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Decisions in Economics and Finance

Erschienen in:

03.10.2018

Competition and cooperation in the exploitation of the groundwater resource

verfasst von: Marta Biancardi, Lucia Maddalena

Erschienen in: Decisions in Economics and Finance | Ausgabe 2/2018

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Abstract

We study the exploitation of a common groundwater resource, first as a static and then as a differential game, in order to take into account the strategic and dynamic interactions among the users of the resource. We suppose that firms can form coalitions or can decide not to cooperate. The non-cooperation regime is characterized by pumping that lead to depletion of the aquifer; the cooperation preserves the resource. Open-loop and feedback equilibria have been computed and compared in order to characterize the existence of cooperators and defectors in water resources management.

Vorheriger Artikel Environmental depletion, defensive consumption and negative externalities

Nächster Artikel Effects of fixed and continuously distributed delays in a monopoly model with constant price elasticity

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Titel: Competition and cooperation in the exploitation of the groundwater resource
verfasst von: Marta Biancardi
Lucia Maddalena
Publikationsdatum: 03.10.2018
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Erschienen in: Decisions in Economics and Finance / Ausgabe 2/2018
Print ISSN: 1593-8883
Elektronische ISSN: 1129-6569
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10203-018-0217-0

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Competition and cooperation in the exploitation of the groundwater resource

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