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2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

2. Different Types of Manipulation in Sport

verfasst von : Wladimir Andreff

Erschienen in: The Palgrave Handbook on the Economics of Manipulation in Sport

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Increased money inflow into sports and its globalisation have triggered a number of dysfunctions, manipulations and corrupt practices over the last four decades or so, creating a so-called dark side of sport and its industry. Nowadays, such behaviours spread over an increasing set of sport disciplines worldwide; first, they simply breach sport rules; then they infringe the sport ethics and jeopardise sport integrity.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Introduction

Nächstes Kapitel The Impact of Manipulation on the Global Demand for Sport

On the dark side of sport, see the special issue of European Sport Management Quarterly, 9(4), 2009.

Though these transfers involve a dimension of human trafficking, they are not directly distorting sporting outcomes on purpose and have not attracted criminals into sport—only unscrupulous and unregistered players’ agents—so far (Andreff 2010); they will not be covered here as a sport manipulation.

A more detailed analysis of different types of corruption in sport is available in Andreff (2015a).

Collusion is a variant of barter corruption. In response to vote trading scandals in the 1998 and 2002 Olympics, the International Skating Union introduced a number of changes in its former judging system, obscuring which judge issues which mark. The intent was to disrupt collusion by groups of judges (Zitzewitz 2014).

In November 2015, the Russian Athletics Federation was suspended for a state-organised doping system of athletes selected in the national squad for the athletics world championships. Further investigations have found that this system was extended to Russian participants in the London and Sochi Olympics.

Moreover, the list of forbidden substances is always updated with delay compared to the emergence of new products; the last significant update of the WADA list dates back to 2011. Moreover, the publication of doping tests is delayed as well; for instance, during the Rio Olympics in 2016, it was published that 98 athletes were doped … at the Beijing 2008 and London 2012 Games, seven of which ex post lost their medals. It would probably take about ten years to know the “genuine” podiums at the Rio Games after some ex post disqualifications.

When it is so, as pointed out by Bourg and Gouguet (2015), the sporting outcome is unchanged, but all the athletes have put their health and even their life in jeopardy. And here we are since the number of doped athletes in 2010 was assessed to be in the range of 7–8 million people in the world (Bourg 2016).

Forrest (2006) and Dietl and Weingärtner (2012) have pointed out that the outcome of a sporting event is an input used by sport bets’ suppliers in a regular bet—without upstream match-fixing. A fixed sporting outcome obviously is also an input though it is not the one expected (wished) by regular punters, bookmakers and betting operators.

In line with first intuitions formulated in Bird and Wagner (1997) and Breivik (1992).

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Titel: Different Types of Manipulation in Sport
verfasst von: Wladimir Andreff
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: The Palgrave Handbook on the Economics of Manipulation in Sport
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-77388-9

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-77389-6

Copyright-Jahr: 2018
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77389-6_2

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