nach oben

Artificial Intelligence and Law

Erschienen in:

10.10.2018

Assessment criteria or standards of proof? An effort in clarification

verfasst von: Giovanni Tuzet

Erschienen in: Artificial Intelligence and Law | Ausgabe 1/2020

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config

KI-gestützte Suche

Aus

Abstract

The paper provides a conceptual distinction between evidence assessment criteria and standards of proof. Evidence must be assessed in order to check whether it satisfies a relevant standard of proof, and the assessment is operated with some criterion; so both criteria and standards are necessary for fact-finding. In addition to this conceptual point, the article addresses three main questions: (1) Why do some scholars and decision-makers take assessment criteria as standards of proof and vice versa? (2) Why do systems differ as to criteria and standards? (3) How can a system work if it neglects one of these things? The answers to the first and second question come from the historical and procedural differences between the systems. The answer to the third focuses on the functional connection between criteria and standards.

Vorheriger Artikel Arguing about causes in law: a semi-formal framework for causal arguments

Nächster Artikel Proof beyond a context-relevant doubt. A structural analysis of the standard of proof in criminal adjudication

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 390 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

See among others Redmayne (1999), Lillquist (2002) and Picinali (2013). See also Vázquez (2013).

On the criminal debate see Ferrajoli (1989: 112ff). See Taruffo (1992: 361ff) on civil aspects too.

See Ferrer (2007: 147ff).

See Ferrer (2007: 145) and González Lagier (2013: 52).

Many of the points discussed in this paper under the heading of “standards of proof” can be also discussed under the heading of “burdens of proof” (see Allen 2014). To make things simpler I won’t use the latter terminology and the corresponding conceptual apparatus. Anyway, let me clarify this: it is true that, as one reviewer has observed, the burden of proof concerns the question as to which party has to prove what, while the standard of proof concerns the question as to “how much” evidence is necessary to discharge a given burden; but it is also true that the literature (especially in the US) focuses on one burden, namely the “burden of persuasion”, which (a) is taken to indicate the relevant standard of proof and (b) is taken to be what another burden (the “burden of production”) is a function of; see McNaughton (1955).

See e.g. Ireland v. UK (1978, § 161), Labita v. Italy (2000, § 121), Fedorov v. Russia (2011, § 57), Rizvanov v. Azerbaijan (2012, § 45) and Najafli v. Azerbaijan (2012, § 36). On the other hand, in these decisions the Court usually adds that such proof may follow from sufficiently “strong, clear and concordant inferences” or “similar unrebutted presumptions of fact”, which in fact amount to ways of assessing the evidence (epistemically as to “strong, clear and concordant inferences”, and legally as to presumptions).

On the common law side see e.g. Clermont and Sherwin (2002) (treating intime conviction as a standard); on the civil law side see e.g. Iacoviello (2006) and Caprioli (2009) (equating “beyond a reasonable doubt” with an evidence evaluation method).

See Redmayne (1999: 189) (where the adoption of this standard in the UK is suggested to face such serious cases).

Putnam (1981: 1ff, 1995: 17).

Of course the .9 value is worrisome for criminal defendants, but the higher the standard is set (to avoid false convictions) the higher is the expected rate of false acquittals. I cannot expand on these topics here. See among others Kaplan (1968), Kaye (1986), Kaplow (2012), Cheng (2013), Allen and Stein (2013) and Verheij (2014).

See especially Bell (1987).

Laudan (2006: 52ff). Note that the UK has been recently abandoning BARD (out of troubles in making it understood?): now fact-finders are to convict only if they are sure (see Roberts and Zuckerman 2010: 253ff). But on BARD’s interesting origins see Whitman (2008) (it was supposed to protect the juror’s religious conscience facing the risk of wrongful convictions, it was not originally designed to protect the defendant).

See, among others, Anderson et al. (2005: 224ff), Barzun (2008) and Haack (2014: 208ff).

I thank one reviewer for drawing my attention to this.

See e.g. Cohen (1977), Redmayne (2003) and Allen and Pardo (2007). See also Verheij et al. (2016).

See Padoa-Schioppa (2003: 280–292).

But see Damaška (2003: 129): “It is true that these lawyers developed a maze of rules about the quantity and quality of evidence needed for fact determinations. But it is a mistake to believe that these rules turned adjudicators into automatons, who made factual determination on the authority of rules, independently of their beliefs.”

See e.g. Cass. sez. III civile, decision n. 10285/2009, n. 10741/2009, n. 15991/2011, n. 23933/2013, n. 18392/2017.

See the reconstruction of the debate in Della Torre (2014: 9–11).

See e.g. Taruffo (2003b: 81–82), Laudan (2005: 98–99), Ferrer (2007: 144–145) and Bayón (2008: 17–18).

Hans and Germain (2011: 755): “the decision based on intime conviction is not best viewed as the expression of a feeling, but rather as a considered opinion based on the charges, evidence, and defenses presented by the parties.”

See Padoa-Schioppa (1994).

See e.g. Clermont and Sherwin (2002: 256).

See e.g. Delmas-Marty (1996: 59–60) and Taruffo (2003a: 666).

Lluch (2012: 194–196) and Taruffo (2003b: 82).

See also art. 297 of the criminal procedure code, that establishes the free assessment of evidence in compliance with logic, experience and science. This provision does not mention “sound criticism” but is read as a reformulation of this traditional idea.

See Accatino (2011) and Coloma (2012).

Taruffo (2009: 160ff, 219). See also Gascón (2010: 32).

To avoid any misunderstanding: “US” stands for the United States, “UK” for the United Kingdom, “I” for Italy, “F” for France, “S” for Spain, “C” for Chile, and “G” for Germany.

The literature is abundant. See, among others, Anderson et al. (2005), Verheij (2014) and Verheij et al. (2016).

I refer to Damaška (1986: 29ff) and to Jackson and Summers (2012: 57ff) among others.

Still, many discussions on things like “moral certainty” show that the concern for a decision threshold was also present on the Continent. See among others Pagano (1828: 59ff) and Ippolito (2008: 218–220). Cf. Whitman (2008).

On functional accounts of law see Green (1998) and Ehrenberg (2016).

Cf. on this point Picinali (2015).

For a similar point see Hans and Germain (2011: 738, 761–763).

Accatino D (2011) Certezas, dudas y propuestas en torno al estándar de la prueba penal. Revista de Derecho de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso 37(2):483–511

Allen RJ (2014) Burdens of proof. Law Probab Risk 13:195–219

Allen RJ, Pardo M (2007) The problematic value of mathematical models of evidence. J Leg Stud 36(1):107–140

Allen RJ, Stein A (2013) Evidence, probability, and the burden of proof. Ariz Law Rev 55:557–602

Anderson T, Schum D, Twining W (2005) Analysis of evidence, 2nd edn. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Barzun C (2008) Rules of weight. Notre Dame Law Rev 83(5):1957–2017

Bayón JC (2008) Epistemología, moral y prueba de los hechos: hacia un enfoque no benthamiano. Analisi e diritto 2008:15–34

Bell RS (1987) Decision theory and due process: a critique of the Supreme Court’s lawmaking for burdens of proof. J Crim Law Criminol 78:557–585

Caprioli F (2009) L’accertamento della responsabilità penale “oltre ogni ragionevole dubbio”. Rivista italiana di diritto e procedura penale 52:51–92

Cheng E (2013) Reconceptualizing the burden of proof. Yale Law J 122(5):1254–1279

Clermont K, Sherwin E (2002) A comparative view of standards of proof. Am J Comp Law 50:243–275

Cohen LJ (1977) The probable and the provable. Clarendon Press, Oxford

Coloma R (2012) ¿Realmente importa la sana crítica? Revista Chilena de Derecho 39(3):753–781

Damaška M (1986) The faces of justice and state authority. A comparative approach to the legal process. Yale University Press, New Haven

Damaška M (2003) Epistemology and legal regulation of proof. Law Probab Risk 2:117–130

Della Torre J (2014) Il lungo cammino della giurisprudenza italiana sull’“oltre ogni ragionevole dubbio". Diritto Penale Contemporaneo. https://www.penalecontemporaneo.it. Accessed 20 June 2014

Delmas-Marty M (1996) La preuve pénale. Droits 23:53–65

Ehrenberg KM (2016) The functions of law. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Ferrajoli L (1989) Diritto e ragione. Teoria del garantismo penale. Laterza, Roma-Bari

Ferrer J (2007) La valoración racional de la prueba. Marcial Pons, Madrid

Gascón M (2010) Los hechos en el derecho. Bases argumentales de la prueba, 3rd edn. Marcial Pons, Madrid

González Lagier D (2013) Quaestio facti. Ensayos sobre prueba, causalidad y acción. Fontamara, Mexico

Green L (1998) The functions of law. Cogito 12(2):117–124MathSciNet

Haack S (2014) Evidence matters. Science, proof, and truth in the law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Hans V, Germain C (2011) The French jury at a crossroads. Chic Kent Law Rev 86(2):737–768

Iacoviello FM (2006) Lo standard probatorio dell’al di là di ogni ragionevole dubbio e il suo controllo in Cassazione. Cassazione penale 46:3869–3884

Ippolito D (2008) Mario Pagano. Il pensiero giuspolitico di un illuminista. Giappichelli, Torino

Jackson JD, Summers SJ (2012) The internationalisation of criminal evidence. Beyond the common law and civil law traditions. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Kaplan J (1968) Decision theory and the factfinding process. Stanf Law Rev 20:1065–1092

Kaplow L (2012) Burden of proof. Yale Law J 121:738–859

Kaye DH (1986) Do we need a calculus of weight to understand proof beyond a reasonable doubt? Boston Univ Law Rev 66:657–672

Laudan L (2005) Por qué un estándar de prueba subjetivo y ambiguo no es un estándar. Doxa 28:95–113

Laudan L (2006) Truth, error, and criminal law. An essay in legal epistemology. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Lillquist E (2002) Recasting reasonable doubt: decision theory and the virtues of variability. U C Davis Law Rev 36:85–197

Lluch XA (2012) La dosis de la prueba: entre el common law y el civil law. Doxa 35:173–200

McNaughton JT (1955) Burden of production of evidence: a function of a burden of persuasion. Harv Law Rev 68:1382–1391

Padoa-Schioppa A (1994) La giuria penale in Francia. LED, Milano

Padoa-Schioppa A (2003) Italia ed Europa nella storia del diritto. il Mulino, Bologna

Pagano FM (1828) Principj del codice penale e Logica de’ probabili. Raffaello di Napoli, Napoli

Picinali F (2013) Two meanings of “reasonableness”: dispelling the “floating” reasonable doubt. Mod Law Rev 76(5):845–875

Picinali F (2015) The threshold lies in the method: instructing jurors about reasoning beyond reasonable doubt. Int J Evid Proof 19:139–153

Putnam H (1981) Reason, truth and history. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

Putnam H (1995) Are moral and legal values made or discovered? Leg Theory 1:5–19

Redmayne M (1999) Standards of proof in civil litigation. Mod Law Rev 62:167–195

Redmayne M (2003) Objective probability and the assessment of evidence. Law Probab Risk 2:275–294

Roberts P, Zuckerman A (2010) Criminal evidence, 2nd edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Taruffo M (1992) La prova dei fatti giuridici. Giuffrè, Milano

Taruffo M (2003a) Rethinking the standards of proof. Am J Comp Law 51:659–677

Taruffo M (2003b) Algunos comentarios sobre la valoración de la prueba. Discusiones 3:81–97

Taruffo M (2009) La semplice verità. Il giudice e la costruzione dei fatti. Laterza, Roma-Bari

Vázquez C (ed) (2013) Estándares de prueba y prueba científica: ensayos de epistemología jurídica. Marcial Pons, Madrid

Verheij B (2014) To catch a thief with and without numbers. Arguments, scenarios and probabilities in evidential reasoning. Law Probab Risk 13:307–325

Verheij B et al (2016) Arguments, scenarios and probabilities: connections between three normative frameworks for evidential reasoning. Law Probab Risk 15:35–70

Whitman J (2008) The origins of reasonable doubt. Theological roots of the criminal trial. Yale University Press, New Haven

Titel: Assessment criteria or standards of proof? An effort in clarification
verfasst von: Giovanni Tuzet
Publikationsdatum: 10.10.2018
Verlag: Springer Netherlands
Erschienen in: Artificial Intelligence and Law / Ausgabe 1/2020
Print ISSN: 0924-8463
Elektronische ISSN: 1572-8382
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10506-018-9233-1

Springer Professional

Abstract

Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu Ihrer Lizenz zu erhalten.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Springer Professional "Technik"

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Weitere Artikel der Ausgabe 1/2020

A new use case for argumentation support tools: supporting discussions of Bayesian analyses of complex criminal cases

Group-to-individual (G2i) inferences: challenges in modeling how the U.S. court system uses brain data

Evidence & decision making in the law: theoretical, computational and empirical approaches

A system of communication rules for justifying and explaining beliefs about facts in civil trials

Normative decision analysis in forensic science

Proof beyond a context-relevant doubt. A structural analysis of the standard of proof in criminal adjudication

Premium Partner