2.1 Domestic effects of RO membership
Institutionalist international relations (IR) theory locates the demand for formalized cooperation on the systemic level, arguing that IGOs help member states to solve cross-border issues (Abbott & Snidal,
1998; Keohane,
1984) or that they serve to further a hegemon’s international interest (Gilpin,
1981; Ikenberry,
2001). In contrast, approaches that explicitly incorporate domestic politics to explain the demand to form and join IGOs argue that foreign policy preferences of states are driven by “two-level games” (Putnam,
1988): governments try to cater to domestic coalitions by creating IGOs. This argument has been particularly taken up by the IR literature on democratization, arguing that IGOs and particularly ROs can help liberalizing member states to credibly commit to certain policies domestically (Moravcsik,
2000). Since liberalizing regimes usually face high uncertainty regarding the credibility of their reform efforts during democratic transitions, they can join democratic ROs to signal to domestic audiences that they are committed to democratization (Fearon,
1997; Mansfield & Pevehouse,
2006,
2008; Martin,
1993). Furthermore, newly established democracies also benefit from membership in the long run, because external monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms tie the hands of future governments and prevent policy reversals (Martin,
2017; Pevehouse,
2002b,
2005).
Both systemic and domestic accounts mostly disregard the question of regime type. For systemic theorists, interdependencies drive cooperation, and the question if autocracies and democracies might be equally willing and able to commit to formal cooperation is left untouched. However, due to informal and nontransparent politics, autocracies are considered to differ to democracies “in terms of their mutual suspicions and divergences, and inherent difficulties in working together as voluntary and mutually trusting partners” (Whitehead,
2014, p. 23). Autocracies might thus be perceived as more likely to renege on their international commitments by democratic counterparts, which could impinge on the likelihood of cooperation even in case of high interdependencies and potential mutual gains. Domestic politics accounts, in contrast, only theorize why joining IGOs might be beneficial for democratic and liberalizing regimes without specifically addressing how autocracies might benefit domestically from RO membership.
So why would autocratic regimes set-up or join ROs and delegate some limited authority to the supra-national level? The literature on regime-boosting argues that the demand to participate in ROs is driven by domestic survival politics of autocratic incumbent elites that hope to increase the likelihood of remaining in power by joining a “Club of Autocrats” (Libman & Obydenkova,
2013; Söderbaum,
2004; Debre,
2021). Autocratic RO membership offers the potential to strengthen legitimation strategies (Libman & Obydenkova,
2018; Russo & Stoddard,
2018; Debre & Morgenbesser,
2017), to pursue dissidents across borders (Cooley & Heathershaw,
2017), to engage in rent-seeking activities (Collins,
2009; Herbst,
2007), or to feign commitment to global standards of good governance to international partners (Jetschke,
2015; van Hüllen,
2015).
To what extent and under which conditions autocracies actually profit from their RO membership in terms of increasing domestic survival chances, however, remains unclear. I argue that two mechanisms can explain domestic effects of RO membership. Autocracies are inherently threatened by domestic forces in the form of popular upheavals, oppositional actors or intra-elite coalitions that intend to challenge the current power distribution (Svolik,
2012), and therefore develop appropriate domestic survival strategies to mitigate these threats (Gerschewski,
2013). However, to increase the likelihood of success for survival politics during times of political upheaval, autocratic regimes might want secure additional regional support through RO membership by both regulating behavior with like-minded international allies to shield themselves from unwanted external interference as well as gaining access to additional regional resources.
First, RO membership helps autocratic regimes to regulate behavior between neighboring states, and profit from institutionalized norms of sovereignty protection and non-interference. From a historical perspective, institution-building in much of the non-democratic Global South was a post-colonial nation-building exercise (Acharya,
2016). Many ROs such as the Arab League, the Association of South-East Asian Nations, or the Organization of African Unity were specifically designed to foster sovereignty and non-interference, thereby alleviating the perceived threat to independence for newly created post-colonial states (Acharya & Johnston,
2007). Until today, autocratic regimes remain highly sensitive to interventionist politics due to the rise of global norms such as election monitoring, the responsibility to protect, or democracy-protection sanctions that increase the cost of authoritarian survival strategies such as repression or electoral fraud. RO membership can thus be seen as a way to profit from these institutionalized norms and ensure that neighboring regimes will not come down on the side of domestic challengers during political turmoil.
Sovereignty, in this regard, has to be understood in non-absolute terms that allow for a differentiated perspective on governing power. States commonly delegate decision-making competences to international bodies in some specific policy area, while retaining sovereignty rights in others. Alan Milward (
1992), for instance, argued that integration in Europe has mostly taken place within ‘low politics’ that are not essential to political sovereignty issues of ‘high politics.’ Therefore, post-war European states were essentially willing to give up limited areas of sovereignty in economics and trade to “rescue” the European nation state system. Likewise, autocracies might agree to coordinate with neighboring regimes in certain policy areas and accept some restrictions of their decision-making freedom in exchange for the protection of core political sovereignty rights such as the use of force or conduct of elections. Institutionalized norms of non-interference within ROs then help to expand the room to maneuver against political challengers because autocratic regimes can exercise costly survival strategies without the danger of external interference by neighboring states (see Tansey,
2016a on this point for autocratic sponsorship by autocratic regional powers). Consequently, autocracies might be willing to accept some limitations to sovereign decision-making vis-à-vis neighboring states that come with membership in ROs in exchange for ensuring non-interference into politically sensitive areas during uncertain moments.
Second, RO membership can also be a means to secure access to pooled regional resources to mitigate domestic challengers during moments of uncertainty. ROs can essentially be conceived as opportunity structures that pool and provide additional resources to empower some domestic actors over others (Börzel & Risse,
2003). RO membership thus opens access to both material resources such as financial redistributions, market access, military equipment, intelligence sharing, or technical support, but also to ideational support such as diplomacy or regional identity discourses. During moments of political turmoil, these additional resources can make a substantial difference to tip the scale in favor of autocratic incumbents. In contrast to short-lived alliances or bilateral relations, formalizing these pooling measures within a RO represents a higher level of commitment to support the existing non-democratic status-quo amongst member states in times of political turmoil.
Regionally pooled resources can essentially be used to strengthen three main survival strategies commonly employed by autocratic incumbent regimes: legitimation, co-optation, and repression (Debre,
2021). While these three strategies can exert mutually reinforcing effects, their respective application and combination often varies depending on type of regime and threat (Gerschewski,
2013). First, ROs can generate legitimacy by helping regimes to present themselves as democratic and part of a regional ideational group. Legitimacy in autocratic regimes either rests on presenting incumbents as quasi-democratic or by recurring to alternative legitimation strategies based on traditional values or ideology (Dukalskis & Gerschewski,
2017; von Soest & Grauvogel,
2017). RO “shadow election monitoring” (Kelley,
2012) has emerged as a highly effective way to award autocratic incumbents international recognition for highly flawed elections by praising their democratic quality without actually engaging in meaningful monitoring activities (Debre & Morgenbesser,
2017). Additionally, ROs often represent ideational communities with common value systems such as Eurasianism in the post-Soviet space (Laruelle,
2008), the “ASEAN Way” in Southeast Asia (Acharya,
2003), pan-Arabism in the Middle East (Korany,
1986), or the Shanghai Spirit in Central Asia (Ambrosio,
2008). By drawing on those regional values and identities, autocratic incumbents strengthen alternative domestic legitimation narratives while critical actors are cast as part of an illegitimate out-group (Hellquist,
2015, Debre,
2020).
Second, ROs provide material benefits in the form of economic support, financial redistributions and development aid or bureaucratic positions that can be employed to strengthen the co-optation of key elites. The literature on regionalism in Sub-Saharan Africa shows how ROs help to sustain patrimonial networks by accumulating diplomatic positions to reward politicians, business elites and military personnel with reputable jobs and to capture rents such as tariff revenues by undermining trade liberalization (Bach,
2005; Hartmann,
2016; Herbst,
2007). Additionally, development assistance, especially from new South-South donors is of particular interest to authoritarian regimes to increase rent-seeking capacities, especially given the fact that all types of development assistance are often intentionally or unintentionally blind to regime type and can thus be easily exploited (Bruszt & Palestini,
2016; Kararach,
2014; Kono & Montinola,
2013). Even the suggestion of economic regionalism without meaningful liberalization might be enough in the short-term ensure the loyalty of key business elites (Collins,
2009).
Third, regional security cooperation and intelligence sharing may help to boost the repression of popular uprisings and oppositional actors. Many ROs such as the Economic Community of West African States or ASEAN have developed security capacities over time, or have been specifically founded as security institutions, such as the SCO. Autocratic regimes might be particularly interested in increased intelligence cooperation. In Central Asia for instance, the SCO Regional Antiterrorism Structure has played a major role in helping member states to criminalize legitimate opposition by blacklisting, extradition, and denial of asylum for political opposition (Cooley & Heathershaw,
2017). Similarly, cross-border policing has become a popular instrument among GCC members to better pursue and prosecute critical activists independently of their physical location (Yom,
2016). While military interference to safeguard an incumbent regime comparable to the 2011 GCC intervention in Bahrain remains the exception, joint military maneuvers can still be used to signal military strength to potential challengers. Finally, simply having the opportunity to learn from other incumbent regimes about “worst-practices” within an institutionalized setting with regard to crisis management can strengthen successful repressive strategies (Yom,
2014).
2.2 The supply and design of institutional cooperation between autocracies
Not all IGOs will be likely to supply autocratic incumbents with the functions outlined above. A central part of this argument comprises the two expectations that first, only “Clubs of Autocrats” as well as second, ROs with low authority levels will be likely to supply those mechanisms. First, I hypothesize that ROs with a higher “autocratic density” – that is, ROs composed of more autocratic member states, should theoretically be more likely to provide the expected stabilizing benefits. I thus adopt a gradual understanding of regime type which is defined as a continuum between full democracy and closed autocracy, and expect that ROs with more autocratic membership will also produce a stronger effect on the likelihood of survival.
I follow rational-institutionalist assumptions that states employ international institutions to further their strategic and normative domestic preferences, and that cooperation will be easier with other states that share similar preferences (Hall & Taylor,
1996). I also contend that political survival is a common preference of all regime types, but that strategies to achieve survival differ significantly between democracies and autocracies, also with regard to their foreign policy choices (Bueno de Mesquita et al.
2003; Weeks,
2008). Democracies need to cater to a wider selectorate and therefore have to provide common goods to a large numbers of citizens to achieve reelection, while also promoting and protecting free and fair elections, the rule of law, and civil liberties at home and abroad (Bermeo,
2016; Lührmann & Lindberg,
2019). Liberalizing regimes are particularly often challenged by disenfranchised autocratic elites that aim to reverse reforms and regain control and therefore look for support to consolidate democracy (Moravcsik,
2000). Autocracies, in contrast, cater to a much smaller group of politically and economically relevant elites, and are thus better off providing club goods to ensure the loyalty of the winning coalition, while repressing dissidents and public protestors that aim to topple the current regime (Geddes et al.
2018; Gerschewski,
2013; Svolik,
2012).
Consequently, the composition of membership of an institution in terms of regime type is an important dimension to determine the outcomes of cooperation. Democracies and liberalizing regimes should be more likely to employ ROs to jointly provide common goods to their selectorates, to spread and protect norms of good governance and human rights, and to funnel resources to liberal coalitions to assist them in consolidating democratic transitions. In contrast, autocracies should have higher preferences to employ institutions to redistribute resources that help to strengthen autocratic incumbent elites vis-à-vis domestic challengers, and to protect regimes from external pressure to democratize.
In fact, previous research shows that ROs that are dominated by more democratic members are more often equipped with enforceable democracy and conditionality clauses as well as judicial control mechanisms that can provide for credible commitments and constrain future reversals of democratic reform in member states (Pevehouse,
2005,
2016; Schimmelfennig,
2016). Efforts to redistribute resources towards liberal elites have also been a central goal of EU accession and neighborhood policy (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier,
2005), while democratic coalitions have used IGOs and bilateral and multilateral trade-agreements to spread human rights and good governance provisions (Greenhill,
2015; Hafner-Burton,
2009). International donor organizations comprised of member states with lower levels of corruption are also more likely to adopt and enforce anti-corruption standards and refrain from diverting money to corrupt states (Ferry et al.
2020; Hafner-Burton & Schneider,
2019).
Second, the above argument also implies that ROs with a weak institutional design that remains in the realm of intergovernmental cooperation should be more likely to provide benefits to autocratic regime survival. Since autocrats want to gain additional support and prevent unwanted external interference through RO membership, they are aware of possible unintended consequences resulting from entering into legally binding forms of cooperation. Thus, they will try to avoid such consequences by making specific institutional design choices to hold tight on the reins of power without delegating too much enforcement competences to RO bureaucracies or installing majority voting procedures. RO bureaucracies with agenda-setting or enforcement powers, for instance in the form of regional courts, might in fact punish member states for employing autocratic survival strategies and thus increase the costs of repressive and manipulative tactics (e.g. Alter & Hooghe,
2016; Jetschke & Katada,
2016). When the newly established SADC court ruled against the Zimbabwe regime on grounds of human rights protection, the tribunal was quickly banished because it interfered too heavily with the domestic politics of the Mugabe regime (Hulse & van der Vleuten,
2015). In a similar vein, empowered bureaucrats with agenda-setting power might push for the adoption of stricter democratic regional standards or block the redistribution of resources to regimes that have come under political pressure. Thus, ROs with weaker institutional designs should be more likely to serve autocratic member states during political turmoil and help them stay in power.
Findings from recent research on international authority for instance show that many autocratic ROs in the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Central and Southeast Asia are equipped with less authority, particularly with regard to pooled decision-making procedures compared to democratic ROs in the Global North like the European Union (EU), the Council of Europe (CoE), or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (Hooghe et al.
2017,
2019b). Furthermore, for many of these autocratic ROs, sovereignty protection is a major driver to explain shallow institutional design including informal and consensual forms of decision-making and strong norms protecting sovereignty and non-interference: “One common feature of these regional “ways” is that notwithstanding geographic, cultural, and political differences and the time lag in their evolution, the emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference has remained a powerful constant” (Acharya & Johnston,
2007, p. 246).
I also follow recent scholarship on the international dimension of authoritarian resilience and argue that authoritarian regimes are mostly concerned with preventing regime change, not with promoting authoritarianism as a regime type abroad (Tansey,
2016b; von Soest,
2015; Way,
2015). Consequently, RO membership is assumed to produce a stabilizing effect for regimes, because the mechanisms outlined above are mostly employed during crisis situation when the survival of regimes is in jeopardy. This also builds on democratization literature that has mostly argued that IO membership helps to stabilize newly established democracies by tying hands of future elites that might want to reverse democratic reform efforts, but that membership does not induce regime change (Pevehouse,
2005).
Finally, I restrict the analysis to regional IGOs because I expect that the hypothesized effects should play out particularly within ROs instead of global IGOs. ROs consist of geographically and culturally proximate members, and can thus be particularly well employed to further domestic preferences without the confounding influence of international-level dynamics. ROs tend to be community-oriented, involving fewer numbers and more interaction compared to task-specific and universal membership IGOs that deal with global coordination problems (Hooghe et al.
2019b). Thus, ROs are also closer to domestic and regional political events, so the proposed causal processes should work more easily.