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Review of Accounting Studies
Erschienen in: Review of Accounting Studies 3/2010

01.09.2010

Discussion of: “Flattening the organization: the effect of organizational reporting structure on budgeting effectiveness”

verfasst von: Richard A. Young

Erschienen in: Review of Accounting Studies | Ausgabe 3/2010

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Abstract

This paper is a discussion of Hannan et al. (Rev Account Stud, 2010), wherein subordinate-participants are endowed with private information, and superior-participants can potentially affect budget requests through their ability to reject them. Their findings are of interest to research on both the design of budgeting systems and span of control. I discuss the relevance of HRT to these literatures and comment on their implementation and experimental design. Also, I offer suggestions for future research, one of which is to explicitly introduce monitoring into experiments on span of control.
Vorheriger Artikel Flattening the organization: the effect of organizational reporting structure on budgeting effectiveness
Nächster Artikel Are CEOs compensated for value destroying growth in earnings?

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Fußnoten
1
The budget requests may be interpreted as cost reports, although these terms may induce a different decision frame for experimental participants.
 
2
In a similar decision and information environment, Arya et al. (1996) investigate a one-principal, two-agent setting. They provide conditions under which the optimal policy takes the form of relative project evaluation, even though there are no exogenous restrictions on available funding. Their setting differs from HRT in that it assumes (1) full commitment abilities for the principal, (2) a positive correlation between project costs, and (3) individual wealth maximization for all parties.
 
3
Of course, this assumption must be violated to make these sorts of experiments interesting.
 
4
This issue also arises in Schwarz et al. (2009a).
 
5
An exception can be found in Rankin et al. (2008), wherein subordinates seemed to care about being honest, but only if superiors were forced to accept the budget requests.
 
6
Schwartz et al. (2009b) study “unobservable commitments,” which are in the laboratory essentially the strategy method. They find that the method of extracting responses has a surprising and significant effect on the superior’s strategies in a setting very close to HRT.
 
Literatur
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Arya, A., Glover, J., & Young, R. (1996). Capital budgeting in a multidivisional firm. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 11(4), 519–534.
Blount, S., & Bazerman, M. (1996). The inconsistent evaluation of absolute versus comparative payoffs in labor supply and bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 30, 227–240.CrossRef
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Demski, J. (2004). Endogenous expectations. The Accounting Review, 79(2), 519–539.CrossRef
Demski, J. (2008). Managerial uses of accounting information (2nd ed.). New York: Springer.
Hannan, R., Rankin, F., & Towry, K. (2010). Flattening the organization: The effect of organizational reporting structure on budgeting effectiveness. Review of Accounting Studies (forthcoming).
Keren, M., & Levhari, D. (1979). The optimum span of control in a pure hierarchy. Management Science, 25(11), 1162–1172.CrossRef
Marschak, J., & Radner, R. (1972). Economic theory of teams. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Rankin, F., Schwartz, S., & Young, R. (2003). Management control using non-binding budgetary announcements. Journal of Management Accounting Research, 15, 75–93.CrossRef
Rankin, F., Schwartz, S., & Young, R. (2008). The effect of honesty and superior authority on budget proposals. The Accounting Review, (July), 1083-1099.
Williamson, O. (1967). Hierarchical control and optimal firm size. The Journal of Political Economy, 75(2), 123–138.CrossRef
Metadaten
Titel
Discussion of: “Flattening the organization: the effect of organizational reporting structure on budgeting effectiveness”
verfasst von
Richard A. Young
Publikationsdatum
01.09.2010
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Review of Accounting Studies / Ausgabe 3/2010
Print ISSN: 1380-6653
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-7136
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-010-9122-7

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