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2016 | Buch

Competing on Supply Chain Quality

A Network Economics Perspective

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Über dieses Buch

This book lays the foundations for quality modeling and analysis in the context of supply chains through a synthesis of the economics, operations management, as well as operations research/management science literature on quality. The reality of today's supply chain networks, given their global reach from sourcing locations to points of demand, is further challenged by such issues as the growth in outsourcing as well as the information asymmetry associated with what producers know about the quality of their products and what consumers know. Although much of the related literature has focused on the micro aspects of supply chain networks, considering two or three decision-makers, it is essential to capture the scale of supply chain networks in a holistic manner that occurs in practice in order to be able to evaluate and analyze the competition and the impacts on supply chain quality in a quantifiable manner.

This volume provides an overview of the fundamental methodologies utilized in this book, including optimization theory, game theory, variational inequality theory, and projected dynamical systems theory. It then focuses on major issues in today's supply chains with respect to quality, beginning with information asymmetry, followed by product differentiation and branding, the outsourcing of production, from components to final products, to quality in freight service provision. The book is filled with numerous real-life examples in order to emphasize the generality and pragmatism of the models and tools. The novelty of the framework lies in a network economics perspective through which the authors identify the underlying network structure of the various supply chains, coupled with the behavior of the decision-makers, ranging from suppliers and manufacturers to freight service providers. What is meant by quality is rigorously defined and quantified. The authors explore the underlying dynamics associated with the competitive processes along with the equilibrium solutions. As appropriate, the supply chain decision-makers compete in terms of quantity and quality, or in price and quality. The relevance of the various models that are developed to specific industrial sectors, including pharmaceuticals and high technology products, is clearly made. Qualitative analyses are provided, along with effective, and, easy to implement, computational procedures. Finally, the impacts of policy interventions, in the form of minimum quality standards, and their ramifications, in terms of product prices, quality levels, as well as profits are explored. The book is filled with many network figures, graphs, and tables with data.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter

Quality and Supply Chains

Frontmatter
Chapter 1. Introduction
Abstract
In this chapter, we motivate this book and demonstrate the need for the inclusion of quality in supply chain network modeling, analysis, and computations. Our perspective is that of network economics, which helps to reveal the complex interactions among supply chain decision-makers and their behaviors as well as the topology of the supply chain structures. In addition, we review definitions of quality and discuss how to quantify quality. We also highlight the foundational literature from economics, operations research and management science, and operations management on the subject of quality relevant to supply chain networks. Finally, we describe the scope of this book and the organization of its parts and chapters.
Anna Nagurney, Dong Li
Chapter 2. Methodological Foundations
Abstract
In this chapter, we set the groundwork for the understanding and application of the methodological tools that are utilized for the supply chain network models with quality competition in this book. We first overview the basics of variational inequality theory and the connections with optimization. We provide conditions for existence and uniqueness of solutions, along with the definitions of the essential properties. We relate the variational inequality problem to game theory since game theory models are developed throughout this book in order to formulate competition among supply chain network decision-makers. In addition, we recall the fundamentals of projected dynamical systems theory and the relationships with variational inequality theory in order to enable the description of dynamic interactions among decision-makers in supply chains. For completeness, we also provide results on stability analysis. We discuss some fundamentals of multicriteria decision-making since supply chain decision-makers may be faced with multiple criteria, even conflicting ones, that they wish to optimize. Finally, we present algorithms that are used for solving the supply chain network models with quality competition.
Anna Nagurney, Dong Li

Information Asymmetry in Quality

Frontmatter
Chapter 3. Information Asymmetry and Minimum Quality Standards in Supply Chain Oligopolies
Abstract
This chapter begins Part II of this book with Part II focusing on information asymmetry in product quality. We present a supply chain network model with information asymmetry in product quality. The competing profit-maximizing firms with multiple manufacturing plants know the quality of the product that they produce but consumers, at the demand markets, are aware only of the average quality. The framework is relevant to products ranging from certain foods to pharmaceuticals to durables such as automobiles. We propose an equilibrium model and its dynamic counterpart and show how minimum quality standards can be incorporated. Qualitative results and an algorithm are presented, along with convergence results. The numerical examples, with sensitivity analysis, provide valuable insights for firms, consumers, as well as policy-makers, who impose the minimum quality standards.
Anna Nagurney, Dong Li
Chapter 4. Information Asymmetry in Perfectly Competitive Spatial Price Equilibrium Problems
Abstract
In this chapter, we continue our investigations into information asymmetry and product quality. We now focus on perfectly competitive markets and present a spatial price equilibrium model with information asymmetry in quality in both static and dynamic versions. Producers at the supply markets know the quality of their products, whereas consumers, at the demand markets, are aware only of the average quality of the products that are shipped to their demand markets. Minimum quality standards are included in order to be able to evaluate the impacts of this policy instrument. We provide qualitative results, in the form of existence, uniqueness, and stability analysis. An algorithm is proposed, accompanied by a convergence proof. The algorithm is applied to compute solutions to a spectrum of spatial price equilibrium numerical examples in order to explore the impacts of information asymmetry under different scenarios. The numerical examples reveal that, as the number of supply markets increases, the “anonymizing” effect leads to a decrease in the average quality. In contrast, as the number of demand markets increases, the pressure to improve quality increases, and the average quality increases. Finally, the results reveal that, after minimum quality standards are imposed, the average quality at the demand markets increases and the prices also increase.
Anna Nagurney, Dong Li

Quality in Product Differntiation and Outsourcing

Frontmatter
Chapter 5. Supply Chain Network Oligopolies with Product Differentiation
Abstract
This chapter is the first chapter of Part III of this book, which concentrates on quality in product differentiation and outsourcing settings. In Chap. 3, we noted that quality information asymmetry under product homogeneity could lead to a quality “free ride,” which might jeopardize certain firms’ profits and product quality. Therefore, in order to prevent such harmful results, it is important for firms to differentiate their products from that of their competitors, so that consumers will be able to identify the products of different firms and their quality. In this chapter, we present a supply chain network model with quality competition in differentiated products, where the product of each firm is substitutable but differentiated by a brand or label. We first present the equilibrium model and derive alternative variational inequality formulations. We then construct the projected dynamical systems model, which provides a continuous-time evolution of the firms’ product shipments and product quality levels. The stability analysis results are also presented, and a discrete-time version of the continuous-time adjustment process is constructed, which yields an algorithm with closed form expressions at each iteration. The algorithm is then utilized to compute solutions to several numerical examples. We also include sensitivity analysis results for minimum quality standards. The framework developed in this chapter can serve as the foundation for the modeling and analysis of competition among firms in industries ranging from food to pharmaceuticals to durable goods and high tech products, as well as Internet services, where quality and product differentiation are seminal.
Anna Nagurney, Dong Li
Chapter 6. Supply Chain Network Competition with Multiple Freight Options
Abstract
This chapter extends the results in Chap. 5 to include multiple freight options for the manufacturers to ship their products from their manufacturing plants to consumers at the demand markets. We first develop a static supply chain network model of Cournot-Nash competition with product differentiation, multiple freight options, and quality competition. Each manufacturing firm seeks to maximize its own profit by determining its product shipments and product quality. We utilize variational inequality theory for the formulation of the governing Cournot-Nash equilibrium. We then construct the projected dynamical systems model, which provides a continuous-time evolution of the product shipments of the firms and the product quality levels, and whose set of stationary points coincides with the set of solutions to the variational inequality problem. We establish stability analysis results using a monotonicity approach and construct a discrete-time version of the continuous-time adjustment processes, which yields an algorithm, with closed form expressions at each iteration. The algorithm is then utilized to compute the solutions to several numerical examples. A sensitivity analysis on changes in the demand price functions is also conducted.
Anna Nagurney, Dong Li
Chapter 7. Outsourcing Under Price and Quality Competition: Single Firm Case
Abstract
In this chapter, we add another set of decision-makers to a supply chain network – that of the contractors. We present a supply chain network equilibrium model with outsourcing under price and quality competition. We consider a firm that is engaged in determining the optimal product flows associated with its supply chain network activities in the form of manufacturing and distribution. In addition to multimarket demand satisfaction, the firm seeks to minimize its cost, with the associated function also capturing the firm’s weighted disrepute cost caused by possible quality issues associated with the contractors. Simultaneously, the contractors, who compete with one another in a noncooperative manner in prices a la Bertrand, and in quality, seek to secure manufacturing and distribution of the product from the firm. This game theory model allows for the determination of the optimal product flows associated with the supply chain in-house and outsourcing network activities and provides the firm with its optimal make-or-buy decisions and the optimal contractor-selections. We state the governing equilibrium conditions and derive the equivalent variational inequality formulation. We propose an algorithm and apply it to compute solutions to numerical examples to illustrate the generality and applicability of the framework.
Anna Nagurney, Dong Li
Chapter 8. Outsourcing Under Price and Quality Competition: Multiple Firms
Abstract
In this chapter, we extend the results of Chap. 7 and develop a supply chain network game theory model with product differentiation, possible outsourcing of production and distribution, and quality and price competition among the contractors. The original firms compete with one another in terms of in-house quality levels and product flows, whereas the contractors, aiming at maximizing their own profits, engage in competition for the outsourced production and distribution in terms of prices that they charge and their quality levels. The solution of the model provides each original firm with its optimal in-house quality level as well as its optimal in-house and outsourced production and shipment quantities that minimize the total cost and the weighted cost of disrepute, associated with lower quality levels and the impact on a firm’s reputation. The governing equilibrium conditions of the model are formulated as a variational inequality problem. An algorithm is proposed and numerical supply chain network examples are provided to illustrate how such a supply chain network game theory model can be applied in practice. The model is relevant to products ranging from pharmaceuticals to fast fashion to high technology products.
Anna Nagurney, Dong Li

Supplier Quality and Freight Service Quality

Frontmatter
Chapter 9. The General Multitiered Supply Chain Network Model with Performance Indicators
Abstract
This chapter begins Part IV of this book, which is on supplier quality and freight service quality. In order to set the stage for quality competition with suppliers in Chap. 10, in this chapter we present a multitiered competitive supply chain network game theory model, which includes the supplier tier. The firms are differentiated by brands and can produce their own components, as reflected by their capacities, and/or obtain components from one or more suppliers, who also are capacitated. The firms compete in a Cournot-Nash fashion, whereas the suppliers compete a la Bertrand since firms are sensitive to prices. All decision-makers seek to maximize their profits with consumers reflecting their preferences through the demand price functions associated with the demand markets for the firms’ products. We construct supply chain network performance measures for the full supply chain and the individual firm levels that assess the efficiency of the supply chain or firm, respectively. They allow for the identification and ranking of the importance of suppliers as well as the components of suppliers with respect to the full supply chain or individual firm. The framework is illustrated through a series of numerical supply chain network examples.
Anna Nagurney, Dong Li
Chapter 10. The General Multitiered Supply Chain Model of Quality Competition with Suppliers
Abstract
In this chapter, we extend the model in Chap. 9 to include quality competition among suppliers. We develop a general multitiered supply chain network equilibrium model consisting of competing suppliers and competing firms who purchase components for the assembly of their final branded products and, if capacity permits, and it enhances profits, produce their own components. The competitive behavior of each tier of decision-makers is described along with their strategic variables, which include quality of the components and, in the case of the firms, the quality of the assembly process itself. The governing equilibrium conditions of the supply chain network are formulated as a variational inequality and qualitative properties are presented. The algorithm, accompanied with convergence results, is then applied to numerical supply chain network examples, along with sensitivity analysis in which the impacts of capacity disruptions and complete supplier elimination are investigated.
Anna Nagurney, Dong Li
Chapter 11. The Supply Chain Network Model with Freight Service Provider Competition
Abstract
With this chapter we turn to the inclusion of the behavior of freight service providers engaged in competition in supply chain networks. The manufacturing firms are profit-maximizing and provide substitutable (but not identical) products and compete in quantities in a Cournot-Nash manner. The freight service providers, which transport the products to the consumers at the demand markets, are also profit-maximizers, but compete in prices in Bertrand fashion and on quality. The consumers respond to the composition of product and freight service provision through the demand price functions, which are both quantity and quality dependent. We derive the governing equilibrium conditions of the integrated supply chain network game theory model and show that it satisfies a variational inequality problem. We then describe the underlying dynamics and provide some qualitative properties, including stability analysis. The proposed algorithmic scheme tracks, in discrete-time, the dynamic evolution of the product shipments, the quality levels, and the prices until an approximation of a stationary point (within the desired convergence tolerance) is achieved. Numerical examples demonstrate the modeling and computational framework.
Anna Nagurney, Dong Li
Chapter 12. Supply Chain Network Competition in Prices and Quality
Abstract
In this chapter, we develop static and dynamic competitive supply chain network models with multiple manufacturers and freight service providers. The manufacturers compete with one another in terms of price and quality of the product manufactured, whereas the freight service providers compete on price and quality of the transportation service that they provide for multiple modes. In contrast to the models in preceding chapters in which either demand price functions or fixed demands were utilized, here we use direct demand functions. In addition, in this chapter, we consider both product quality as well as freight service quality in consumer decision-making. Manufacturers and freight service providers maximize their profits while considering the consequences of the competitors’ prices and quality levels. Bounds on prices and quality levels are included that have relevant policy-related implications. The governing equilibrium conditions of the static model are formulated as a variational inequality problem. The underlying dynamics are then described, with the stationary point corresponding to the variational inequality solution. An algorithm, which provides a discrete-time adjustment process and tracks the evolution of the quality levels and prices over time is proposed, and convergence results given. Numerical examples illustrate how such a supply chain network framework, which is relevant to products ranging from high value to low value ones, can be applied in practice.
Anna Nagurney, Dong Li
Backmatter
Metadaten
Titel
Competing on Supply Chain Quality
verfasst von
Anna Nagurney
Dong Li
Copyright-Jahr
2016
Electronic ISBN
978-3-319-25451-7
Print ISBN
978-3-319-25449-4
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25451-7

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