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Erschienen in:
Authentication and Confidentiality in FPGA-Based Clouds Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

2024 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

6. Contention-Based Threats Between Single-Tenant Cloud FPGA Instances

verfasst von : Ilias Giechaskiel, Shanquan Tian, Jakub Szefer

Erschienen in: Security of FPGA-Accelerated Cloud Computing Environments

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Public cloud infrastructures with FPGA-accelerated virtual machine (VM) instances allow for easy, on-demand access to reconfigurable hardware that users can program with their own designs. These VM instances can be used to accelerate machine learning, image and video manipulation, or genomic applications, for example, [5]. The potential benefits of the instances with FPGAs have resulted in numerous cloud providers including Amazon Web Services (AWS) [14], Alibaba [3], Baidu [20], and Tencent [57], giving public users direct access to FPGAs. However, providing users low-level access to upload their own hardware designs has resulted in serious implications for the security of cloud users and the cloud infrastructure itself. …

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Vorheriges Kapitel Practical Implementations of Remote Power Side-Channel and Fault-Injection Attacks on Multitenant FPGAs
Nächstes Kapitel Cross-board Power-Based FPGA, CPU, and GPU Covert Channels
Fußnoten
1
Section 6.4.5 shows that different setups can result in even higher bandwidths exceeding 20 kbps.
 
2
Assuming that slots within a server are assigned randomly, the probability of getting instances with shared SSDs given that they are already co-located in the same NUMA node is 33%: out of the three remaining slots in the same NUMA node, exactly one slot can be in an instance that shares the SSD.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Contention-Based Threats Between Single-Tenant Cloud FPGA Instances
verfasst von
Ilias Giechaskiel
Shanquan Tian
Jakub Szefer
Copyright-Jahr
2024
Buch
Security of FPGA-Accelerated Cloud Computing Environments

Print ISBN: 978-3-031-45394-6

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-031-45395-3

Copyright-Jahr: 2024

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45395-3_6

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