5. Critical Erosion of the European Union’s Credibility

See Nathalie Tocci, “Elite Opinion Dimension: Behind the Scenes of Turkey’s Protracted Accession Process: European Elite Debates,” in A.E. Cakir (ed.), Fifty Years of EU–Turkey Relation: A Sisyphean Story (Oxon: Routledge, 2011).

“Consolidate Version of the Treaty on European Union,” Title One: Common Provisions. The original Art. 6 of TEU 1992 was similar to the present version.

From the “Birkelbach Report” produced by the European Parliament in January 1962 and cited in Geoffrey Pridham, Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2005), p. 30.

Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council, Copenhagen, 21–22 June 1993.

“As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community.” Art. 2 of the Agreement established three stages of the relations between the two parties, with the final one culminating in full membership. The “Agreement Creating an Association Between the Republic of Turkey and the European Economic Community” was signed in September 1963 and into force on 1 January 1964.

European Commission, “Agenda 2000—For a Stronger and Wider Europe,” Bulletin of the European Union, Supplement 5/97, pp. 47–57 COM(97) 2000, vol. II, Section “Strategy for Enlargement.” Emphasis added. See Graham Avery and Fraser Cameron, The Enlargement of the European Union (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), Chapter 6. See also William Wallace, “Where Does Europe End? Dilemmas of Inclusion and Exclusion,” in J. Zielonka (ed.), Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union (London: Routledge, 2002).

European Council, Luxembourg (12–13 December 1997), Presidency Conclusions, para. 31. Emphasis added.

George Christou, The European Union and Enlargement: The Case of Cyprus (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2004), p. 75. Also, Ali Resul Usul, Democracy in Turkey: The Impact of EU Conditionality (New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 81.

European Commission, “Toward the Enlarged Union: Strategy Paper and Report of the European Commission on the Progress Towards Accession by Each of the Candidate States,” COM (2002) 700 final, October 9, p. 4.

Emphasis added.

Emphasis added.

Lionel Barber, “EU Group Rebuffs Turkish Entry Push,” Financial Times, 5 March 1997. The German Ambassador to Ankara bluntly stated to the Turkish daily Milliyet, in late August 1997, that “Turkey does not fit into any group of candidates”. Cited in Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey: A Challenge to Europe and the US (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p. 287, footnote 40. That disposition toward Turkey was rooted in the very way, since long, the Europeans had attempted to establish “Europeaness”. From the time pope Callistus III, in the middle of the Fifteen century, spoke of “our Europe, our Christian Europe” to reinvigorate the crusade, now against the expanding Ottoman empire, all attempts to form a European identity have depended on the cultural and social construction of an “other”—and, as Iver Neumann documented, during many centuries “the Turk” was “the dominant other” that afforded the Europeans that common identity. Iver B. Neumann, Uses of the Other: The East in European Identity Formation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). Also Meltem Muftuler-Bac, “Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe,” Turkish Studies, 1.1 (Spring 2000), who stresses how the “Turks represented all that was negated in European identity: savage, barbarian, despotic, oppressive, violent and a threat to European civilization.”

Hajo G. Boomgaarden and Andreas M. Wüst, “Religion and Party Positions Towards Turkish EU Accession,” Comparative European Politics, 10 (2012). Also Tocci, “Elite Opinion Dimension,” cit. Such an attitude toward Turkey’s membership was not limited to Christian democratic parties. Former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, a social-democrat, similarly expressed his opposition to Turkey’s accession because of that country’s “unsuitable civilization.” See Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, “Negotiating Europe: The Politics of Religion and the Prospects for Turkish Accession,” Review of International Studies, 32.3 (2006), p. 406.

See Rachid Azrout, Joost van Spanje, and Claes de Vreese, “A Threat Called Turkey: Perceived Religious Threat and Support for EU Entry of Croatia, Switzerland and Turkey,” Acta Politica, 48.1 (2013); Lauren M. McLaren, “Explaining Opposition to Turkish Membership of the EU,” European Union Politics, 8.2 (2007).

Le Monde, 8 November 2004. Giscard re-started the whole debate over the eligibility of Turkey in an interview with Le Monde days after the AKP’s electoral victory of 3 November 2002. See Claire Visier, “La Turquie,” cit.

6 October 2004.

As the agreement states, “if the EU is not in a position to take in new members or Turkey cannot fully meet the criteria necessary for membership, Turkey must be bound closely to the European structures in a way that allows its privileged relationship with the EU to develop further.” Quoted from Der Spiegel in “German Parties Won’t Rule Out Turkey’s EU Bid,” Daily News (Beirut), 17 October 2009.

European Commission’s “Opinion on the Application of the Republic of Cyprus for Membership,” 30 June 1993, Conclusions. See European Commission, Enlargement, Archives. The close relationship maintained with Great Britain (that had annexed it in late XIX Century and remained on the island with two military bases) had made the EEC considering Cyprus’ membership when accession negotiations started with London in 1962.

See Ebru S. Canan-Sokullu and Cigdem Kentmen, “Public Opinion Dimension: Turkey in the EU? An Empirical Analysis of European Public Opinion on Turkey’s ‘Protracted’ Accession Process,” in A.E. Cakir (ed.), Fifty Years of EU–Turkey Relations, cit., pp. 115–16.

Canan-Sokullu and Kentmen, “Public Opinion Dimension,” cit.

See Lauren M. McLaren, “Explaining Opposition to Turkish Membership of the European Union,” European Union Politics, 8.2 (2007), especially pp. 278–79. For Islam as a negative factor and the European Parliament’s debate on Turkey see Paul T. Levin, Turkey and the European Union: Christian and Secular Images of Islam (New York: Palgrave, 2011), pp. 200–1.

Claes de Vreese et al., “(In)direct Framing Effects: The Effects of News Media Framing on Public Support for Turkish Membership in the European Union,” Communication Research, 38.2 (April 2011). For how Austria’s public opinion on Turkish accession reflected the political elites’ position see Alexander Burgin, “Ongoing Opposition in the West, New Options in the East: Is Turkey’s EU Accession Process Reversible?” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 12.4 (December 2010), p. 423. Also, Independent Commission on Turkey, “Turkey in Europe: Breaking the Vicious Circle,” (September 2009); Centre for the study of political change, European Elites Survey: Survey of Members of the European Parliament & Top European Commission and European Council Officials (Compagnia di San Paolo, 2008). Islamophobia grew exponentially after September 11, 2001.

Interview with the Author, Summer 2012.

Ankara refused to take part in the Paris conference, in July 2008, until received assurances that membership in the Mediterranean Union was not meant as alternative to membership. Chaired, with Sarkozy, by Egyptian autocrat Hosni Mubarak, the “Union” stopped to be mentioned as framework of the EU’s Mediterranean policy with the arrival of the Arab Spring.

Armagan Emre Cakir, “Political Dimension: Always in the List of ‘Also Ran’: Turkey’s Rivals in EU–Turkey Relations,” in A.E. Cakir (ed.), Fifty Years of EU–Turkey Relations: A Sisyphean Story (Oxon: Routledge, 2011), cit., especially p. 32.

See Nathalie Tocci, “Elite Opinion Dimension: Behind the Scenes of Turkey’s Protracted Accession Process: European Elite Debates,” in Cakir (ed.), Fifty Years of EU–Turkey Relations, cit., pp. 87–88.

A parallel consideration in Ahmet Insel, “Boosting Negotiations with Turkey: What Can France Do?” Policy Brief 4, Stiftung Mercator (November 2012).

See Geoffrey Pridham, Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005), p. 42. On the evolution of EU conditionality see Chapter 1.

Commission of the European Communities, “Issues Arising from Turkey’s Membership Perspective,” Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2004) 1202 (Brussels, 6 October 2004), p. 4. Emphasis added.

“Negotiating Framework” (Luxembourg, 3 October 2005), p. 1.

See Nathalie Tocci, “New Doubts and Uncertainties in Turkey–EU Relations,” Paper, Centre for European Policy Studies (October 2000).

Pridham, “Change and Continuity in the European Union’s Political Conditionality,” cit., p. 464.

For a similar assessment see Usul, Democracy in Turkey, cit., p. 118; Dismorr, Turkey Decoded, cit., p. 66. For the Framework and the negotiations see Nathalie Tocci, The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting Peace in the Backyard (London: Routledge, 2007), Chapter 4.

“Negotiating Framework,” cit. Art. 2. Emphasis added.

“Negotiating Framework,” cit., Art. 6. The Additional Protocol extended the Ankara (Association) Agreement to the ten new members of the Union. Regarding Cyprus, most relevant was the extension of the obligations pertaining to the EU–Turkey Customs Union.

Cakir, “Political Dimension,” cit.

On 15 November 1983 the Turkish-Cypriot parliament established the TRNC. While opposed, Ankara recognized the TRNC the next April.

Cakir, “Political Dimension,” cit., p. 35. EC, European Council, Dublin, 25–26 June 1990, Presidency Conclusions, Annex VIII. Similarly, the “Commission’s Opinion advising against the acceptance of Turkey’s application” mentions “the negative effects of the dispute between Turkey and [Greece], and also the situation in Cyprus,” as obstacles to that application.

Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, cit., pp. 142–43; Christou, The European Union and Enlargement, cit., pp. 80, 147–48. Also, “Turkey-TRNC Joint Declaration, January 20, 1997,” Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011, http://​www.​mfa.​gov.​tr/​turkey-trnc-joint-declaration-january-20_​-1997.​en.​mfa.

See Dismorr, Turkey Decoded, cit., p. 40. Neill Nugent, “EU Enlargement and ‘the Cyprus Problem’,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 38.1 (March 2000).

Commission of the European Communities, “Commission Opinion on the Application by the Republic of Cyprus for Membership,” COM 93 final/2 (1 September 1993). Emphasis added. The subsequent reference made by the European Council to the Opinion’s suggestion to start using right away the instruments afforded by the Association Agreement, “to contribute […] to the economic, social and political transition of Cyprus towards integration with the Community,” will be equivocated by the Greek-Cypriot side into a sort of bypassing of the reunification issue for the start of the accession talks. See Embassy of the Republic of Cyprus in Washington, DC, Official Website, “Application for Membership—Pre-Accession Strategy,” http://​cyprusembassy.​net/​home/​index.​php?​module=​page&​cid=​31.

For instance, EU Commissioner Van den Broek, in Cyprus News Agency, “EU Warns Turkey, Turkish Cypriots,” 17 April 1998. A Greek-Cypriot diplomatic campaign portrayed the situation as one in which Cyprus and the EU were hostage of an illegal government, the TRNC, and an uncompromising non-member state, Turkey. See Nugent, “EU Enlargement and ‘the Cyprus Problem’,” cit., p. 137.

Commission of the European Communities, “Commission Opinion on the Application by the Republic of Cyprus for Membership,” cit. (1 September 1993), p. 22.

Philippe Monfils, co-chair of the EU-Cyprus Joint Parliamentary Committee, quoted by Cyprus News Agency, 23 April 1998. See also the position expressed by EU Commissioner for External Affairs Van den Broek in 1997 cited in Christou, The European Union and Enlargement, cit., p. 72; Commission of the European Union, “Agenda 2000,” cit., p. 55. See also Chapters 3 and 4, The European Union and Enlargement, cit., on this; Susannah Verney, “The Cyprus issue in the European Parliament,” in N. Tocci and T. Diez, Cyprus: A Conflict at the Crossroads (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), pp. 144–45.

Quoted in C. Andrew, “EU Enlargement: The Political Process,” Research Paper 98/55, House of Commons Library, International Affairs and Defence Section (London: 1 May 1998), p. 26.

Nugent, “EU Enlargement and ‘the Cyprus Problem’,” cit., p. 134.

Cyprus News Agency, “Verheugen Says No EU Talks for Turkey with Cyprus Issue Pending,” 19 November 2003.

Luxembourg European Council, 20 November 1997, Presidency Conclusions.

2003 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Toward Accession (Brussels 2003), p. 45.

2004 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Toward Accession (Brussels 2004), p. 19.

“Commission’s Opinion,” cit., Conclusions. Emphasis added.

European Council at Corfu, 24–25 June 1994, Presidency Conclusions. In December, the Essen European Council will repeat the same position.

See Christou, The European Union and Enlargement, cit., pp. 132–33; Dismorr, Turkey Decoded, cit., p. 40; Meltem Muftuler-Bac and Aylin Guney, “The European Union and the Cyprus Problem, 1961–2003,” Middle Eastern Studies, 41.2, p. 283.

See Gideon Rachman, “How Europe’s Leaders Run Out of Credit,” Financial Times, 19 March 2013: “Greece had threatened to veto the entire enlargement of the EU […] unless Cyprus was admitted […] EU leaders succumbed to that act of blackmail.” Also Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, cit., pp. 496–97.

Presidency Conclusions. Emphasis added.

Declaration by the Greek Foreign Minister, in Cyprus News, Cyprus High Commission, London, November 1966, No. 87.

“Cyprus President Meets with Hellenic Parliament President,” Embassy News, Cyprus Embassy, 29 November 2007: “[T]he decision of the Hellenic Parliament that all ten candidate states, including Cyprus, should accede to the EU and its firm stand that if Cyprus does not join, no other candidate should join the EU, were very decisive for our accession.”

See the detailed account by Claire Palley, An International Relations Debacle: The UN Secretary General’s Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999–2004 (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005), p. 122. For the position above see Ahmet Sozen, “The Cyprus Challenge in Turkey–EU Relations: Heading Towards the Defining Moment?” in F. Cengiz and L. Hoffmann (eds.), Turkey and the European Union: Facing New Challenges and Opportunities (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 47–48.

That of 31 March was the fifth version of the Plan, the first one going back to November 2002. Having restarted negotiations, on 13 February 2004 the two sides agreed on a three-phased procedure to bring the talks to conclusion and to simultaneous referendums before 1 May. In case of deadlock, in phase III the parties would invite the UNSG to finalize the text.

United Nations, Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus,” S/2004/437, para. 87.

Cited in www.​parliament.​uk, cit.

See www.​parliament.​uk, House of Commons, Foreign Affairs, Written Evidence, “Further Written Evidence from the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” President’s Office, 10 November 2009.

Papadopoulos took office (February 2003) with a reputation of rejectionist of the UN reunification Plan, then showed a more cooperative approach in the first several months in office. See Helena Smith, “Threat to Cyprus Deal as Hardliner Elected,” The Guardian, 17 February 2003. For a contemporary account of Papadopoulos’ position, see “Turkey’s EU Bid in Doubt After Cyprus Talks Collapse,” The Independent, 12 March 2003.

Cited in www.​parliament.​uk cit. See also “One Island, Two Cultures,” The Independent, 24 April 2004.

“Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus,” cit., para. 8.

Cited in www.​parliament.​uk, cit.

European Council, Brussels 16/17 December 2004, “Presidency Conclusions,” Section on Turkey.

Peter Ludlow, “Dealing with Turkey: The European Council of 16–17 December 2004,” A View from Brussels, Eurocomment, Briefing Note 3.7 (Brussels, February 2005).

See “Declaration by the European Community and Its Member States,” Brussels, 21 September 2005, 12541/05 (Presse 243), para. 5. The EU’s counter-declaration considered Ankara’s statement to be “unilateral,” and having no consequences with regard to Turkey’s obligations under the Protocol. See also Marcel Brus et al., “A Promise to Keep: Time to End the International Isolation of the Turkish Cypriots,” TESEV, Foreign Policy Analysis Series, No. 7 (Istanbul, June 2008), p. 14.

Council of the European Union, “Council Conclusions on Cyprus,” 27 April 2004. The names of the Commission’s “twin” instruments are Financial Aid Regulation and Direct Trade Regulation. General Affairs Council, “2576th General Affairs Council meeting in Luxembourg, 26 April 2004.”

Europa, Press Release, “Commission Proposes Comprehensive Measures to End Isolation of Turkish-Cypriot Community,” Brussels, 7 July 2004. Also, on 29 April, the European Council adopted the (Cyprus’) Green Line regulation concerning trade between the two communities. See Council of the European Union, “Council Regulation (EC) No. 866/2004 of 29 April 2004 on a regime under Art. 2 of Protocol 10 to the Act of Accession” (2004).

Cited in Brus et al., “A Promise to Keep,” cit., p. 18.

“Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus,” cit., para. 93. For the implications of non-recognition action by the UNSC and for the details of this case see Brus et al., “A Promise to Keep,” cit., pp. 18ff. Commercial interaction with Northern Cyprus continued unimpeded after 1984 and until 1994.

See Brus et al., “A Promise to Keep,” cit., p. 14.

On the isolation of Northern Cyprus see Brus et al., “A Promise to Keep,” cit. The restrictions imposed from 1963 to 1968 by the ROC were condemned by the UNSG in a report to the Security Council.

Brus et al., “A Promise to Keep,” cit.—challenge the position that lifting European sanctions would constitute recognition of the TRNC.

After 2004, Greece chose to lower its profile on issues concerning Cyprus while the ROC was now dealing with them as EU member-state. See International Crisis Group, “Reunifying Cyprus: The Best Chance Yet,” Europe Report No. 194 (23 June 2008), p. 22 and footnote 201. As late as 1999 Greece was considered main interlocutor on matters related to Cyprus and, as such, in December of that year, it verbally promised that ROC would accept the UN-led plans for a bi-communal solution of the island’s division. See International Crisis Group, “Turkey and Europe: The Way Ahead,” Europe Report No. 184 (17 August 2007), p. 3.

See Brus et al., “A Promise to Keep,” cit., p. 1.

European Council, “Conclusions,” 11 December 2006. See Chapter 4.

The Commission’s 2006 Progress Report, COM (2006), Brussels 8 November 2006, p. 24 stated: “EU representatives have frequently reminded the Turkish government that implementation of the Protocol is a legal obligation as such, which must not be linked to the situation of the Turkish Cypriot community.”

See Burgin, “Ongoing Opposition in the West, New Options in the East,” cit., p. 424.

BBC News, “Cyprus ‘May Veto’ EU–Turkey Talks,” 30 November 2006.

In an interview with the author (April 2009), a senior Commission official, while defending the existing EU decision-making mechanisms, also conceded that “Cyprus has certainly abused its veto power.”

Ludlow, “Dealing with Turkey,” cit.

“Greek Cyprus: EU Members Hiding Behind Us Against Ankara,” The New Anatolian, 21 October 2006. Steven A. Cook, Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria and Turkey (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), p. 130—qualifies the EU’s behaviour toward Turkey as “duplicitous.”

European Commission, Eurobarometer, Numbers from 61 through 70. In 2009, a German Marshall Fund survey—Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings, 2009, pp. 24–25—found that only 28 per cent of interviewees believed that someday Turkey would become a member of the Union. See also Ali Carkoglu and Cigdem Kentmen, “Diagnosing Trends and Determinants in Public Support for Turkey’s EU Membership,” South European Society and Politics, 16.3 (2011).

In a 2007 interview with this author, a retired senior officer likened the possible withdrawal from Cyprus to the loss of another important island, Crete, in 1913, and related the whole issue to the question of power balances in the Eastern Mediterranean.

On 1 January 2003, Erdogan criticized the “status quo policy” followed by successive cabinets during 29 years. See Turkey Update, cit. See also Radio Free Europe, 24 January 2003, “Turkey: New Leadership Faces Difficulties in Addressing Cyprus Issue,” www.​eurac.​edu/​webscripts/​eurac/​services/​viewblobnews.​asp?

Two days after the election in the TRNC, Erdogan warned the new leaders against changing course with regard to the settlement. See Security Council Report, Update Report No. 6, 28 April 2009. At the April 2009 election in Northern Cyprus, Dervis Eroglu’s National Unit Party gained 44 per cent of the votes while Talat’s Republican Party dropped to 29 per cent. A nationalist, Eroglu was critical of Talat’s positions on the settlement.

International Crisis Group, “Reunifying Cyprus,” cit., p. 19.

See Sedef Eylemer and Ilkay Tas, “Pro-EU and Euroskeptic Circles in Turkey,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 23.4 (December 2007), cit., p. 572. TÜSIAD: Türkiye Sanayici ve Isadamlari Dernegi. TOBB: Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği.

“No Love Lost,” cit.

Austrian Prime Minister Wolgang Schüssel differed from Plassnik and kept a more open position with regard to Turkey’s accession. See Graham Bowley, “Turkey Rebuffs EU Pressures on Cyprus,” New York Times, 31 August 2005 and “Turkey’s EU Entry Talks,” BBC News, 11 December 2006. Also Eylemer and Tas, “Pro-EU and Euroskeptics Circles in Turkey,” cit., p. 564.