2005 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economies
verfasst von : Guangsug Hahn, Nicholas C. Yannelis
Erschienen in: Differential Information Economies
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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A mechanism
coalitionally implements
a social choice set if any outcome of the social choice set can be achieved as a coalitional Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a mechanism and vice versa. We say that a social choice set is
coalitionally implementable
if there is a mechanism which coalitionally implements it. Our main theorem proves that a social choice set is coalitionally implementable if and only if it is interim individually rational, interim efficient, coalitional Bayesian incentive compatible, and satisfies a coalitional Bayesian monotonicity condition as well as a closure condition. As an application of our main result, we show that the private core and the private Shapley value of an economy with differential information are coalitionally implementable.