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Erschienen in:
Pioneering Developments in Location Analysis Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

2011 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

7. Equilibria in Competitive Location Models

verfasst von : H. A. Eiselt

Erschienen in: Foundations of Location Analysis

Verlag: Springer US

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Abstract

Whereas the usual location models locate facilities based on the wishes and objectives of a single decision maker, competitive location models consider the location of facilities that are under the jurisdiction of more than one decision maker. The economist Hotelling (1929) was the first to introduce competition into location models. His results stood unchallenged for fifty years, until d’Aspremont et al. (1979) corrected an inconsistency that invalidated Hotelling’s main result. Nonetheless, this has not diminished the originality and importance of the original contribution, and it is also the reason why the present paper reviews Hotelling’s contribution and its impact on location models with multiple decision makers.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Covering Problems
Nächstes Kapitel Sequential Location Models
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Metadaten
Titel
Equilibria in Competitive Location Models
verfasst von
H. A. Eiselt
Copyright-Jahr
2011
Verlag
Springer US
Buch
Foundations of Location Analysis

Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-7571-3

Electronic ISBN: 978-1-4419-7572-0

Copyright-Jahr: 2011

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-7572-0_7

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