. This is why they are labeled a semi- or partial solution to the challenge of Madisonian government.

Jeanne Sheehan

Chapter 7. The Strategy of Majority Rule: Paradox III and Semi-Solution II

Abstract

This chapter (“The Strategy of Majority Rule: Paradox III & Semi-Solution II”) focuses on the third great paradox of our system—the fact that Thomas Jefferson, a man who we think of as a small “d” democrat and a revolutionary, a man who favored limited government and states’ rights, turned out to be the one most capable of turning Madisonian government on its head and making it work. Jefferson understood what his predecessors did not, and what too few of his successors have—that in order to govern in a system so divided the president’s best option was (and is) to use extra-constitutional means (i.e., a party leadership strategy) to form a moderate, majority coalition. While Jefferson did this to an admirable degree in the end, as talented as he was, even he was unable to make the government work or fully resolve the tension between democracy and leadership that is embedded in our system and continues to inhibit governmental responsiveness, accountability, and effectiveness today.

Jeanne Sheehan

Chapter 8. A Failure to Act or What’s Most Remarkable: Paradox IV

Abstract

The final chapter in Part II (“A Failure to Act or What’s Most Remarkable: Paradox IV”) begins by addressing what many scholars see as the key paradox of the US government: given how little citizens know about government and politics, how is it that the United States has continued, unabated, for more than two centuries? Following the realist school, instead of criticizing citizens for a lack of knowledge, this chapter moves in another direction and focuses on a related, more pressing dilemma and paradox: how remarkable it is that the United States has continued unabated for more than two-hundred years given how unresponsive and impotent the system is. Using case studies such as immigration reform and gun control, this chapter makes the case that it is not only a lack of knowledge that drives people to fall prey to demagogues and charlatans, it is also frustration with a system that is unable to address or take meaningful action on critical issues. While the academy has spent a good deal of time discussing where the people fall short—and fall short we do—it is incumbent on us to spend at least as much time discussing where the system falls short, how it has contributed toward their frustrations, and how it can be remedied.

Jeanne Sheehan

Remedies

Frontmatter

Chapter 9. Nothing Human Can Be Perfect: Constitutional Change and the Limits of the Remedies Thereafter

Abstract

Part III of the text moves from focusing on the problems inherent in the structure the Framers adopted (Part I) and the ways our foremothers and fathers have tried to mitigate them (Part II) to focusing on potential remedies or reforms that can be adopted to address them. To this end, the first chapter in this section, Chapter 9 (“Nothing Human Can Be Perfect: Constitutional Change and the Limits of the Remedies Thereafter”), begins by noting that the Framers were the first to acknowledge that the Constitution was flawed. In recognition of these defects, they took the somewhat unusual (although not unprecedented) step of including in Article V methods for amendment. As in the case of our first constitution, however, it is still difficult to revise; so much so that in the post-Civil War period it has only been done successfully twelve times, two of which cancelled each other out. As of this writing, the document has not been amended since the early 1990s. Moreover, of those amendments that have been adopted, few concern the type of structural changes that this book is concerned with. The discussion ends with a recognition that Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Paine were two of the Framers who proposed a mechanism for reconstitution that was not included in the Constitution, but is worth consideration today.

Jeanne Sheehan

Chapter 10. Restructuring by Rewriting or Toward a More Responsible Government: Remedies I (The What)

Abstract

“Is America by nature a violent society?” This question is posed at the beginning of this chapter (“Restructuring by Rewriting Or Towards a More Responsible Government: Remedies I (The What)”) and critical to a discussion of “the what” of constitutional change because it brings to the forefront an overarching concern: Is structural change of the kind being called for in this text possible in the absence of violent revolution or crisis? In the fervent hope it is, this chapter moves from focusing on the mechanisms for change included in the Constitution by the Framers (Chapter 9) to the types of structural reforms that have been called for by various scholars and advocates throughout the years—in particular, in the post-Reconstruction era. To this end, the chapter includes ten specific reform proposals called for by reformers going back to Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story and President Woodrow Wilson and continuing to reformers in the modern era such as Lloyd Cutler and James Sundquist.

Jeanne Sheehan

Chapter 11. The “Two Modes”—Proposal by Congress and “The Other Way”: Remedies II (The How)

Abstract

This chapter (“The ‘Two Modes’—Proposal by Congress and ‘The Other Way’: Remedies II (The How)”) begins by focusing on Woodrow Wilson’s transformation from advocate of reform via constitutional means (Article V) to advocate for reform via extra-constitutional means (parties, judicial interpretation, statute, leadership, etc.). Whereas the last chapter focused on “the who and what” of constitutional reform: Who throughout American history has called for structural reform and what types of reforms did they advocate? This chapter (and the subsequent chapter) focuses on the “how”—How can constitutional revision be achieved? Can reason-based reform be realized in a system such as ours? What methods are available? Are the methods the Framers left us with viable or should we be looking to extra-constitutional means to bridge the divisions?

Jeanne Sheehan

Chapter 12. Return to First Solutions or Extra-Constitutional Means of Bridging the Divide: Remedies III (The How, Continued)

Abstract

The final chapter of the text, Chapter 12 (“Return to First Solutions or Extra-Constitutional Means of Bridging the Divide: Remedies III (The How, Continued)”) continues where the previous chapter left off focusing on the “how” of constitutional reform. Given the difficulty of amending the Constitution via the two Article V routes provided by the Framers, this chapter focuses on extra-constitutional means of changing the structure of government, including a return to first solutions (parties and leadership), electoral reform proposals, changes to federal and state statute, and institutional reforms. In this context, the chapter also includes an argument made by E.E. Schattschneider that scholars do themselves no favors when they consider this strictly a structural problem because it is, in his view and at its root, not only a structural problem but more importantly, theoretical and political as well.

Jeanne Sheehan

Backmatter

Titel: American Democracy in Crisis
verfasst von: Jeanne Sheehan
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-62281-7
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-62280-0
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-62281-7