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2017 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

1. Asymmetry of Information, Trust-Building and Market Quality: Governing the Quality of Goods in Modern Asia

verfasst von : Kazuko Furuta, Toshiaki Ushijima

Erschienen in: Imitation, Counterfeiting and the Quality of Goods in Modern Asian History

Verlag: Springer Singapore

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Abstract

Markets characterized by fraud and poor quality products cannot be viewed as effective and well functioning, although we can find such markets anywhere in the world at any time in history. The quality of goods is one of the determinants of market quality. This chapter investigates the production of low-quality goods, imitation, and counterfeiting, and the dishonest trading that frequently occurred in Asia during the period of overall market expansion from the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries. It examines how the asymmetry of product-quality information was reduced and mechanisms were created to make the stable trading of quality products at appropriate prices possible. This chapter provides an introduction to Part I of our collaborative project. It first describes a theoretical framework for thinking about market quality. This framework is distinguished by its focus on competition quality, information quality, and product quality as determining factors in market quality. It also emphasizes the fairness of prices, not just the efficiency of resource allocation. Then the chapter explores the approaches used to alleviate asymmetry of quality information, including enhancements to information disclosure systems and regulations, creation of appraisal markets, creation of markets for certified products by quality inspection, and establishment of brands, and learning and building trust among the parties to transactions within the market. There are various methods from institutional solutions outside the market taken by government and other third-party organizations, to market-based solutions undertaken by the parties to the transaction. Yet these all face the same issue of how to secure trust in assessments of product quality. The research reported in Part I found that the formation of new trading systems by market participants have functioned effectively when new markets are being formed, when demand suddenly expands, and when it is otherwise difficult to establish screening systems covering entire markets.

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Nächstes Kapitel Market Approaches to Dealing with Cotton Adulteration in Early Twentieth-Century China

In conjunction with the protection of property rights, McMillan notes the importance of not over-protecting rights.

One example is “block booking” in which distribution companies distribute films to theaters in sets of uneven quality (Yano 2005, pp. 37–48). Katsuhiko Ikawa argues that the essential problem of inferior goods in exported raw silk during the early Meiji period was not so much in the production process as in the substitution and misrepresentation of local brands at the distribution stage. A central role was played by “Jōshū” raw silk, which was used to camouflage inferior silk from other regions, and the focal point was the city of Maebashi, where raw silk for export was collected and distributed. A comparison of sales volumes tabulated on a regional basis against shipping volumes to Yokohama indicates the likelihood that silk from Ōshū, Bushū, Shinshū, and Kōshū was sold under the Jōshū brand. The author makes the important point that even when production organizations made improvements in their silk, the corresponding improvement in valuations would be disguised within the general “Jōshū” brand (Ikawa 2006, p. 89).

This is one form of “Type A information” as discussed in Furuta 2003.

There is a great deal of excellent empirical research into quality problems in the economic history of Japan. For an overview of this research, please consult the work of Tomoko Hashino, who focuses on the term “sosei-ranzō”, arguing that it has two components. “Sosei” refers to products that fail to meet certain quality levels, while “ranzō” refers to production activities that ignore the supply and demand for products (Hashino 2007, p. 17). She goes on to point out that there were differences in the type of “sosei” depending upon whether silk weaves were pre-dyed or post-dyed (finished goods or intermediates) and whether they were bound for the domestic or the export market.

Many of the academic articles listed here examine quality problems related to the use of new chemical dyes. Toshiaki Ushijima explores the town of Nishikatsura (Minami Tsuru-gun, Yamanashi), which since the late Meiji period was known for its cloth used to line clothing and umbrellas. He uses this example as a case study to illustrate the regulatory problems created by inferior Kōmori-gasa umbrellas made with inappropriate dyes (Ushijima 2003). It should be noted that umbrellas became an important export from Japan to Asia. They began to be in high demand among the Korean population from the end of the 1880s, and the initial exports used white cambric cloth, but around 1894 the demand shifted to colors. Umbrellas made in Osaka were said to “change color after the third rain,” which significantly undermined the reputation of “Osaka” on the Korean market (Furuta 2007).

Much research has been done on local trade associations. Takanori Matsumoto lists several functions for local trade associations, including product testing, market research, evaluation disclosure, advertising and public relations, infrastructure enhancement (through the establishment and activities of industrial experimental stations and training centers), and joint operations. Among them, he emphasizes product testing and evaluation disclosure as being particularly important (Matsumoto 1993). For further discussion of the roles played by quality testing institutions and joint promotion associations run by trade associations and government bodies, see for example Kiyokawa (1995), Kiyokawa and Makino (1998). For more information on hanamushiro (mat with floral or bulrush pattern), Masafumi Yomoda compares Japan and China through the local lenses of Guangdong to Okayama, and Fukuoka to reveal the different institutional factors behind the organization and regulation of transactions within production areas which gave comparative advantages in the production of mat rush of different qualities. In China, the primary objective of producer organizations was to ensure the fulfillment of contracts and maintain transaction systems rather than improve quality. Fulfillment of contracts included guarantees of quality. By contrast, local trade associations in Japan used a process of government retrospective approvals and reinforcements to help to reduce mass-production of inferior articles (Yomoda 2004, p. 293).

The industries with the highest local trade association organizing rates (in 1925) were raw silk 98.7%, cotton weaving 89%, blended silk–cotton weaving 94.1%, pottery and porcelain 84.1%, knit work 83.7%, and wheat straw, (paper-thin) wood sheets and plaited hemp straw 96.4%. Industries with low organizing rates included wood products 10.4%, fertilizer 28.1%, roofing tile 12%, and miso 11.9% (Comment by Kazuhiro Ōmori in a panel discussion on “Jōhō, shinrai, shijō no shitsu” (September 27, 2009) at the 78th Annual Conference of the Socio-Economic History Society).

See for example Yano 2001, pp. 147–154.

The Fertilizer Trade Law examined in this volume, product liability laws for risky products, compensation laws, and securities trading laws, etc. One example of penalties for misrepresentations of quality and fraudulent actions can be found in the Law Concerning Japanese Trade Associations for Important Manufactures, which provides for the collection of negligence fines and the confiscation of offending articles from operators who violate the testing provisions in the association's articles of incorporation.

Asymmetry of information limits market functions and results in adverse selection so that only low-quality goods are traded. This can be resolved by sellers of quality goods sending signals about quality. Attaching quality guarantees results in costs for maintenance and repairs, but if quality is high, costs should be low. It therefore suffices for the sellers of merchandise to provide the minimum guarantees necessary to differentiate themselves from competitors (Salanie 1997).

According to research by Kazuhiro Ōmori, the local trade association for weaving in Aichi Prefecture provided ratings based on quality testing that resulted in a gradual convergence of prices in the market. Thanks to testing by the association, producers “understood that prices differed according to certificate rankings and began to voluntarily compete on the basis of rankings” (Ōmori 1991, p. 31). Other studies discuss the establishment of rice testing and increases in rice price levels in Akita, where spoilage was a problem (Ōmameuda 1997, 2000). Takanori Matsumoto argues that the attachment of inspection certificates from local trade associations functioned as a “signal” for the market (Matsumoto 1993, p. 52).

In addition to trust, Luhmann highlights laws, organizations, and languages as elements that serve to reduce the social complexity. Trust relies on law, organizations, and languages but presumably cannot be reduced to them (Luhmann 1979, p. 93).

Beckert lists trust among parties to the transaction as an important element in the establishment of markets. For Beckert “trust” is basically an expectation among parties to the transaction that unilateral concessions granted in advance by one of the parties to the transaction will not be betrayed by the counterparty even if betrayal will bring additional profit to the counterparty (Beckert 2006, p. 318). When McMillan says that trust is indispensable to the functioning of markets, what is behind the statement is the idea that the uneven distribution of information will impede negotiations and limit the matters that can be determined in contracts and thus there is a need for mechanisms to ensure that information is communicated and can be trusted (McMillan 2002, p. 10).

For a discussion of trust as social capital, see Putnam et al. (1993).

Presumably, a full inspection regime covering all goods on the market could only be maintained in limited circumstances in which an appraisal market (c) is viable because there are experts with “merchandise-specific” skills in appraisal and evaluation. Examples would be expensive goods such as automobiles, precious metals, real estate, financial instruments, and works of art.

Greif discusses the collective punishment of Maghribi traders, which could be considered a method for effective screening of informal participants in transactions. However, ensuring that the punishment of exclusion from transactions is effective against “problem” operators requires the maintenance of closed “collusion” as an enforcement tool. Inherent in this is the flaw of constraining expansion in the scale of transaction (Greif 2006, Chap. 3). As an example within an enterprise, when dishonest action is endemic among employees of grain merchants in Madagascar, most merchants are reluctant to expand their staffing, and managers must perform product testing on their own, which limits the enterprise's size (Fafchamps 2001, p.128).

There are case studies of other products in Japan in which inspection systems have been effective when producer organizations decided to establish trademarks and brands either for specific locales or specific enterprises (Ōmori 1991; Matsumoto 1993). The product testing and attachment of trademarks performed by Kaimeisha (Suwa-gun, Nagano) in the silk industry of Meiji Japan was a great success (Nakabayashi 2010, p. 67). These case studies indicate that it is important for there be functions to support the self-directed efforts of producers and distributors to improve quality if product testing is to be effective as a centralized approach.

One example of policy-level support for voluntary attempts by producer organizations is the transfer of producer organization testing in Japan from local trade associations to prefectural governments and fiscal support for classes established by local producers and associations to improve dyeing technology (Hashino 2007, Chaps. 3 and 4).

If, for example, the intent is to maintain and improve the “reputation” of exports at the national level rather than establish trademarks and brands for individual enterprises or locales, the priority will be on large-scale, centralized solutions with policy intervention rather than on decentralized approaches. On this point see Yomoda 2008.

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Titel: Asymmetry of Information, Trust-Building and Market Quality: Governing the Quality of Goods in Modern Asia
verfasst von: Kazuko Furuta
Toshiaki Ushijima
Verlag: Springer Singapore
Buch: Imitation, Counterfeiting and the Quality of Goods in Modern Asian History
Print ISBN: 978-981-10-3751-1

Electronic ISBN: 978-981-10-3752-8

Copyright-Jahr: 2017
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-3752-8_1

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