East Meets West: Toward a Universal Ethic of Virtue for Global Business

As I have argued elsewhere, referring to “Asian” ethics or “Western” ethics is problematic because these geographical regions are huge and contain diverse communities. Moreover, cultures are not static nor are they isolated from each other. Cultures are continually cross-pollinating each other with ideas. However, in this paper, I have retained references to Eastern and Western ethics because these terms belong to the discourse of moral relativists who want to insist upon the vast disparity in cultures and their ethics (see, e.g., Quintelier and Fessler 2012). As I argue in this paper, pace the cultural ethical relativists, these cultures are not in fact so different insofar as elements of virtue ethics expounded by Aristotle and Confucius and manifested in countries as diverse as France (Western) and China (Eastern) are remarkably the same.

The only author I have found who has attempted a sustained and multi-topic comparison of Confucius and Aristotle is Yu (1998a). My analysis differs from his in several crucial respects. First, Yu is not especially interested in arguing for the possibility of a universal virtue of ethic as a counter to ethical relativism. Second, he is really contrasting Confucianism with Aristotle insofar as he draws on texts by Mencius and on other “Confucian” classics, not confining himself to the Analects (whose comments are traditionally imputed at least in part to Confucius). I prefer to stay close to the Analects because it makes it easier to stay focused on the highly similar structure and nature of virtue as argued for by two thinkers. I do not have to refract the arguments about virtue through an entire interpretive tradition. Third, I am interested in points of similarity either not discussed or not highlighted by Yu—e.g., the role and relevance of experience, the ability to cope with so-called “moral luck,” the crucial importance of shame, the focus on an internal locus of control, and the part played by the larger political community in the development of virtue. While I concur with Yu that both thinkers have a natural basis for virtue and view virtue as habitual, I disagree with his assertion that Aristotle’s ethic revolves around a distinction between virtuous activity and the possession of virtue, while Confucius has no such distinction. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle’s general thrust is that virtue is valuable insofar as we act well—hence, his claim that a “virtuous” person who spends his or her entire life asleep would be virtuous only in an equivocal sense (Aristotle 1985, pp. 1095b25–1096a5). The real worth of virtue lies in its action-directing and action-modifying force. In my view, Aristotle and Confucius are in perfect accord on this score. Confucius, too, praises as virtuous not those who say noble things but those who enact virtue on a daily basis. For example, he praises his student Yen Hui who listens well to Confucius, incorporates what he hears into practice, and who finds joy in quotidian activities (Confucius 1997, p. 2.9, 6.11). Like Aristotle, Confucius would not have found Yen Hui of much ethical interest if the young man had spent his entire day sleeping. It is the endless active cultivation of virtue that is Confucius’ focus (Confucius 1997, p. 6.18, 7.3, 7.8, 7.28).

In addition, there is considerable anecdotal evidence suggesting that multinational firms do not necessarily suffer when they take what we in the West would see as the ethical high road. One huge American-based computer company decided it would stop paying bribes to customs officials in India. The CEO was warned by fellow computer firm managers that his decision, while perhaps morally commendable, would mean corporate disaster. The firm's computers would never be allowed to leave airport warehouses. Despite this dire prediction, the CEO stuck to his guns. He met with local officials and quietly told them that, although his predecessor may have sanctioned the payment of bribes, under his leadership, the firm would no longer pay bribes to expedite shipments. The firm soon found that its shipments were moving faster than ever before. When customs officials realized that there was nothing to be gained by holding up these shipments, they simply let the computers through. By making the morally right choice, the CEO gained a competitive advantage. I do not claim that such choices always have a happy ending, but I would argue that there is no compelling evidence that firms that act in accordance with high moral standards consistently suffer business losses.

Both Aristotelianism and Confucianism stress that virtue lies in a mean (Confucius 1997, p. 6.26; Aristotle 1985, p. 1106a2-30). I have consciously refrained from discussing this apparent similarity for several reasons. First, this particular issue is one that has recently been canvassed by several thinkers (Sim 2004; Xia 2009). Second, to do this issue justice, I would have to discuss at some length what Aristotle, in my view, does and does not compass within his notion of a mean “relative to us.” That topic itself is quite complex and very contentious as evidenced by Urmson’s claim that “few philosophical theories have been more frequently and more grossly misunderstood…than the doctrine of the mean” (Urmson 1988, p. 28). Third, the Confucian take on the idea of a mean is equally complex (Legge 1930; Leys 1997; Ames and Hall 2001), relating to complicated ideas of harmony, physics, process, etc. Consequently, to compare the two in any persuasive way would require a small treatise on its own.

All quotations are taken from Aristotle (1985). I have quoted from two different editions of the Confucius and have clearly indicated which edition I am citing at each point.

McLeod (2009) argues that Aristotle, unlike Confucius, makes morality depend primarily upon the exercise of individual reason. In my view, McLeod’s approach is overly simplistic because (1) he forgets that Aristotle is quite clear that the development of reason is itself a social/political process and (2) because he wrongly assumes that Confucius thinks virtue is acquired through a kind of slavish adherence to social norms.

Indeed, it would be worth investigating whether Asian-Americans, Asian-Canadians, etc., are thriving in the West at least in part because the Confucian virtue ethic overlaps so considerably with the Aristotelian ethic of virtue. As far as I know, no one has even raised this question, much less studied it.

Tu (1999, p. 292) also stresses that Confucius’ ethic aims at bringing human beings into harmony with the cosmos: “A life informed and enriched by an anthropocosmic vision is not merely human but fully human, which means a sympathetic resonance in and a mutual responsiveness to the will of Heaven.”