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Erschienen in:
Who Was James M. Buchanan and Why Is He Significant? Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

20. Beneficent Bullshit

verfasst von : Peter T. Leeson

Erschienen in: James M. Buchanan

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Political-economic life is rife with bullshit: false, often nonsensical, beliefs. Some of those beliefs are socially productive. James M. Buchanan identifies popular false beliefs in the constitutional realm as foundational supports of political-economic order. I consider how popular false beliefs in the judicial realm support criminal law and order. The beneficence of bullshit in such arenas may help explain the prevalence of bullshit in political-economic life.

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Vorheriges Kapitel The Questionable Morality of Compromising the Influence of Public Choice by Embracing a “Nobel” Lie
Nächstes Kapitel Groups, Sorting, and Inequality in Constitutional Political Economy
Fußnoten
1
Or at least it has been historically—up through the mid-twentieth century, after which Buchanan (1970) sees such beliefs as deteriorating.
 
2
And the logical structure of American government is that described in The Calculus of Consent (1962). As Buchanan puts it, that book simply “provide[s] a tight logical structure to what must have been the essential vision of James Madison and the Founding Fathers in their conceptualization of the workings of a political order” (Buchanan 1988, p. 16).
 
Literatur
Beard, C. A. (1913). An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. New York: Macmillan.
Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. M. (1988). Is Public Choice Immoral? The Case for the ‘Nobel’ Lie. Virginia Law Review, 74, 179–189.CrossRef
Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. M. (2000). The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Brennan, G., & Munger, M. (2014). The Soul of James Buchanan? Independent Review, 18, 331–342.
Buchanan, J. M. (1970). The ‘Social’ Efficiency of Education. Il Politico, 35, 653–662.
Buchanan, J. M. (1975). The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Buchanan, J. M. (1988). This Week’s Citation Classic. Current Contents, 2, 16.
Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1962). The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.CrossRef
Leeson, P. T. (2012a). Ordeals. Journal of Law and Economics, 55, 691–714.
Leeson, P. T. (2012b). An Austrian Approach to Law and Economics, with Special Reference to Superstition. Review of Austrian Economics, 25, 185–198.
Leeson, P. T. (2014). Anarchy Unbound: Why Self-Governance Works Better Than You Think. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
Leeson, P. T. (2017). WTF?! An Economic Tour of the Weird. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Leeson, P. T., & Coyne, C. J. (2012). Sassywood. Journal of Comparative Economics, 40, 608–620.CrossRef
Leeson, P. T., & Suarez, P. A. (2015). Superstition and Self-Governance. Advances in Austrian Economics, 19, 57–66.
McGuire, R. A. (2003). To Form a More Perfect Union: A New Economic Interpretation of the United States Constitution. New York: Oxford University Press.
Plato. (1991). The Republic: The Complete and Unabridged Jowett Translation (B. Jowett, trans.). New York: Vintage Books.
Tullock, G. (1987). The Calculus: Postscript After 25 Years. Cato Journal, 7, 313–321.
Wagner, R. E. (1987). Courts, Legislatures, and Constitutional Maintenance. Cato Journal, 7, 323–329.
Metadaten
Titel
Beneficent Bullshit
verfasst von
Peter T. Leeson
Copyright-Jahr
2018
Buch
James M. Buchanan

Print ISBN: 978-3-030-03079-7

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-03080-3

Copyright-Jahr: 2018

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03080-3_20