nach oben

Asia Pacific Journal of Management

Erschienen in:

01.12.2015

Gender and other major board characteristics in China: Explaining corporate dividend policy and governance

verfasst von: Paul B. McGuinness, Kevin C. K. Lam, João Paulo Vieito

Erschienen in: Asia Pacific Journal of Management | Ausgabe 4/2015

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config

KI-gestützte Suche

Aus

Abstract

This study examines the association between Chinese stock issuers’ board characteristics and dividends. We focus on the gender of CEO and accompanying board members, as well as other salient board demographics and characteristics. Using more than 9,000 firm-year observations, we observe little difference in the dividend distributions of female- and male-led Chinese firms. Other salient demographics, notably CEO age and tenure bear a strong positive association with cash distributions. Cash pay-out is also increasing in directors’ equity stakes and state ownership. In a general sense, the proportion of independent directors on boards bears only limited association with cash pay-out. However, in state-invested entities, greater independent director presence acts as a brake against cash distributions. We challenge a lingering perception in the investment literature that women are significantly more risk-averse than men. Cross-cultural theory suggests that risk aversion is manifest in greater cash retention and thus lower pay-outs (Bae, Chang, & Kang, The Journal of Financial Research, 35(2): 289–316, 2012; Khambata & Liu, Journal of Asia-Pacific Business, 6(4): 31–43, 2005). Building on this literature, and extending it specifically to gender, our results are consistent with male and female CEOs displaying comparable levels of risk aversion. They are also congruent with “financial knowledge” lessening gender-based differences in risk aversion (Hibbert, Lawrence, & Prakash, Global Finance Journal, 24: 140–152, 2013) and/or its general absence in the specific field of financial decisions (Schubert, Brown, Gysler, & Brachinger, The American Economic Review, 89(2): 381–385, 1999). We also emphasize theory on managerial power (Allen, Social Forces, 60(2): 482–494, 1981) and entrenchment. Results for CEO tenure and age support notions of CEO entrenchment, while those for duality do not. In contrast to agency theory, but consistent with tunneling arguments, the present study stresses the overarching role of state-ownership in increasing (decreasing) cash (stock) payouts. We observe non-monotonic effects in this relation, thus extending related findings elsewhere (Huang, Chen, & Kao, Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 29: 39–58, 2012).

Vorheriger Artikel Consequences of abusive supervision: A meta-analytic review

Nächster Artikel Partner resource asymmetry and IJV survival

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Bradford et al. (2013) and Su et al. (2013) offered background in relation to independent directors’ impact on Chinese firms’ dividend pay-outs, while Chen et al. (2005) accounted for independent director effects on dividends in Hong Kong. However, such studies exclude or make little account of (1) important board demographics (like the gender of the CEO, the gender of accompanying directors, CEO age, and tenure), (2) the relative size of supervisory boards, and (3) the equity holdings of supervisors and directors.

Asquith and Mullins (1983) reported positive wealth effects in stocks that either initiate or resume dividends after a break of 10-years or more. Healy and Palepu (1988) found strong positive (negative) signaling effects from “initiations” (“omissions”). Benesh et al. (1984) noted an asymmetric price response to major dividend change. Michaely et al. (1995) noted “omissions” cause price reactions around twice the size of “initiations.”

In contrast, Grullon and Michaely (2002) demonstrated that dividend change corresponds more closely to changes in future systematic risk levels than to profitability. In this account, the negative shareholder wealth effect from a dividend cut “signals” a reduction in the firm’s cost of equity capital.

Both studies suggest that wealth maximization is best served by managers only increasing dividends in response to sustainable earnings increases. A temporary dividend increase in one period followed by reversal in the next would likely weaken shareholder wealth. However, for “specially designated” dividend increases, Brickley (1983) observed a less positive return effect than for “unlabeled” increases.

Agency and information signaling arguments feature widely (Aharony and Swary 1980; DeAngelo et al., 1992; Easterbrook 1984; Jensen, 1986; La Porta et al., 1998, 2000; Watts, 1973). Other important theories of dividends include Graham and Dodd’s (1951) “bird-in-the-hand” argument, various behavioral accounts (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981), “catering” theory (Baker & Wurgler, 2004), and tax (Elton & Gruber, 1970; Miller & Scholes, 1978). Generally low income tax rates suggest limited scope for a Chinese tax effect (Cheng et al., 2009; Lam et al., 2012).

Mitton’s (2004) study of 19 emerging markets and Goyal and Muckley’s (2013) analysis of ten Asian markets offer support for the agency explanation of cash pay-outs.

Cash pay-outs are increasing in non-tradable shares (Wei & Xiao, 2009). Cheng, Firth, and Gao (2002) observed a weak relation between cash dividend changes and stock returns. Chen et al. (2002) and Chen et al. (2009) showed stock dividends offer a stronger signal of earnings than cash pay-outs.

For account of the term’s origins, see Johnson, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer (2000: 22).

Huang et al. (2011) showed that Chinese firms’ cash pay-outs are responsive to downside earnings change. Chiou et al. (2010) observed that “tunneing” effects weaken with investment opportunities. Lv et al. (2012) extended research on Chinese firms’ “tunneling” activities by considering controllers’ affiliates. Wang and Yung (2011) observed that after account of “tunneling,” state-held firms are less likely to “manage” earnings.

The effects of financial reform are also of interest. Chen et al. (2012b) found that firms with weaker governance experience greater contraction of free cash flow following major reforms. Berkman et al. (2010) measuring governance as the inverse of the value of a firm’s related-party transactions, found larger stock returns around regulatory announcements for firms with weaker governance.

We refer readers to Byoun et al.’s (2011: 8–11) cogent review of how gender diversity spawns such results. They highlight female board members’ enhanced monitoring and strategic decision-making powers.

Evidence on the CEO gender-firm performance link is also instructive. Weak associations are apparent between performance and mixed gender boards in Shrader, Blackburn, and Iles (1997), while Erhardt, Werbel, and Shrader (2003) reported positive effects. In addition, Carter, Simkins, and Simpson (2003) noted a positive link between firm value and female board participation. However, Carter et al.’s (2010) analysis of US boards suggests the absence of significant associations between board gender diversity and the underlying entity’s performance. They, nonetheless, report important endogenity effects in the overall relationship. Given specific contexts, Adams and Ferreira (2009) also reported negative performance effects deriving from board diversity. Anderson et al. (2011b) found that firms in more complex environments command a premium when boards are more heterogeneous.

Gender differences also arise in other facets of investment. Charness and Gneezy (2012) showed that women are less likely to buy stock than men, while Arano, Parker, and Terry (2010) and Neelakantan (2010) revealed that women exhibit greater risk aversion in relation to retirement funds.

Carter et al. (2010) also noted that their results accord with theory from the “social psychology” field, and thus the possibility of mediating effects arising from other board dimensions. For cogent discussion of this literature, as well as other pertinent theories, see Carter et al. (2010: 398–399). For reasons of brevity, we also refer the interested reader to Carter et al.’s (2010) literature review of “contingency” theory.

Women thus tend to gain board entry by virtue of the “expertise” they bring to bear (see, in particular, Fan et al., 2007: 351 for specific remarks and empirical assessment of this issue).

Meaningful tests of Hypothesis 1Aa and Hypothesis 1Ab require construction of a direct and compact measure of “financial education” (in the sense of Hibbert et al., 2013) or “expertise” (in the sense of Fan et al., 2007). Formal academic qualifications may be insufficient to capture such attributes. Lam et al. (2013) observed little difference on average between the educational bona fides of male and female CEOs in Chinese listed firms. For inter-country comparison of female board representation, see Terjesen and Singh’s (2008) analysis of 2003–2005 data.

More generally, Graham and Harvey’s (2001) survey evidence highlights the importance of CEO age and tenure in relation to a range of corporate finance decisions.

Conyon and He (2011) reported greater performance-based pay in Chinese firms with a split CEO/chair. Chen et al. (2005) observed a weak relation between cash pay-outs and duality in Hong Kong. Issues of “organizational slack” may also play a role in mediating duality effects (Peng et al., 2010).

In respect of their 1992 to 1996 sample-frame, Peng et al. (2007) reported around 58 % of firms with duality. In our much more sample-frame, “duality” still accounts for around 15 % of firm-year cases.

Lin (2006) provided concise analysis of important changes wrought by the legislation.

Greater cash payout could also reflect independent directors’ role in purging inefficiencies. Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas (2010) indicated that independent directors in the US exert a negative (positive) effect on performance when information costs are high (low). Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) found a significant negative relation between Tobin’s Q and the proportion of “outside directors.” Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2012) found weaker performance in US firms with foreign independent directors. For Australia, Setia-Atmaja (2009) noted that independent directors enhance firm value.

Firth et al. (2007a) showed that “Modified Audit Opinions” decrease with the number of board supervisors and independent directors.

“Entrenchment” issues in the sense of Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) might also be pertinent.

Conyon and He (2011) noted greater CEO ownership leads to a tighter performance-executive compensation link.

We lose 73 firm-years because of missing or incomplete data on tradable A- and B-share numbers. A further three cases are lost due to (1) incomplete financial statement information and (2) extreme tradable float values.

Existing empirical analyses of Chinese firms’ dividend policies, specifically Zhang (2008); Cheng et al. (2009, 2010); Lam et al. (2012); Bradford et al. (2013), and Su et al. (2013), exclude consideration of buybacks.

Liu, Uchida, and Yang (2014: 342, footnote 8) highlighted restrictions that effectively prohibit buy-backs in the mainland marketplace. Gong (2014) reported relatively little repurchase activity in this marketplace prior to 2005. Regulated on-market buybacks became possible only from June 2005 (see CSRC relevant consultation paper at: http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/200712/t20071213_69240.html). As shown in Gong (2014), apart from 2006, very little buy-back activity occurred in A-listed stocks over the period 2005–2009.

Such duality form features widely (Bradford et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2005; Peng et al., 2007).

This form is widely employed (see Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Bradford et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2005; How et al., 2008; Hu et al., 2010; Sharma, 2011; Su et al., 2013).

Pearson correlations of LnTasset and number of directors (number of independent directors, number of supervisors) are .284 (.262, .241). Correlation of LnTasset with IndRatio (SupervR) is only .124 (.023).

Respective Pearson correlations for the whole sample (n = 11,687) are −.747 and −.335. When summing means for StatOwn, LegalPS, and AFloat, the three stock types account for 94.34 % of Chinese listed issuers’ stock (Table 3). Adjoining B-shares (mean = 2.66 %), H-shares (mean = .74 %), and other stock types, including employer and promoter’s shares, account for the remainder. By way of comparison, Yuan, Xiao, and Zou (2008: 1558) report means for state ownership and legal-person holdings in their 2001–2005 sample (n = 5,314) of 34.8 and 23.8 %. If we analyze only 2001–2005 (n = 6,196) in our panel, we observe respective means of 35.2 and 23.7 %.

The precise form we employ, as explained in Table 2, is one that Gul and Tsui (1998) remark is: “widely used … by Lehn and Poulson (1989) and Lang et al. (1991).” (227).

We account for companies with adjoining B- or H-listings. B-shares, as listed in Shanghai or Shenzhen, are available for foreign parties’ direct stock purchase. While domestic investors trade A-shares in RMB, B-share trades take place in either USD (in Shanghai) or HKD (in Shenzhen). Hong Kong listed H-shares trade in HKD.

For reasons of brevity, tables do not report such results; which are available on request from the authors.

Peng et al. (2007) reported stronger performance in Chinese listed firms with dual CEO/chairs for the period 1992–1996. Yu (2008) offered preliminary evidence on the duality-performance link for reporting years 2000–2004.

We also examine three other dummies: Stat_{10 bel}, Stat_{40 abv}, and Stat_10→40 for relevant state equity thresholds below 10 %, above 40 % and between 10 and 40 %. Non-linear effects are again apparent. Stat_{40 abv} is highly significant and positive (t = +7.036) while Stat_10→40 bears weak association with CashPo (t = +.131). Replacing the dummy pair by Stat_{10 bel} and Stat_{40 abv} results in little change: Stat_{40 abv} (t stat = +6.814) and Stat_{10 bel} (t stat = −.131).

Table 2B confirms this. Means for StatOwn, LegalPs, and AFloat sum to 94.5 % (=31.40 + 21.41 + 41.59 %). Remaining stock forms are numerous, and include employee shares, founders’ shares, B-shares, H-shares, and so on.

This finding confirms earlier evidence. For example, Cheng et al.’s (2009) examination of Chinese listed firms reveals a negative relation between cash dividends/total assets and a dummy for stock distributions.

These results are visibly apparent in the various regressions in Tables 3, 5, and 8 for the respective dependent variables CashPo, DumCash, and DumCash2. For reasons of brevity, results for each of the year dummies (Year2005 is the excluded dummy variable) are not reported but are available upon request.

Pan et al. (2015) demonstrated stronger SSR effects on cash payout in higher-growth firms.

According to the Shanghai Stock Exchange Fact Book (2010: 20) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange Fact Book (2008: 6) there were 904 stock listings in Shanghai and 712 in Shenzhen as of the 2007 year-end.

The precise dating of a firm’s SSR is problematic due to lengthy gaps between initial proposal and final endorsement dates, especially where intervening revisions take place.

Adams, R., & Ferreira, D. 2009. Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 94: 291–309.CrossRef

Adjaoud, F., & Ben-Amir, W. 2010. Corporate governance and dividend policy: Shareholders’ protection or expropriation?. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 37(5-6): 648–667.CrossRef

Agrawal, A., & Knoeber, C. 1996. Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between manager and shareholders. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 31: 377–389.CrossRef

Aharony, J., & Dotan, A. 1994. Regular dividend announcements and future unexpected earnings: An empirical analysis. Financial Review, 29(1): 125–151.

Aharony, J., & Swary, I. 1980. Quarterly dividend and earnings announcements and stockholders returns: An empirical analysis. Journal of Finance, 35: 1–12.CrossRef

Ahlstrom, D. 2010. Publishing in the Asia Pacific Journal of Management. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 27(1): 1–8.

Allen, M. 1981. Managerial power and tenure in the large corporation. Social Forces, 60(2): 482–494.CrossRef

Anderson, H. D., Chi, J. I., Ing-Aram, C., & Liang, L. 2011a. Stock dividend puzzles in China. Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, 16(3): 422–447.CrossRef

Anderson, R. C., & Reeb, D. M. 2003. Founding-family ownership and firm performance: Evidence from the S&P 500. Journal of Finance, 58(3): 1301–1328.CrossRef

Anderson, R., Reeb, D., Upadhyay, A., & Zhao, W. 2011b. The economics of director heterogeneity. Financial Management, 40(1): 5–38.CrossRef

Arano, K., Parker, C., & Terry, R. L. 2010. Gender-based risk aversion and retirement asset allocation. Economic Inquiry, 48(1): 147–155.CrossRef

Arnott, R. D., & Asness, C.S. 2003. Surprise! Higher dividends = higher earnings growth, Financial Anlaysts Journal: 70–87.

Asquith, P., & Mullins, D. 1983. The impact of initiating dividend payments on shareholder wealth. Journal of Business, 56(1): 77–96.CrossRef

Bae, S. C., Chang, K., & Kang, E. 2012. Culture, corporate governance, and dividend policy: International evidence. Journal of Financial Research, 35(2): 289–316.CrossRef

Baker, M., & Wurgler, J. 2004. A catering theory of dividends. Journal of Finance, 59: 1125–1165.CrossRef

Bell, A. 2007. Evolutionary biology: Animal personalities. Nature, 447: 539–540.CrossRef

Benartzi, S., Michaely, R., & Thaler, R. 1997. Do changes in dividends signal the future or the past?. Journal of Finance, 52(3): 1007–1034.CrossRef

Benesh, G., Keown, A., & Pinkerton, J. 1984. An examination of market reaction to substantial shifts in dividend policy. Journal of Financial Research, 7(2): 131–142.CrossRef

Berkman, H., Cole, R., & Fu, L. 2010. Political connections and minority-shareholder protection: Evidence from securities-market regulation in China. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 45(6): 1391–1417.CrossRef

Bhattacharya, S. 1979. Imperfect information, dividend policy and the ‘Bird in the Hand’ fallacy. Bell Journal of Economics, 10: 259–270.CrossRef

Bhattacharya, S. 1988. Corporate finance and the legacy of Miller and Modigliani. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2(4): 135–147.CrossRef

Bradford, W., Chen, C., & Zhu, S. 2013. Cash dividend policy, corporate pyramids and ownership structure: Evidence from China. International Review of Economics and Finance, 27: 445–464.CrossRef

Brav, A., Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Michaely, R. 2005. Payout policy in the 21st century. Journal of Financial Economics, 77: 483–527.CrossRef

Brickley, J. 1983. Shareholder wealth, information signalling and the specially designated dividend. Journal of Financial Economics, 12: 187–209.CrossRef

Brickley, J., & James, C. 1987. The takeover market, corporate board composition and ownership structure: The case of banking. Journal of Law and Economics, 30(1): 161–190.CrossRef

Brockman, P., & Unlu, E. 2009. Dividend policy, creditor rights, and the agency costs of debt. Journal of Financial Economics, 92: 276–298.CrossRef

Bruton, G. D., Peng, M. W., Ahlstrom, D., Stan, C., & Xu, K. 2015. State-owned enterprises around the world as hybrid organizations. Academy of Management Perspectives, 29(1): 92–114.CrossRef

Byoun, S., Chang, K., & Kim, Y. 2011. Does corporate board diversity affect corporate payout policy?. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1786510.

Carter, D., D’Souza, F., Simkins, B., & Simpson, W. 2010. The gender and ethnic diversity of US boards and board committees and firm financial performance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 18(5): 396–413.

Carter, D., Simkins, B., & Simpson, W. 2003. Corporate governance, board diversity, and firm value. Financial Review, 38(3): 33–53.CrossRef

Charness, G., & Gneezy, U. 2012. Strong evidence for gender differences in risk taking. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 83: 50–58.CrossRef

Chen, C., & Jaggi, B. 2000. Association between independent non-executive directors, family control and financial disclosure in Hong Kong. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 19: 285–310.CrossRef

Chen, D., Jian, M., & Xu, M. 2009. Dividends for tunneling in a regulated economy: The case of China. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 17: 209–223.CrossRef

Chen, G., Firth, M., & Gao, N. 2002. The information content of concurrently announced earnings: An investigation of the Chinese stock market. Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting, 13: 101–124.CrossRef

Chen, J., Ezzamel, M., & Cai, Z. 2011a. Managerial power theory, tournament theory, and executive pay in China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17: 1176–1199.CrossRef

Chen, L., Da, Z., & Priestley, R. 2012a. Dividend smoothing and predictability. Management Science, 58(10): 1834–1853.CrossRef

Chen, L., Lin, C., & Kim, Y.-C. 2011b. Financial characteristics, corporate governance and the propensity to pay cash dividends of Chinese listed companies. International Business and Management, 3(1): 176–188.

Chen, Q., Chen, X., Schipper, K., Xu, Y., & Xue, J. 2012b. The sensitivity of corporate cash holdings to corporate governance. Review of Financial Studies, 25(12): 3610–3644.CrossRef

Chen, Z., Cheung, Y., Stouratis, A., & Wong, A. 2005. Ownership concentration, firm performance, and dividend policy in Hong Kong. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 13: 431–449.CrossRef

Cheng, L., Chan, R., & Leung, T. 2010. Management demography and corporate performance: Evidence from China. International Business Review, 19: 261–275.

Cheng, L., Fung, H., & Leung, T. 2009. Dividend preference of tradable-share and non-tradable-shareholders in mainland China. Accounting and Finance, 49: 291–316.CrossRef

Chiou, J., Chen, Y., & Huang, T. 2010. Asset expropriations via cash dividends? Free cash flow or tunnelling. China Journal of Accounting Research, 91: 71–93.CrossRef

Conyon, M., & He, L. 2011. Executive compensation and corporate governance in China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17: 1158–1175.CrossRef

CSRC. 2001. Establishment of independent director systems by listed companies guiding opinion. Beijing: CSRC.

Cumming, D., Leung, T., & Rui, O. 2015. Gender diversity and securities fraud. Academy of management Journal. doi:10.5465/amj.2013.0750.

DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L., & Skinner, D. 1992. Dividends and losses. Journal of Finance, 47: 1837–1863.CrossRef

Dedman, E., Jiang, W., & Stark, A. 2015. The value relevance and information content of cash and stock dividends in China. European Journal of Finance. doi:10.1080/1351847X.2014.996658.

Denis, D., & Osovov, I. 2008. Why do firms pay dividends? International evidence on the determinants of dividend policy. Journal of Financial Economics, 89: 62–82.CrossRef

Dewenter, K., & Warther, V. 1998. Dividends, asymmetric information, and agency conflicts: Evidence from a comparison of the dividend policies of Japanese and U.S. firms. Journal of Finance, 53: 879–904.CrossRef

Dharwadkar, R., George, G., & Brandes, P. 2000. Privatization in emerging economies: An agency theory perspective. Academy of Management Review, 25(3): 650–669.

Duchin, R., Matsusaka, J., & Ozbas, O. 2010. When are outside directors effective?. Journal of Financial Economics, 96: 195–214.CrossRef

Dunbar, R. L. M., & Ahlstrom, D. 1995. Seeking the institutional balance of power: Avoiding the power of a balanced view. Academy of Management Review, 20(1): 171–192.

Easterbrook, F. 1984. Two agency cost explanations of dividends. American Economic Review, 74: 650–659.

Elton, E., & Gruber, M. 1970. Marginal shareholder tax rates and the clientele effect. Review of Economics and Statistics, 52(1): 68–74.CrossRef

Erhardt, N., Werbel, J., & Shrader, C. 2003. Board of director diversity and firm financial performance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 11(2): 102–111.CrossRef

Faccio, M., Lang, L., & Young, L. 2001. Dividends and expropriation. American Economic Review, 91: 54–78.CrossRef

Faccio, M., Marchica, M. T., & Mura, R., 2015. CEO gender, corporate risk-taking, and the efficiency of capital allocation. SSRN: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2021136.

Falaye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. 2011. The costs of intense monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 101: 160–181.CrossRef

Fama, E. 1980. Agency problems and theory of firm. Journal of Political Economy, 88(2): 288–307.

Fama, E., & Babiak, H. 1968. Dividend policy: An empirical analysis. Journal of American Statistical Association, 63: 1132–1161.CrossRef

Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. 1983. The separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2): 301–325.CrossRef

Fan, P., Wong, T., & Zhang, T. 2007. Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and post-IPO performance of China’s newly partially privatized firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 84: 330–357.CrossRef

Farinha, J. 2003. Dividend policy, corporate governance and the managerial entrenchment hypothesis: An empirical analysis. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 30(9-10): 1173–1209.CrossRef

Firth, M., Fung, P., & Rui, O. 2007a. How ownership and corporate governance influence chief executive pay in China’s listed firms. Journal of Business Research, 60: 776–785.CrossRef

Firth, M., Fung, P., & Rui, O. 2007b. Ownership, two-tier board structure, and the informativeness of earnings – Evidence from China. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 26: 463–496.CrossRef

Firth, M., Rui, O., & Wu, W. 2011. Cooking the books: Recipes and costs of falsified financial statements in China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17: 371–390.CrossRef

Forker, J. 1992. Corporate governance and disclosure quality. Accounting and Business Research, 22(86): 111–124.CrossRef

Francis, B., Hasan, I., Park, J., & Wull, Q. 2015. Gender differences in financial reporting decision making: Evidence from accounting conservatism. Contemporary Accounting Research. doi:10.1111/1911-3846.12098.

Glaeser, E., Johnson, S., & Shleifer, A. 2001. Coase versus the Coasians. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(3): 853–899.CrossRef

Ghosh, C., & Sirmans, C. 2006. Do managerial motives impact dividend decisions in REITs?. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 32(3): 327–355.CrossRef

Gong, L. 2014. Empirical study on the relationship between stock repurchases and stock return of Chinese companies listed in China Mainland, Hong Kong and the U.S. ANR paper no. 391796 (available at: http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=135104).

Goyal, A., & Muckley, C. 2013. Cash dividends and investor protection in Asia. International Review of Financial Analysis, 29: 31–43.CrossRef

Graham, B., & Dodd, D. 1951. Security analysis: Principles and techniques, 3rd ed. New York: McGraw Hill.

Graham, J. R., & Harvey, C. R. 2001. The theory and practice of corporate finance: Evidence from the field. Journal of Financial Economics, 60: 187–243.CrossRef

Grim, C., & Smith, K. 1991. Management and organizational change: A note on the railroad industry. Strategic Management Journal, 12: 557–562.CrossRef

Grinblatt, M., Masulis, R., & Titman, S. 1984. The valuation effects of stock splits and stock dividends. Journal of Financial Economics, 13: 461–490.CrossRef

Grullon, G., & Michaely, R. 2002. Dividends, share repurchases, and the substitution hypothesis. Journal of Finance, 57: 1649–1684.CrossRef

Grullon, G., Michaely, R., & Swaminathan. 2002. Are dividend changes a sign of firm maturity?. Journal of Business, 75: 387–424.CrossRef

Guest, P. 2009. The impact of board size on firm performance: Evidence from the UK. European Journal of Finance, 15(4): 385–404.CrossRef

Gugler, K. 2003. Corporate governance, dividend payout policy, and the interrelation between dividends, R&D, and capital investment. Journal of Banking & Finance, 27: 1297–1321.CrossRef

Gul, F., Srinidhi, B., & Ng, A. 2011. Does board gender diversity improve the informativeness of stock prices?. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 51: 314–338.

Gul, F., & Tsui, J. 1998. A test of the free cash flow and debt monitoring hypotheses: Evidence from audit pricing. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24: 219–237.CrossRef

Guo, H., Su, Z., & Ahlstrom, D. 2015. Business model innovation: The effects of exploratory orientation, opportunity recognition, and enterprenurial bricolage in an emerging economy. Asia Pacific Journal of Management. doi:10.1007/s10490-015-9428-x.

Hambrick, D., & Fukutomi, G. 1991. The seasons of a CEO’s tenure. Academy of Management Review, 16(4): 719–742.

He, X., Inman, J., & Mittell, V. 2008. Gender jeopardy in financial risk taking. Journal of Marketing Research, 45(4): 414–424.CrossRef

He, X., Li, M., Shi, J., & Twite, G. 2009. Determinants of dividend policy in Chinese firms: Cash versus stock dividends (available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1479053).

Healy, P., & Palepu, K. 1988. Earnings information conveyed by dividend initiations and omissions. Journal of Financial Economics, 21: 149–176.CrossRef

Hibbert, A., Lawrence, E., & Prakash, A. 2013. Does knowledge of finance mitigate the gender difference in financial risk-aversion?. Global Finance Journal, 24: 140–152.CrossRef

Ho, S. M., Li, A. Y., Tam, K., & Zhang, F. 2015. CEO gender, ethical leadership, and accounting conservatism. Journal of Business Ethics, 127: 351–370.CrossRef

How, J., Verhoeven, P., & Wu, C. 2008. Dividends and expropriation in Hong Kong. Asian Academy of Management Journal of Accounting and Finance, 4(19): 75–85.

Hu, A., & Kumar, P. 2006. Managerial entrenchment and payout policy. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 39(4): 759–790.CrossRef

Hu, W., Tam, O., & Tan, G. 2010. Internal governance mechanisms and firm performance in China. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 27(4): 727–749.CrossRef

Huang, J., & Kisgen, D. 2013. Gender and corporate finance: Are male executives overconfident relative to female executives?. Journal of Financial Economics, 108(3): 822–839.

Huang, J., Shen, Y., & Sun, Q. 2011. Nonnegotiable shares, controlling shareholders and dividend payments in China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17: 122–133.

Huang, Y., Chen, A., & Kao, L. 2012. Corporate governance in Taiwan: The nonmonotonic relationship between family ownership and dividend policy. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 29(1): 39–58.CrossRef

Huyghebaert, N., & Wang, L. 2012. Expropriation of minority investors in Chinese listed firms: The role of internal and external corporate governance mechanisms. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 20(3): 308–332.CrossRef

Jacobsen, B., Lee, J., Marquering, W., & Zhang, C. 2014. Gender differences in optimism and asset allocation. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 107 B: 630–651.CrossRef

Jensen, M. 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review, 76(2): 323–339.

Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behaviour, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4): 305–360.CrossRef

Jiang, Y., & Peng, M. W. 2011. Are family ownership and control in large firms good, bad or irrelevant?. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 28(1): 15–39.CrossRef

Jiankoplos, N., & Bernasek, A. 1998. Are women more risk averse?. Economic Inquiry, 36: 620–630.CrossRef

Jo, H., & Pan, C. 2009. Why are firms with entrenched managers more likely to pay dividends?. Review of Accounting and Finance, 8(1): 87–116.CrossRef

Johnson, S., La Porta, R., Lopez de Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. 2000. Tunneling. AEA Papers and Proceedings, 90(2): 22–27.CrossRef

Jurkus, A., Park, J., & Woodward, L. 2011. Women in top management and agency costs. Journal of Business Research, 64: 180–186.CrossRef

Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. 1979. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 2(47): 263–291.CrossRef

Kato, T., & Long, C. 2006. CEO turnover, firm performance, and enterprise reform in China: Evidence from micro data. Journal of Comparative Economics, 34: 796–817.CrossRef

Khambata, D., & Liu, W. 2005. Cultural dimensions, risk aversion and corporate dividend policy. Journal of Asia-Pacific Business, 6(4): 31–43.CrossRef

Kim, B., Burns, M., & Prescott, J. 2009. The strategic role of the board: The impact of board structure on top management team strategic action capability. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17: 728–743.CrossRef

Lam, K., McGuinness, P., & Vieito, J. 2013. An empirical assessment of CEO gender, executive compensation and firm performance in Chinese Listed enterprises. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 21: 1136–1159.

Lam, K., Sami, H., & Zhou, H. 2012. The role of cross-listing, foreign ownership and state ownership in dividend policy in an emerging market. China Journal of Accounting Research, 5(3): 199–216.CrossRef

Lang, L., Stultz, R., & Walkling, R. 1991. A test of the free cash flow hypothesis: The case of bidder returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 29: 315–335.CrossRef

La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. 1998. Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy, 106: 1113–1155.

La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. 2000. Agency problems and dividend policies around the world. Journal of Finance, 65(1): 1–33.CrossRef

Leary, M. T., & Michaely, R. 2011. Determinants of dividend smoothing: Empirical evidence. Review of Financial Studies, 24(10): 3197–3249.CrossRef

Lee, B. S., & Rui, O. M. 2007. Time-series behavior of share repurchases and dividends. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 42(1): 119–142.CrossRef

Lee, B. S., & Suh, J. 2011. Cash holdings and share repurchases: International evidence. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17: 1306–1329.CrossRef

Lee, J., & Xiao, X. 2004. Tunneling dividends (article available at: http://www.bschool.cuhk.edu.hk/research/cig/pdf_download/LeeXiao.pdf).

Lee, S. M., Koopman, J., Hollenbeck, J. R., Wang, L. C., & Lanaj, K. 2015. The team descriptive index TDI: Operationalizing the multidimensional scaling approach to team description. Academy of Management Discoveries, 1(1): 88–113.CrossRef

Lehn, K., & Poulson, A. 1989. Free cash flow and stockholder gains in going private transactions. Journal of Finance, 44(3): 771–787.CrossRef

Li, K., Wang, T., Cheung, Y. L., & Jiang, P. 2011. Privatization and risk sharing: Evidence from the split share structure reform in China. Review of Financial Studies, 24: 2499–2525.CrossRef

Li, S., Xia, J., Long, X. C., & Tan, J. 2012. Control modes and outcomes of transformed state-owned enterprises in China: An empirical test. Management and Organization Review, 8(2): 283–309.CrossRef

Lin, C. 2006. Independent directors in China, Waseda Law School (article available at: http://www.waseda.jp/law-school/jp/keisei/pdf/action1_17_07.pdf).

Lintner, J. 1956. Distribution of incomes of corporations among dividends, retained earnings, and taxes. American Economic Review, 46(2): 97–113.

Liu, C., Uchida, K., & Yang, Y. 2014. Controlling shareholder, split-share structure reform and cash dividend payments in China. International Review of Economics and Finance, 29: 339–357.CrossRef

Liu, Y., Ahlstrom, D., & Yeh, K. S. 2006. The separation of ownership and management in Taiwan’s public companies: An empirical study. International Business Review. 15(4): 415–435.CrossRef

Liu, Y., Wang, L., Zhao, L., & Ahlstrom, D. 2013. Board turnover in Taiwan’s public firms: An empirical study. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 30(4): 1059–1086.CrossRef

Loukil, N., & Yousfi, O. 2015. Does gender diversity on corporate boards increase risk-taking?. Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences. doi:10.1002/cjas.1326.

Lv, H., Li, W., & Gao, S. 2012. Dividend tunnelling and joint expropriation: Empirical evidence from China’s capital market. European Journal of Finance, 18(3-4): 369–392.CrossRef

Maheshwari, S. K., & Ahlstrom, D. 2004. Turning around a state owned enterprise: The case of Scooters India Limited. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 21(1-2): 75–101.CrossRef

Masulis, R., Wang, C., & Xie, F. 2012. Globalizing the boardroom: The effect of foreign directors on corporate governance and firm performance. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 53: 527–554.CrossRef

McGuinness, P. B. 2009. An overview and assessment of the reform of the non-tradable shares of Chinese state-owned enterprise A-share issuers. Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 17(1): 2009.

Michaely, R., Thaler, H., & Womack, K. 1995. Price reactions to dividend initiations and omissions Overreactions or drift. Journal of Finance, 50: 573–608.CrossRef

Miller, M., & Modigliani, F. 1961. Dividend policy, growth and the valuation of shares. Journal of Business, 34: 411–433.CrossRef

Miller, M., & Scholes, M. 1978. Dividends and taxes. Journal of Financial Economics, 6: 333–364.CrossRef

Mitton, T. 2004. Corporate governance and dividend policy in emerging markets. Emerging Markets Review, 5(4): 409–426.CrossRef

Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. 1988. Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 20: 293–315.CrossRef

Mutlu, C. C., Zhan, W., Peng, M. W., & Lin, Z. 2015. Competing in (and out of) transition economies. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 32(3): 571–596.CrossRef

Neelakantan, U. 2010. Estimation and impact of gender differences in risk tolerance. Economic Inquiry, 48(1): 228–233.CrossRef

Nielsen, S., & Huse, M. 2010. The contribution of women on boards of directors: Going beyond the surface. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 18: 136–148.CrossRef

Nguyen, N., & Wang, D. 2013. Stock dividends in China: Signaling or liquidity explanations?. Accounting and Finance, 53: 513–535.CrossRef

Pan, R., Shi, J., & Zhu, Q. 2015. Dividend policy, corporate governance and stock liquidity. Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2570868.

Peng, M. W., Li, Y., Xie, E., & Su, Z. 2010. CEO duality, organizational slack, and firm performance in China. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 27(4): 611–624.CrossRef

Peng, M. W., Zhang, S., & Li, X. 2007. CEO duality and firm performance during China’s institutional transitions. Management and Organization Review, 3(2): 205–225.

Post, C., & Byron, K. 2015. Women on boards and firm financial performance: A meta analysis. Academcy of Management Journal. doi:10.5465/amj.2013.0319.

Pucheta-Martinez, M. C., & Bel-Oms, I. 2015. The board of directors and dividend policy: The effect of gender diversity. Industrial and Corporate Change. doi:10.1093/icc/dtv040.

Rechner, P. L., & Dalton, D. R. 1991. CEO duality and organizational performance: A longitudinal analysis. Strategic Management Journal, 12: 155–160.CrossRef

Rivas, M. 2013. An experiment on corruption and gender. Bulletin of Economic Research, 65(1): 10–42.

Rozeff, M. 1982. Growth, beta and agency costs as determinants of dividend payout ratios. Journal of Financial Research, 5(3): 249–259.CrossRef

Schubert, R., Brown, M., Gysler, M., & Brachinger, H. W. 1999. Gender and economic transactions – Financial decision-making: Are women really more risk-averse?. American Economic Review, 89(2): 381–385.CrossRef

Setia-Atmaja, L. 2009. Governance mechanisms and firm value: The impact of ownership concentration and dividends. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(6): 694–709.CrossRef

Shan, Y. 2013. Can internal governance mechanisms prevent asset appropriation? Examination of type I tunneling in China. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 21(3): 225–241.CrossRef

Shanghai Stock Exchange Fact Book. 2010 (available at: http://english.sse.com.cn/aboutsse/publications/factbook/c/factbook_us2010.pdf).

Sharma, V. 2011. Independent directors and the propensity to pay dividends. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17: 1001–1015.

Shenzhen Stock Exchange Fact Book. 2008 (available at: http://www.szse.cn/main/files/2009/05/07/760410685444.pdf).

Shin, M., Kwon, J., & Kim, S. 2011. R&D expenditure and dividend smoothing: Evidence from Korean small and medium sized enterprises. Journal of Finance and Accountancy, 5: 1–19.

Shrader, C., Blackburn, V., & Iles , P. 1997. Women in management and firm financial performance: An exploratory study. Journal of Managerial Issues, 9: 355–372.

Skinner, D. 2008. The evolving relation between earnings, dividends and stock repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics, 87: 582–609.CrossRef

Steffensmeier, D. J., Schwartz, J., & Riche, M. 2013. Gender and twenty-first-century corporate crime: Female involvement and the gender gap in Enron-era corporate fraud. American Sociological Review, 78(3): 448–476.

Su, Z., Fung, H., Huang, D., & Shen, C. 2013. Cash dividends, expropriation, and political connections: Evidence from China. International Review of Economics and Finance, 29: 260–272.CrossRef

Tang, X., Du, J., & Hou, Q. 2013. The effectiveness of the mandatory disclosure of independent directors’ opinions: Empirical evidence from China. Journal of Accounting Public Policy, 32: 89–125.

Terjesen, S., Sealy, R., & Singh, V. 2009. Women directors on corporate boards: A review and research agenda. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(3): 320–337.

Terjesen, S., & Singh, V. 2008. Female presence on corporate boards: A multi-country study of environmental context. Journal of Business Ethics, 83: 55–63.CrossRef

Thaler, R., & Shefrin, H. 1981. An economic theory of self-control. Journal of Political Economy, 89(2): 392–406.CrossRef

van Essen, M., Carney, M., Gedajlovic, E. R., & Heugens, P. P. M. A. R. 2015. How does family control influence firm strategy and performance? A meta-analysis of US publicly listed firms. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 23(1): 3–24.

van Essen, M., van Oosterhout, J. H., & Carney, M. 2012. Corporate boards and the performance of Asian firms: A meta-analysis. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 29(4): 873–905.

Wang, J. 2010. A comparison of shareholder identity and governance mechanisms in the monitoring of CEOs of listed companies in China. China Economic Review, 21: 24–37.

Wang, L. C., Ahlstrom, D., Nair, A., & Hang, R. Z. 2008. Creating globally competitive and innovative products: China’s next Olympic challenge. SAM Advanced Management Journal, 73(3): 4–15.

Wang, L., & Yung, K. 2011. Do state enterprises manage earnings more than privately owned firms: The case of China. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 38(7-8): 794–812.

Wang, X., Manry, D., & Wandler, S. 2011. The impact of government ownership on dividend policy in China. Advances in International Accounting, 27: 366–372.CrossRef

Watts, R. 1973. The information content of dividends. Journal of Business, 46(2): 191–211.CrossRef

Wei, G., & Xiao, Z. 2009. Ownership segregation, shareholder preferences and dividend policy in listed Chinese firms. British Accounting Review, 41(3): 169–183.CrossRef

Wei, Z., Wu, S., Li, C., & Chen, W. 2011. Family control, institutional environment and cash dividend policy: Evidence from China. China Journal of Accounting Research, 4: 29–46.CrossRef

Woolley, A. W., Chabris, C. F., Pentland, A., Hashmi, N., & Malone, T. W. 2010. Evidence for a collective intelligence factor in the performance of human groups. Science, 330: 686–688.CrossRef

Xiao, J., Dahya, J., & Lin, Z. 2004. A grounded theory exposition of the role of the supervisory board in China. British Journal of Management, 15: 39–55.CrossRef

Young, M. N., Peng, M. W., Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G. D., & Jiang, Y. 2008. Corporate governance in emerging economies: A review of the principal-principal perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 45(1): 196–220.CrossRef

Young, M. N., Tsai, T., Wang, X., Liu, S., & Ahlstrom, D. 2014. Strategy in emerging economies and the theory of the firm. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 31(2): 331–354.CrossRef

Yu, B., Hao, S., Ahlstrom, D., Si, S., & Liang, D. 2014. Entrepreneurial firms’ network competence, technological capability, and new product development performance. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 31(3): 687–704.CrossRef

Yu, M. 2008. CEO duality and firm performance for Chinese shareholding companies. Presented at the 19th Chinese Economic Association Annual Conference, England (available at: http://www.ceauk.org.uk/2008-conference-papers/YU-mei-CEO-duality-firm-performance-Chinese-shareholding-companies.pdf).

Yu, W., & Zheng, Y. 2014. Government regulation, corporate board, and firm value: Evidence from China. Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting, 25(2): 182–208.CrossRef

Yuan, R., Xiao, J., & Zou, H. 2008. Mutual funds’ ownership and firm performance: Evidence from China. Journal of Banking and Finance, 32: 1552–1565.

Zeng, S., & Wang, L. 2015. CEO gender and corporate cash holdings. Are female CEOs more conservative?. Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics. doi:10.1080/16081625.2014.1003568.

Zhang, H. 2008. Corporate governance and dividend policy: A comparison of Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong and in the Mainland. China Economic Review, 19: 437–459.CrossRef

Zhao, Y. F., Xia, X. P., Tang, X. X., Cao, W., Liu, X. Y., & Fan, Y. H. 2015. Private placements, cash dividends and interests transfer: Empirical Evidence from Chinese listed firms. International Review of Economics and Finance, 36: 107–118.CrossRef

Zou, H., & Xiao, J. 2006. The financing behaviour of listed Chinese firms. British Accounting Review, 38: 239–258.CrossRef

Titel: Gender and other major board characteristics in China: Explaining corporate dividend policy and governance
verfasst von: Paul B. McGuinness
Kevin C. K. Lam
João Paulo Vieito
Publikationsdatum: 01.12.2015
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: Asia Pacific Journal of Management / Ausgabe 4/2015
Print ISSN: 0217-4561
Elektronische ISSN: 1572-9958
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10490-015-9443-y

Springer Professional

Abstract

Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu Ihrer Lizenz zu erhalten.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Weitere Artikel der Ausgabe 4/2015

Consequences of abusive supervision: A meta-analytic review

Capacity building at the Asia Pacific Journal of Management

High impact strategy research by overseas Chinese scholars in leading business journals: 1991–2011

MNE ties and new venture internationalization: Exploratory insights from India

Innovation in India: A review of past research and future directions

Family firms in India: family involvement, innovation and agency and stewardship behaviors

Premium Partner