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Journal of Financial Services Research
Erschienen in: Journal of Financial Services Research 3/2015

01.06.2015

Board Holdings, Compensation and Mutual Fund Manager Turnover

Erschienen in: Journal of Financial Services Research | Ausgabe 3/2015

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Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between board holdings, compensation and the turnover of underperforming mutual fund managers. Previous studies find that some fund managers consistently underperform their peers over long periods of time. The presence of these consistent underperforming funds might be partially explained by ineffective monitoring whereby board interests are not aligned with those of shareholders. Based on 2003 data collected from 606 mutual funds, our results provide evidence that underperforming fund managers have a lower probability of being replaced when their boards have lower holdings and higher compensation.
Vorheriger Artikel A Comparison of Bank and Non-bank Funds in the French Market
Nächster Artikel Capital Structure of Microfinance Institutions

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Metadaten
Titel
Board Holdings, Compensation and Mutual Fund Manager Turnover
Publikationsdatum
01.06.2015
Erschienen in
Journal of Financial Services Research / Ausgabe 3/2015
Print ISSN: 0920-8550
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-0735
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10693-014-0196-4

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