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Erschienen in:

2023 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Casino Rationale: Countering Attacker Deception in Zero-Sum Stackelberg Security Games of Bounded Rationality

verfasst von : Ryan Gabrys, Mark Bilinski, Justin Mauger, Daniel Silva, Sunny Fugate

Erschienen in: Decision and Game Theory for Security

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

In this work, we consider a zero-sum game between an adaptive defender and a potentially deceptive attacker who is able to vary their degree of rationality as a deceptive ruse. Under this setup, we provide a complete characterization of the deception space of the attacker and uncover optimal strategies for adaptive defender against a deceptive attacker. In addition, we consider the setup in which both the attacker and defender are allowed to evolve their strategies over time. In this setting, one of our main results is to demonstrate that allowing the attacker to vary their degree of rationality can significantly impact the game in favor of the attacker.

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Vorheriges Kapitel The Risk of Attacker Behavioral Learning: Can Attacker Fool Defender Under Uncertainty?

Nächstes Kapitel Cyber Deception Against Zero-Day Attacks: A Game Theoretic Approach

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In other words, the value of \(\lambda ^{\ell }\) is unique.

By arbitrary, we mean that \(\lambda ^{\ell }\) can be any real value.

In other words, we consider the case where there may not exist a parameter \(\lambda '\) whereby we can write the observed distribution as \(\left( q_1', q_2', \ldots , q_T' \right) = \left( q_1(x,\lambda '), q_2(x,\lambda '), \ldots , q_T(x,\lambda ') \right) \) in the next section.

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Titel: Casino Rationale: Countering Attacker Deception in Zero-Sum Stackelberg Security Games of Bounded Rationality
verfasst von: Ryan Gabrys
Mark Bilinski
Justin Mauger
Daniel Silva
Sunny Fugate
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Decision and Game Theory for Security
Print ISBN: 978-3-031-26368-2

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-031-26369-9

Copyright-Jahr: 2023
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26369-9_2

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