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Erschienen in:
Decomposable Atomic Norm Minimization Channel Estimation for Millimeter Wave MIMO-OFDM Systems Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

2019 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Fairness-Aware Auction Mechanism for Sustainable Mobile Crowdsensing

verfasst von : Korn Sooksatra, Ruinian Li, Yingshu Li, Xin Guan, Wei Li

Erschienen in: Wireless Algorithms, Systems, and Applications

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

With the proliferation of sensor-embedded mobile devices, mobile crowdsensing has become a paradigm of significant interest. Incentivizing sensory-data providers to keep sustainability in a mobile crowdsensing system is a critical issue nowadays, and auction-based mechanisms have been proposed to motivate providers via monetary rewards. In our work, this sustainability problem is formulated as an optimization problem maximizing providers’ proportionally fair utilities with respect to their multi-dimensional fairness factors, and a fairness-aware auction mechanism is designed accordingly. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that considers multi-dimensional fairness of providers as the objective in selecting providers for the mobile crowdsensing system. In addition, we present rigorous theoretical analysis proving that our mechanism meets budget feasibility, individual rationality and truthfulness. Finally, simulations are performed to demonstrate the performance of our proposed mechanism.

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Metadaten
Titel
Fairness-Aware Auction Mechanism for Sustainable Mobile Crowdsensing
verfasst von
Korn Sooksatra
Ruinian Li
Yingshu Li
Xin Guan
Wei Li
Copyright-Jahr
2019
Buch
Wireless Algorithms, Systems, and Applications

Print ISBN: 978-3-030-23596-3

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-23597-0

Copyright-Jahr: 2019

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23597-0_25

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