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2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

40. From Models to Experiments; James Buchanan and Charles Plott

verfasst von : Gil Hersch, Daniel Houser

Erschienen in: James M. Buchanan

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Buchanan’s work, and in particular The Calculus of Consent, which he wrote with Gordon Tullock, has been foundational in the field of public choice. One of his students, Charles Plott, became a pioneer with multiple seminal contributions in the field of experimental public choice. In this chapter we focus on Buchanan’s work on decision making under majority rule, and any influence it may have had on Plott. While Buchanan and Tullock address environments with single decisions, they focus much more on decision making under repeated votes, a topic they found of great interest. Plott’s seminal 1978 paper with Morris Fiorina, however, focuses on single decisions. It may seem puzzling, then, that Plott has often suggested Buchanan’s influence on his work. We offer a resolution to this puzzle.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Diagnosing the Electorate: James Buchanan in the Role of Political Economist

Nächstes Kapitel Rules Versus Authorities: Buchanan and Simons and Fiscal Policy

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Titel: From Models to Experiments; James Buchanan and Charles Plott
verfasst von: Gil Hersch
Daniel Houser
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: James M. Buchanan
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-03079-7

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-03080-3

Copyright-Jahr: 2018
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03080-3_40