nach oben

Political Behavior

Erschienen in:

01.06.2008 | Original Paper

Consideration Sets and Political Choices: A Heterogeneous Model of Vote Choice and Sub-national Party Strength

verfasst von: Carole J. Wilson

Erschienen in: Political Behavior | Ausgabe 2/2008

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config

KI-gestützte Suche

Aus

Abstract

This paper brings to political science a new decision-making model based on research in consumer behavior. Individuals do not necessarily make choices from the universe of alternatives; rather, they choose from a “consideration set,” a notion derived from both utility maximization and information processing theories. Here I apply a model of heterogeneous consideration sets to voting in the 2000 Mexican national election. I argue that the sub-national variation in the strength of Mexican parties leads to heterogeneous consideration sets, resulting in individuals with identical issue preferences and personal attributes making different voting decisions. Application of this model provides both interesting substantive conclusions about vote choice in Mexico and a more general theoretical innovation regarding vote choice.

Vorheriger Artikel Can Partisan Cues Diminish Democratic Accountability?

Nächster Artikel Why Do Experienced Challengers Do Better than Amateurs?

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

The term consideration set comes from Wright and Barbour (1977).

See Roberts and Nedungadi (1995) for a discussion of the differences between these approaches.

I use the term party system to mean the set of competitive parties in a region. In the 1940s, the party system in the US South was different from that in the North. Although the national party system was a competitive two-party, at the sub-national-level, there were multiple party systems.

In actuality, Alvarez and Nagler (1995) argue that Perot’s presence in the race benefited Clinton.

The 1997 election data come from the web site of the Instituto Federal Electoral (http://www.ife.org.mx).

Two exceptions are Hiskey and Bowler (2005) and Hiskey and Canache (2005), which look at the effects of local context on participation and sub-national institutional change in the 2000 election.

An excellent more recent project on Mexican voting is the volume edited by Domínguez and Lawson (2004). While the book is eclectic, a number of pieces in it still conceptualize Mexican vote choice as the two-step process posited by Domínguez and McCann (see especially the chapter by Klesner).

Participants in the Mexico 2000 Panel Study included (in alphabetical order): Miguel Basañez, Roderic Camp, Wayne Cornelius, Jorge Domínguez, Federico Estévez, Joseph Klesner, Chappell Lawson (Principal Investigator), Beatriz Magaloni, James McCann, Alejandro Moreno, Pablo Parás, and Alejandro Poiré. Funding for the study was provided by the National Science Foundation (SES-9905703) and Reforma newspaper. Sampling techniques and survey procedures available on Chappell Lawson’s website: http://web.mit.edu/polisci/faculty/C.Lawson.html.

These results are available from the author.

The average difference in non-response/don’t knows for questions about the PRD and Cardenas between strong and weak PRD states is 31%. The average difference for questions about the PAN and Fox is 42%.

The results in this paper are robust across different waves of the panel data and using past vote share as a measure of party strength, but there are concerns about possible endogenity.

Magaloni and Poiré find 51 strategic voters. I cannot replicate this finding using their described method unless I consider each wave separately. Doing so would overestimate strategic voting. For example, a PRD identifier who intends to vote for the PRD in wave 1 but intends to vote for the PRI in waves 2, 3, and 4 would be counted three times. This would also code PRD identifiers who indicate a vote preference for the PAN in wave 2, but report their actual vote for the PRD in wave 4 as strategic voters. In order to avoid this over-counting I use the voter as the unit of analysis rather than the voter-panel. Thus strategic voters are PRD identifiers who intend to vote for the PRD in panel 1 but their last measured vote intention is for the PAN or PRI.

Fox and Cárdenas were actually candidates for the major parties in coalitions.

I use “conditional” to refer to models with attributes of both the choice and the individual.

For a more detailed discussion of the models and the IIA assumption, see Alvarez and Nagler (1995, 1998); Greene (1997, Chapter 19); Hausman and McFadden (1984); Hausman and Wise (1978); and Whitten and Palmer (1996, Appendix).

Alba, J. W., & Chattopadhyay, A. (1985). Effects of context and part-category cues on recall of competing brands. Journal of Marketing Research, 22(3), 340–349.CrossRef

Alvarez, R. M., & Nagler, J. (1995). Economics, issues and the perot candidacy: Voter choice in the 1992 presidential election. American Journal of Political Science, 39(3), 714–744.CrossRef

Alvarez, R. M., & Nagler, J. (1998). When politics and models collide: Estimating models of multiparty elections. American Journal of Political Science, 42(1), 55–96.CrossRef

Bearden, W. O., Netemeyer, R. G., & Teel, J. E. (1989). Measurement of consumer susceptibility to interpersonal influence. Journal of Consumer Research, 15(4), 473–481.CrossRef

Canache, D., Mondak, J. J., & Conroy, A. (1994). Politics in multiparty context: Multiplicative specifications, social influence, and electoral choice. Public Opinion Quarterly, 58(4), 509–538.CrossRef

Chiang, J., Chib, S., & Narasimhan, C. (1999). Markov Chain Monte Carlo and models of consideration set and parameter heterogeneity. Journal of Econometrics, 89(1–2), 223–248.

Conover, P. J., & Feldman, S. (1984). How people organize the political world: A schematic model. American Journal of Political Science, 28(1), 95–126.CrossRef

Craig, A. L., & Cornelius, W. A. (1995). Houses divided: Parties and political reform in Mexico. In S. Mainwaring & R. S. Timothy (Eds.), Building democratic institutions: Party systems in Latin America (pp. 249–297). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Crosby, L. A., & Taylor, J. R. (1983). Psychological commitment and its effects on post-decision evaluation and preference stability among voters. Journal of Consumer Research, 9(4), 413–431.CrossRef

Domínguez, J. I., & Lawson, C. H. (Eds.). (2004). Mexico’s pivotal democratic election: Campaigns, voters, and the presidential campaign of 2000. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Domínguez, J. I., & McCann, J. A. (1995). Shaping Mexico’s electoral arena: The construction of partisan cleavages in the 1988 and 1991 national elections. American Political Science Review, 89(1), 34–48.CrossRef

Domínguez, J. I., & McCann, J. A. (1996). Democratizing Mexico: Public opinion and electoral choices. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper & Row.

Feldman, S. (1988). Structure and consistency in public opinion: The role of core beliefs and values. American Journal of Political Science, 32(2), 416–440.CrossRef

Gómez, L., & Klesner, J. L. (1988). Mexico’s 1988 elections: The beginning of a new era of Mexican politics? Latin American Studies Association Forum, 19(3), 3–8.

Greene, W. H. (1997). Econometric analysis (3 Ed.). New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Hauser, J., & Wernerfelt, B. (1990). An evaluation cost model of consideration sets. Journal of Consumer Research, 16(4), 393–408.CrossRef

Hausman, J. A., & McFadden, D. (1984). Specification tests for the multinomial logit model. Econometrica, 52(5), 1219–1240.CrossRef

Hausman, J. A., & Wise, D. A. (1978). A conditional probit model for qualitative choice: Discrete decisions recognizing interdependence and heterogeneous preferences. Econometrica, 46(2), 403–426.CrossRef

Hiskey, J. T., & Bowler, S. (2005). Local context and democratization in Mexico. American Journal of Political Science, 49(1), 57–71.CrossRef

Hiskey, J. T., & Canache, D. (2005). The demise of one-party politics in mexican municipal elections. British Journal of Political Science, 35(2), 257–284.CrossRef

Howard, J. A., & Sheth, J. N. (1969). The theory of buyer behavior. New York: Wiley.

Huber, V. L., Neale, M. A., & Northcraft, G. B. (1987). Decision bias and personnel selection strategies. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 40(1), 136–147.CrossRef

Huckfeldt, R. (1986). Politics in context: Assimilation and conflict in urban neighborhoods. New York: Agathon Press.

Huckfeldt, R., & Sprague, J. (1987). Networks in context: The social flow of political information. American Political Science Review, 81(4), 1197–1216.CrossRef

Klein, J. G., & Ahluwalla, R. (2005). Negativity in the evaluation of political candidates. Journal of Marketing, 69, 131–142.CrossRef

Klesner, J. L. (2004). The structure of the Mexican electorate: Social, attitudinal, and partisan bases of Vicente Fox’s victory. In J. I. Domínguez & C. H. Lawson (Eds.), Mexico’s pivotal democratic election: Campaigns, voters, and the presidential campaign of 2000 (pp. 91–122). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Krosnick, J. A. (1989). Attitude importance and attitude accessibility. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 15(3), 297.CrossRef

Laakso, M., & Taagepera, R. (1979). Effective number of parties: A measure with application to West Europe. Comparative Political Studies, 12(1), 3–27.

Levin, I. P., Japser, J. D., & Forbes, W. S. (1998). Choosing versus rejecting options at different stages of decision making. Journal of Behavior Decision Making, 11, 193–210.CrossRef

Lodge, M., & Stroh, P. (1993). Inside the mental voting booth: An impression-driven process model of candidate evaluation. In S. Iyengar & W. J. McGuire (Eds.), Explorations in political psychology (pp. 225–263). Durham: Duke University Press.

Magaloni, B., & Poiré, A. (2004). Strategic coordination in the 2000 Mexican presidential race. In J. I. Domínguez & C. H. Lawson (Eds.), Mexico’s pivotal democratic election: Campaigns, voters, and the presidential campaign of 2000. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Maldonado, R., Tansuhaj, P., & Muehling, D. D. (2003). The impact of gender on ad processing: A social identity perspective. Academy of Marketing and Science, 3, 1–15.

Middlebrook, K. J. (1987). Political liberalization in an authoritarian regime: The case of Mexico. In G. O’Donnell, P. C. Schmitter, & L. Whitehead (Eds.), Transitions from ruthoritarian rule: Latin America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Morgenstern, S., & Zechmeister, E. J. (2001). Better the devil you know than the saint you don’t? Risk propensity and vote choice in Mexico. Journal of Politics, 63(1), 93–119.CrossRef

Nedungadi, P. (1990). Recall and consumer consideration sets: Influencing choice without altering brand evaluations. Journal of Consumer Research, 17(3), 263–276.CrossRef

Newman, B. I., & Sheth, J. N. (1985). A model of primary voter behavior. Journal of Consumer Research, 12(2), 178–187.CrossRef

Poiré, A. (1999). Retrospective voting, partisanship, and loyalty in presidential elections: 1994. In J. I. Domínguez & A. Poiré (Eds.), Toward Mexico’s democratization: Parties, campaigns, elections and public opinion. London: Routledge.

Popkin, S. L. (1991). The reasoning voter: Communication and persuasion in presidential campaigns. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Punj, G., & Brookes, R. (2001). Decision constraints and consideration-set formation in consumer durables. Psychology & Marketing, 18(8), 843–863.CrossRef

Roberts, J., & Lattin, J. M. (1991). Development and testing of a model of consideration set composition. Journal of Marketing Research, 28(4), 429–440.CrossRef

Roberts, J. H., & Lattin, J. M. (1997). Consideration: Review of research and prospects for future insights. Journal of Marketing Research, 34(3), 406–410.CrossRef

Roberts, J., & Nedungadi, P. (1995). Studying consideration in the consumer decision process. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 12, 3–7.CrossRef

Shocker, A. D., Ben-Akiva, M., Boccara, B., & Nedungadi, P. (1991). Consideration set influences on consumer decision-making and choice: Issues, models, and suggestions. Marketing Letters, 2(3), 181–197.

Sniderman, P. M., Brody, R. A., & Tetlock, P. (1991). Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in political psychology. Cambridge University Press.

Stopher, P. R. (1980). Captivity and choice in travel-behavior models. Transportation, 106(4), 427–435.

Swait, J., Adamowicz, W., Hanemann, M., Diederich, A., Krosnick, J., Layton, D., Provencher, W., Schkade, D., & Tourangeau, R. (2002). Context dependence and aggregation in disaggregate choice analysis. Marketing Letters, 13(3), 195–205.CrossRef

Swait, J., & Ben-Akiva, M. (1987). Incorporating random constraints in discrete models of choice set generation. Transportation Research B, 21(2), 91–102.CrossRef

Swinyard, W. R., & Coney, K. A. (1978). Promotional effects on a high-versus low-involvement electorate. Journal of Consumer Research, 5(1), 41–48.CrossRef

Tate, K. (1993). From protest to politics: The new black voters in American elections. Harvard University Press.

Whitten, G. D., & Palmer, H. D. (1996). Heightening comparativists’ concern for model choice: Voting behavior in Great Britain and the Netherlands. American Journal of Political Science, 40(1), 231–260.CrossRef

Williams, H., & Ortúzar, J. D. (1982). Behavior theories of dispersion and the mis-specification of travel demand models. Transportation Research B, 16, 267–219.CrossRef

Wilson, C. J., & Zechmeister, E. J. (1999). Political reform and party competition in Mexico, 1988–1991. In Paper Delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta GA, September 2–5, 1999.

Wright, P., & Barbour, F. (1977). Phased decision strategies: Sequels to infinite screening. In M. K. Starr & M. Zeleny (Eds.), Multiple criteria decision making. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company.

Wyer, R. S., & Ottati, V. C. (1993). Political information processing. In S. Iyengar & W. J. McGuire (Eds.), Explorations in political psychology. Durham: Duke University Press.

Yaniv, I., & Schul, Y. (1997). Elimination and inclusion procedures in judgment. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 10(3), 211–220.CrossRef

Zaller, J. R. (1992). The nature and origins of mass opinion. Cambridge University Press.

Titel: Consideration Sets and Political Choices: A Heterogeneous Model of Vote Choice and Sub-national Party Strength
verfasst von: Carole J. Wilson
Publikationsdatum: 01.06.2008
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: Political Behavior / Ausgabe 2/2008
Print ISSN: 0190-9320
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-6687
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-007-9045-6

Springer Professional

Abstract

Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu Ihrer Lizenz zu erhalten.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Weitere Artikel der Ausgabe 2/2008

Testing Zaller’s Reception and Acceptance Model in an Intense Election Campaign

Reaching Out or Pulling Back: Macroeconomic Conditions and Public Support for Social Welfare Spending

Can Partisan Cues Diminish Democratic Accountability?

Why Do Experienced Challengers Do Better than Amateurs?

Conflict, Fusion, or Coexistence? The Complexity of Contemporary American Conservatism

Premium Partner