Do Investors See Value in Ethically Sound CEO Apologies? Investigating Stock Market Reaction to CEO Apologies

Since the late 1990s, the number of apologies being offered by CEOs of large companies has exploded (Lindner in Austin American-Statesman, 2007; Adams in USA Today, 2000). Communication and management scholars have analyzed whether and why some of these apologies are more effective or more ethical than others (Souder in Sci Eng Ethics 16:175–184, 2010; Benoit in Accounts, excuses, and apologies: a theory of image restoration strategies, 1995a; Benoit and Czerwinski in Bus Commun Q 60:38–57, 1997). Most of these analyses, however, have remained at the anecdotal level. Moreover, the practical, economic consequences of apologies have not been examined. Almost no rigorous or systematic empirical work exists that examines whether stakeholders (1) reward firms whose CEOs give apologies that are more, rather than less, ethical; and (2) punish firms whose corporate apologies are not ethically sound. This lacuna is surprising given that the whole purpose of an apology is to restore trust between the apologizer and the recipients of the apology. It is also surprising, given that stock market participants do appear, in at least some cases, to evaluate and respond to apologies by CEOs. When Johnson and Johnson was hit by the Tylenol poisonings, its stock price plummeted. One day after CEO James Burke’s apology—an apology widely praised for being ethically sound—approximately a half billion dollars of its previously lost stock value was restored (The financial effect of Burke’s 1982 apology was calculated using Eventus data for a window −1, +1 days around the date of the actual apology.). It appears, then, that a good CEO apology may lead to an increased stock value ceteris paribus. But is the Johnson and Johnson case representative of how the market responds in general to CEO apologies?