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Review of Industrial Organization

Erschienen in:

23.03.2020

Cheating in Ranking Systems

verfasst von: Lihi Dery, Dror Hermel, Artyom Jelnov

Erschienen in: Review of Industrial Organization | Ausgabe 2/2021

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Abstract

Consider a software application that pays a commission fee to be sold on an on-line platform (e.g., Google Play). The sales depend on the applications’ customer rankings. Therefore, developers have an incentive to dishonestly promote their application’s ranking, e.g., by faking positive customer reviews. The platform detects dishonest behavior (cheating) with some probability, and then decides whether to ban the application. We provide an analysis and find the equilibrium behaviors of both the application (cheat or not) and the platform (setting the commission fee). We provide insights into how the platform’s detection accuracy affects the incentives of the application’s developers.

Vorheriger Artikel Endogenous Price Leadership and Product Positioning

Nächster Artikel Bargaining in Patent Licensing with Inefficient Outcomes

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Titel: Cheating in Ranking Systems
verfasst von: Lihi Dery
Dror Hermel
Artyom Jelnov
Publikationsdatum: 23.03.2020
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: Review of Industrial Organization / Ausgabe 2/2021
Print ISSN: 0889-938X
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-7160
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-020-09754-2

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