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Erschienen in: Demography 3/2013

01.06.2013

Economic Incentives and Foster Child Adoption

verfasst von: Laura Argys, Brian Duncan

Erschienen in: Demography | Ausgabe 3/2013

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Abstract

Every year, a large number of children in the United States enter the foster care system. Many of them are eventually reunited with their biological parents or quickly adopted. A significant number, however, face long-term foster care, and some of these children are eventually adopted by their foster parents. The decision by foster parents to adopt their foster child carries significant economic consequences, including forfeiting foster care payments while also assuming responsibility for medical, legal, and educational expenses, to name a few. Since 1980, U.S. states have begun to offer adoption subsidies to offset some of these expenses, significantly lowering the cost of adopting a child who is in the foster care system. This article presents empirical evidence of the role that these economic incentives play in foster parents’ decision of when, or if, to adopt their foster child. We find that adoption subsidies increase adoptions through two distinct price mechanisms: by lowering the absolute cost of adoption, and by lowering the relative cost of adoption versus long-term foster care.

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Fußnoten
1
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Children’s Bureau, defines children waiting to be adopted as those whose parents’ rights have been terminated and/or with a stated case goal of adoption.
 
2
Previous studies have found that economic incentives alter family decisions, such as fertility (Acs 1996; Grogger and Bronars 2001; Kearney 2004), unwed births (Hoffman and Foster 2000), and abortions (Argys et al. 2000).
 
3
The AFCARS data contain information about the foster parents’ age, race/ethnicity, marital status, and whether they are related to the foster child. Unfortunately, the data do not contain any additional demographic information about the foster parents, such as income, education, or number of children (including other foster children) in the household.
 
4
In addition to long-term foster care, other possible outcomes for parents who fail to adopt their foster child include the child welfare agency removing the child to place in a pre-adoptive home, or the child running away.
 
5
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, South Dakota, and Tennessee are not included in the 1998 AFCARS data.
 
6
We exclude children under 4 because in many states, they may not qualify as special-needs and would therefore not be eligible for the adoption subsidy.
 
7
Children in Colorado, Indiana, Kansas, New York, and Pennsylvania are excluded because a basic monthly subsidy rate is not set by the state. Children in Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Michigan, and New Mexico are excluded because of missing data in the 1998 AFCARS data.
 
8
Although the adoption rates are similar among boys and girls, we are nevertheless concerned that lowering the cost of adoption, as well as other demographic controls, may have different influences on the adoption rates of boys and girls.
 
9
An intermediate step would be to simply include 29 state fixed effects and 13 age fixed effects in Eq. (1). State fixed-effects regressions produce similar estimates to the state-age fixed-effects regressions reported in this article (see footnote 13).
 
10
Our policy of interest varies at the state-age level, and so we include state-age fixed effects and cluster the standard errors at the state-age level. As a robustness check, we also estimate models with state-age fixed effects, but with standard errors clustered at the state level. For both boys and girls, clustering at the state level approximately doubles the standard errors reported here. When clustered at the state level, the “difference in payments” marginal effects remain statistically significant, but the “generosity of payments” marginal effects become statistically insignificant.
 
11
If parents are forward-looking, it may not be current payments that matter but rather the value of all future payments. To investigate this possibility, we estimated additional regressions that include the net present value of basic foster care and adoption subsidies in place of the monthly rates. These regressions yield similar results as those reported in this article, which is not surprising given that the present values and the monthly rates are highly correlated and that state-age fixed effects are included in the regressions.
 
12
Ordinary least squares estimates of Eq. (2) produce nearly identical marginal effects.
 
13
As a robustness check, we estimated several alternative models that use different identification strategies. For example, models that include state fixed effects and age fixed effects separately, rather than the state-age fixed-effects models presented here, produce similar results. Specifically, the corresponding “difference in payments” marginal effects are .040 for boys and .050 for girls. The corresponding “generosity of payments” marginal effects are .028 for boys and .040 for girls. In addition, we estimated models that include state-year fixed effects. These models use only the variation in payments within a state-year by child age, and produce marginal effects that are smaller in magnitude and are not statistically significant.
 
14
The resulting marginal effects reported in Tables 6 and 7 can be interpreted as if they were produced from 22 separate estimates of Eq. (2): one overall, and 21 more for each child and parent characteristic (i.e., a regression for children aged 4–6, another for children aged 7–11, another for white children, for black children, and so on). Limited by sample sizes, we actually estimated nine regressions: one overall, and eight that include interactions with the child characteristics (age, disability, race/ethnicity, and reason for removal) or the foster parent characteristics (age, marital status, race/ethnicity, and whether related to child). Each regression was estimated separately for boys and girls.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Economic Incentives and Foster Child Adoption
verfasst von
Laura Argys
Brian Duncan
Publikationsdatum
01.06.2013
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Demography / Ausgabe 3/2013
Print ISSN: 0070-3370
Elektronische ISSN: 1533-7790
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13524-012-0166-0

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