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International Journal of Information Security
Erschienen in: International Journal of Information Security 5/2020

17.10.2019 | Regular Contribution

Analysis of some simple stabilizers for physically obfuscated keys

verfasst von: Riccardo Bernardini, Roberto Rinaldo

Erschienen in: International Journal of Information Security | Ausgabe 5/2020

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Abstract

Physically Obfuscated Keys (POK) are used to embed in chips secret bit-strings to be used in cryptographic protocols. Usually a POK is built as an array of elementary 1-bit POKs (cells). In order to guarantee that the same secret bit-string is generated at every turn-on, stabilizer circuits are required, which are typically based on possibly expensive error-correction circuitry. In this paper we propose a stabilizer scheme that is not based on error-correction codes, but rather forces to zero the cells that are too unreliable and compensate for the disabled cells by means of a mixing stage.
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Fußnoten
1
Note that with this definition the PO for \({\mathfrak p}_{1}=0.5\) is conventionally taken equal to 0. Since \({\mathfrak p}_{1}=0.5\) is a zero probability event, the actual definition of the PO for \({\mathfrak p}_{1}=0.5\) has no impact in practice.
 
2
Note that the fact that the probability of error is not larger than \(1-R\) holds in in any environment, because of the definition (4) of \(R\).
 
3
The common convention in error-correction code theory is that the codes are generated by the rows of the generator, therefore they are the image of the transpose.
 
4
Remember that https://static-content.springer.com/image/art%3A10.1007%2Fs10207-019-00473-8/MediaObjects/10207_2019_473_IEq340_HTML.gif . If https://static-content.springer.com/image/art%3A10.1007%2Fs10207-019-00473-8/MediaObjects/10207_2019_473_IEq341_HTML.gif , then it must be https://static-content.springer.com/image/art%3A10.1007%2Fs10207-019-00473-8/MediaObjects/10207_2019_473_IEq342_HTML.gif for some https://static-content.springer.com/image/art%3A10.1007%2Fs10207-019-00473-8/MediaObjects/10207_2019_473_IEq343_HTML.gif ; https://static-content.springer.com/image/art%3A10.1007%2Fs10207-019-00473-8/MediaObjects/10207_2019_473_IEq344_HTML.gif cannot be a strict subset of https://static-content.springer.com/image/art%3A10.1007%2Fs10207-019-00473-8/MediaObjects/10207_2019_473_IEq345_HTML.gif since it would be https://static-content.springer.com/image/art%3A10.1007%2Fs10207-019-00473-8/MediaObjects/10207_2019_473_IEq346_HTML.gif ; therefore, https://static-content.springer.com/image/art%3A10.1007%2Fs10207-019-00473-8/MediaObjects/10207_2019_473_IEq347_HTML.gif is a code-word.
 
5
The codes have been extracted from the online code database www.​codetables.​de (that includes the codes with \(1 \le n\le 256\), \(1 \le \ell \le 256\)) by taking the codes whose distance \(d\) is exactly known.
 
6
Labels 0.5/0.5 and 1.5/5 are the same labels used in [19] and refer to two different variants.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Analysis of some simple stabilizers for physically obfuscated keys
verfasst von
Riccardo Bernardini
Roberto Rinaldo
Publikationsdatum
17.10.2019
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Erschienen in
International Journal of Information Security / Ausgabe 5/2020
Print ISSN: 1615-5262
Elektronische ISSN: 1615-5270
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-019-00473-8

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