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Erschienen in: Constitutional Political Economy 4/2013

01.12.2013 | Original Paper

Constitutional craftsmanship and the rule of law

verfasst von: Shruti Rajagopalan, Richard E. Wagner

Erschienen in: Constitutional Political Economy | Ausgabe 4/2013

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Abstract

Is “rule of law” anything more than a fictional allusion? After all, “law” is an abstract noun, and abstract nouns can’t rule. Only people can rule. The conceptual framework of constitutional political economy invokes a central distinction between choosing rules and playing within those rules. Claims on behalf of a rule of law require a sharp distinction between the enforcement of agreed-upon rules and arbitrary changes in those rules. This paper explores whether there are constitutional arrangements under which it could reasonably be claimed that governance reflects a deep level operation of a rule of law despite the surface level recognition that it is men who rule. With the exercise of rulership being a social process and not a matter of individual action, the network pattern through which rules are enforced takes on particular significance. In particular, polycentric architectures are generally more consistent with rule of law than monocentric architectures.

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Metadaten
Titel
Constitutional craftsmanship and the rule of law
verfasst von
Shruti Rajagopalan
Richard E. Wagner
Publikationsdatum
01.12.2013
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Constitutional Political Economy / Ausgabe 4/2013
Print ISSN: 1043-4062
Elektronische ISSN: 1572-9966
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-013-9144-9

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