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2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

15. Constitutional Reform: Promise and Reality

verfasst von : Dennis C. Mueller

Erschienen in: James M. Buchanan

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Starting with The Calculus of Consent James M. Buchanan published many books and articles emphasizing the importance of constitutional institutions and the promise of constitutional reforms. In this chapter I review some of these publications. The review begins with The Calculus, and then goes on to The Limits of Liberty, The Power to Tax, The Reason of Rules, Politics by Principle, Not Reason, and essays about the importance of constitutions in the European Union. The chapter closes with discussions of the prospects of and impediments to constitutional reform in the United States and the European Union.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Samaritan’s Dilemmas, Wealth Redistribution, and Polycentricity

Nächstes Kapitel Constitutional, Political and Behavioral Feasibility

See, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx, accessed 28 August 2017.

See, http://history.house.gov/Institution/Election-Statistics/Election-Statistics/, accessed 28 August 2017.

See, http://democracyranking.org/wordpress/, accessed 29 August 2017.

For further criticism of bicameralism see Mueller (1996, Chap. 13).

I discuss ideal variants of these systems in Mueller (1996, Chaps. 8–10).

I took some of these questions up in the final chapter of Constitutional Democracy (Mueller 1996).

Aroney, N. (2000). Mueller on European Federation: A Reply from the Perspective of Australian Federalism. Public Choice, 105(3–4), 255–272.CrossRef

Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. M. (1980). The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. M. (1985). The Reason of Rules. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Buchanan, J. M. (1975). The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Buchanan, J. M. (1976). A Hobbesian Interpretation of the Rawlsian Difference Principle. Kyklos, 29(1), 5–25.CrossRef

Buchanan, J. M. (1990). Europe’s Constitutional Opportunity. In Europe’s Constitutional Future (pp. 1–20). London: Institute for Economic Affairs.

Buchanan, J. M. (1995 [1996], Fall/Winter). Federalism and Individual Sovereignty. Cato Journal, 15(2), 259–278.

Buchanan, J. M. (2003). Competitive Federalism by Default. In C. B. Blankart & D. C. Mueller (Eds.), A Constitution for the European Union (pp. 25–35). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Buchanan, J. M., & Congleton, R. D. (1998). Politics by Principle, Not Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef

Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1962). The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.CrossRef

Demsetz, H. (1967). Toward a Theory of Property Rights. American Economic Review, 67(2), 347–359.

Economist. (2017, September 30). Conventional Follies, 21–23.

Fiorina, M. P. (1977). Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Mueller, D. C. (1996). Constitutional Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mueller, D. C. (1997, March). Federalism and the European Union: A Constitutional Perspective. Public Choice, 90(1–4), 255–280.

Mueller, D. C. (2003). Public Choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef

Müller, C. (1998). The Veil of Uncertainty Unveiled. Constitutional Political Economy, 9(1), 5–17.CrossRef

Rawls, J. A. (1972). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.

Reynolds, M. E. (2016, November 22). Republicans in Congress Got a ‘Seat Bonus’ This Election (Again). Washington, DC: FIXGOV, Brookings Institution. http://democracyranking.org/. Accessed 28 August 2017.

Wicksell, K. (1896/1967). A New Principle of Just Taxation, Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen, Jena. Reprinted in R. A. Musgrave & A. T. Peacock (Eds.), Classics in the Theory of Public Finance (pp. 72–118). New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Titel: Constitutional Reform: Promise and Reality
verfasst von: Dennis C. Mueller
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: James M. Buchanan
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-03079-7

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-03080-3

Copyright-Jahr: 2018
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03080-3_15