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Economics of Governance
Erschienen in: Economics of Governance 1/2014

01.02.2014 | Original Paper

Corruption, regulation, and growth: an empirical study of the United States

verfasst von: Noel D. Johnson, William Ruger, Jason Sorens, Steven Yamarik

Erschienen in: Economics of Governance | Ausgabe 1/2014

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Abstract

This paper investigates whether the costs of corruption are conditional on the extent of government intervention in the economy. We use data on corruption convictions and economic growth between 1975 and 2007 across the US states to test this hypothesis. Although no state approaches the level of government intervention found in many developing countries, we still find evidence for the “weak” form of the grease-the-wheels hypothesis. While corruption is never good for growth, its harmful effects are smaller in states with more regulation.
Vorheriger Artikel Fiscal decentralization and public sector efficiency: evidence from OECD countries
Nächster Artikel Trust in government and its effect on preferences for income redistribution and perceived tax burden

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Fußnoten
1
A third group of scholars (Drury et al. 2006) argue that corruption has little impact one way or the other.
 
2
Concomitantly, some argue that corruption should reduce the effectiveness of regulation (Breen and Gillanders 2012).
 
3
The fact that a single federal government prosecutes cases of local corruption across all the federal jurisdictions further constrains variation on the independent variables and “controls for” the manner in which differing state cultures might otherwise affect prosecutions and thus the observed prevalence of corruption.
 
4
Although Myrdal’s pronouncement is more famous, Leff (1964) noted the taboo a half decade before Myrdall’s famous piece.
 
5
Lui (1996) surveys many of these contributions up to the mid-90’s.
 
6
See also Rose-Ackerman (1999), La Porta et al. (1999), Ades and di Tella (1999), Treisman (2000), Drury et al. (2006), Fisman and Svensson (2007), and Aidt (2009).
 
7
For a more formal treatment of the theoretical relationship between corruption and efficiency, see Leys (1965), Shleifer and Vishny (1993), and Méon and Weill (2010).
 
8
Boylan and Long (2003) provide an alternative survey-based measure of perceived corruption for US states. We will use this as an alternative measure as part of our robustness analysis.
 
9
These are the same instruments used in Johnson et al. (2011).
 
10
For 2SLS we assume that corruption is endogenous and freedom is exogenous given the timing of the data and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test results in Table 2. As a result, we use the three instruments for corruption and those instruments interacted with freedom (Ozer-Balli and Sorensen 2010).
 
11
The Mercatus Center economic freedom is a composite measure of state fiscal policy along with regulatory and judicial policies (Ruger and Sorens 2011). Unfortunately, the data are only available starting in 2007 so there is a strong likelihood of reverse causality even in the 2SLS.
 
12
We use the response from question 6 on the overall perception of corruption. Note that a zero response rate from Massachusetts, New Hampshire and New Jersey reduced our sample to 47 states Boylan and Long (2003).
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Corruption, regulation, and growth: an empirical study of the United States
verfasst von
Noel D. Johnson
William Ruger
Jason Sorens
Steven Yamarik
Publikationsdatum
01.02.2014
Verlag
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Erschienen in
Economics of Governance / Ausgabe 1/2014
Print ISSN: 1435-6104
Elektronische ISSN: 1435-8131
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-013-0132-3

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