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Asia Pacific Journal of Management

Erschienen in:

01.12.2015

Family firms in India: family involvement, innovation and agency and stewardship behaviors

verfasst von: A. S. Ashwin, Rishikesha T. Krishnan, Rejie George

Erschienen in: Asia Pacific Journal of Management | Ausgabe 4/2015

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Abstract

Family firms and business groups play an important role in many emerging economies. In this paper we study how different aspects of family involvement influence technological innovation in a firm. Arguments drawn from agency theory and particularly the principal-principal agency hypothesize a negative influence of family involvement with respect to technological innovation. In contrast, stewardship theory predicts a positive influence of family involvement on technological innovation. Drawing on these theoretical lenses with contrasting directionalities with regard to the impact of family involvement on technological innovation, we study how family involvement in ownership, management and board of directors, and business group affiliation influence R&D investments and patents obtained by the firm. The hypotheses are empirically tested on a seven-year panel of 172 firms from the pharmaceutical industry in India. Our results indicate that family shareholding and family control over both CEO and chairperson positions have a positive and significant influence on the firm’s R&D investments, broadly lending support to stewardship theory. We also find a positive influence of business group affiliation on R&D investments and patents applied by the firm. Our conjecture is that the high technology opportunity environment in the Indian pharmaceutical industry facilitates stewardship behavior which in turn promotes innovation in these firms.

Vorheriger Artikel Innovation and entrepreneurship in India: Understanding jugaad

Nächster Artikel MNE ties and new venture internationalization: Exploratory insights from India

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Hypotheses are presented in the following format: the principal-principal agency hypotheses are listed as 1a–4a in the first section and the stewardship hypotheses are listed as 1b–4b in the next section.

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According to Cappelli et al. (2010), “The India Way” of management had its foundations in the 1991 economic reforms in India. The authors noted some of the following behavior common among many of the Indian firms. Indian firms built a culture of family among the workforce; taking care of the employees and their families, and providing empowerment and resources to carry out their responsibilities (Cappelli et al., 2010: 50). This was reciprocated by employees, through higher level of commitment and trust in the organization. The executives offered employees a long term vision—like that of reaching customers with new products or services, or lifting large sections out of poverty—rather than focusing on higher financial growth that is seen in some Western firms (Cappelli et al., 2010: 96). Indian firms were also found to be much more open to failures. Managers focused on developing creativity and entrepreneur behavior in organizations and were comfortable with failure of projects and provided some leeway for errors and learning in decision making (Cappelli et al., 2010: 125).

We thank an anonymous reviewer for these inputs.

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Titel: Family firms in India: family involvement, innovation and agency and stewardship behaviors
verfasst von: A. S. Ashwin
Rishikesha T. Krishnan
Rejie George
Publikationsdatum: 01.12.2015
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: Asia Pacific Journal of Management / Ausgabe 4/2015
Print ISSN: 0217-4561
Elektronische ISSN: 1572-9958
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10490-015-9440-1

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