Skip to main content

2014 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

3. Causes of Preference Reversal Phenomenon

verfasst von : Professor Kazuhisa Takemura

Erschienen in: Behavioral Decision Theory

Verlag: Springer Japan

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

Chapter 2 provided descriptions of preference reversal phenomenon. This phenomenon was reported first by psychologists such as Lindman (1971) and Lichtenstein and Slovic (Slovic and Lichtenstein 1968; Lichtenstein and Slovic 1971) as the phenomenon of preference relation inconsistency that results from the methods of selection and pricing in gambles. The selection problem of these studies had the test subjects choose between Gamble H with a high winning percentage and a small amount of prize money (i.e., the winning percentage is 28/36 and the prize is $10) and Gamble L with a low winning percentage and a large amount of prize money (i.e., the winning percentage 3/36 and the prize is $100). The pricing question asked how much the lowest probable price at which Gamble H and Gamble L could be sold if the respondents owned them. In most cases, Gamble H was preferred in the selection problem and Gamble L was priced higher than the others in the pricing question (Slovic and Lichtenstein 1983; Slovic 1995; Tversky and Thaler 1990).

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Literatur
Zurück zum Zitat Bell, D. E. (1982). Regret in decision making under uncertainty. Operations Research, 39, 961–981.CrossRef Bell, D. E. (1982). Regret in decision making under uncertainty. Operations Research, 39, 961–981.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Cubitt, R. P., Munro, A., & Starmer, C. (2004). Testing explanations of preference reversal. Economic Journal, 114, 709–726.CrossRef Cubitt, R. P., Munro, A., & Starmer, C. (2004). Testing explanations of preference reversal. Economic Journal, 114, 709–726.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Fishburn, P. C. (1982). Nontransitive measurable utility. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 26, 31–67.CrossRef Fishburn, P. C. (1982). Nontransitive measurable utility. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 26, 31–67.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Grether, D. M., & Plott, C. R. (1979). Economic theory and the preference reversal phenomenon. American Economic Review, 69, 623–638. Grether, D. M., & Plott, C. R. (1979). Economic theory and the preference reversal phenomenon. American Economic Review, 69, 623–638.
Zurück zum Zitat Holt, C. A. (1986). Preference reversals and the independence axiom. American Economic Review, 76, 508–515. Holt, C. A. (1986). Preference reversals and the independence axiom. American Economic Review, 76, 508–515.
Zurück zum Zitat Karni, E., & Safra, Z. (1987). ‘Preference reversal’ and the observability of preferences by experimental Methods. Econometrica, 55, 675–685.CrossRef Karni, E., & Safra, Z. (1987). ‘Preference reversal’ and the observability of preferences by experimental Methods. Econometrica, 55, 675–685.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Lichtenstein, S. R., & Slovic, P. (1971). Reversals of preference between bids and choices in Gambling decisions. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 89, 46–55.CrossRef Lichtenstein, S. R., & Slovic, P. (1971). Reversals of preference between bids and choices in Gambling decisions. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 89, 46–55.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Lindman, H. R. (1971). Inconsistent preferences among Gambles. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 89, 390–397.CrossRef Lindman, H. R. (1971). Inconsistent preferences among Gambles. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 89, 390–397.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Loomes, G., Starmer, C., & Sugden, R. (1989). Preference reversal: Information-processing effect or rational non-transitive choice? The Economic Journal, 99, 146. Loomes, G., Starmer, C., & Sugden, R. (1989). Preference reversal: Information-processing effect or rational non-transitive choice? The Economic Journal, 99, 146.
Zurück zum Zitat Loomes, G., Starmer, C., & Sugden, R. (1991). Observing violations of transitivity by experimental methods. Econometrica, 59, 425–439.CrossRef Loomes, G., Starmer, C., & Sugden, R. (1991). Observing violations of transitivity by experimental methods. Econometrica, 59, 425–439.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1982). Regret theory: An alternative theory of rational choice under uncertainty. Economic Journal, 92, 805–824.CrossRef Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1982). Regret theory: An alternative theory of rational choice under uncertainty. Economic Journal, 92, 805–824.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1983). Rationale for preference reversal. American Economic Review, 73, 428–432. Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1983). Rationale for preference reversal. American Economic Review, 73, 428–432.
Zurück zum Zitat Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1989). Preference reversal: Information-processing effect or rational transitive choice? Economic Journal, 99, 140–151.CrossRef Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1989). Preference reversal: Information-processing effect or rational transitive choice? Economic Journal, 99, 140–151.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Segal, U. (1988). Does the preference reversal phenomenon necessarily contradict the independence axiom? American Economic Review, 78, 233–236. Segal, U. (1988). Does the preference reversal phenomenon necessarily contradict the independence axiom? American Economic Review, 78, 233–236.
Zurück zum Zitat Slovic, P. (1995). The construction of preferences. American Psychologist, 50, 346–371.CrossRef Slovic, P. (1995). The construction of preferences. American Psychologist, 50, 346–371.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Slovic, P., Griffin, D., & Tversky, A. (1990). Compatibility effects in judgment and choice. In R. M. Hogarth (Ed.), Insights in decision making: A tribute to Hillel J Einhorn (pp. 5–27). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Slovic, P., Griffin, D., & Tversky, A. (1990). Compatibility effects in judgment and choice. In R. M. Hogarth (Ed.), Insights in decision making: A tribute to Hillel J Einhorn (pp. 5–27). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Slovic, P., & Lichtenstein, S. (1968). The relative importance of probabilities and payoffs in risk taking. Journal of Experimental Psychology Monograph Supplement, 78, 1–18.CrossRef Slovic, P., & Lichtenstein, S. (1968). The relative importance of probabilities and payoffs in risk taking. Journal of Experimental Psychology Monograph Supplement, 78, 1–18.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Slovic, P., & Lichtenstein, S. (1983). Preference reversals: A broader perspective. American Economic Review, 73, 596–605. Slovic, P., & Lichtenstein, S. (1983). Preference reversals: A broader perspective. American Economic Review, 73, 596–605.
Zurück zum Zitat Starmer, C. (2000). Developments in non-expected utility theory: The hunt for descriptive theory of choice under risk. Journal of Economic Literature, 38, 332–382.CrossRef Starmer, C. (2000). Developments in non-expected utility theory: The hunt for descriptive theory of choice under risk. Journal of Economic Literature, 38, 332–382.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Takemura, K. (1994). Risuku handan ni okeru sentaku kadai to matchingu kadai no mujun [On the discrepancy of risk judgment in choice and matching tasks]. Nihon risuku kenkyu gakkaishi [Japanese Journal of Risk Analysis], 5(2), 88–95. Takemura, K. (1994). Risuku handan ni okeru sentaku kadai to matchingu kadai no mujun [On the discrepancy of risk judgment in choice and matching tasks]. Nihon risuku kenkyu gakkaishi [Japanese Journal of Risk Analysis], 5(2), 88–95.
Zurück zum Zitat Takemura, K. (1996). Ishikettei to Sono Shien [Decision-making and support for decision-making]. In S. Ichikawa (Ed.), Ninchi Shinrigaku 4kan Shikou [Cognitive psychology vol. 4 thoughts] (pp. 81–105). Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press. Takemura, K. (1996). Ishikettei to Sono Shien [Decision-making and support for decision-making]. In S. Ichikawa (Ed.), Ninchi Shinrigaku 4kan Shikou [Cognitive psychology vol. 4 thoughts] (pp. 81–105). Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Tversky, A. (1969). Intransitivity of preferences. Psychological Review, 76, 31–48.CrossRef Tversky, A. (1969). Intransitivity of preferences. Psychological Review, 76, 31–48.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Tversky, A., Sattath, S., & Slovic, P. (1988). Contingent weighting in judgment and choice. Psychological Review, 95, 371–384.CrossRef Tversky, A., Sattath, S., & Slovic, P. (1988). Contingent weighting in judgment and choice. Psychological Review, 95, 371–384.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Tversky, A., Slovic, P., & Kahneman, D. (1990). The cause of preference reversal. American Economic Review, 80, 204–217. Tversky, A., Slovic, P., & Kahneman, D. (1990). The cause of preference reversal. American Economic Review, 80, 204–217.
Zurück zum Zitat Tversky, A., & Thaler, R. (1990). Anomalies: preference reversals. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4(2), 201–211.CrossRef Tversky, A., & Thaler, R. (1990). Anomalies: preference reversals. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4(2), 201–211.CrossRef
Metadaten
Titel
Causes of Preference Reversal Phenomenon
verfasst von
Professor Kazuhisa Takemura
Copyright-Jahr
2014
Verlag
Springer Japan
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-54580-4_3

Premium Partner