Holding It All Together: on the Value of Compromise and the Virtues of Compromising

In cases of political controversy, a compromise might be presented as a solution; it is sometimes accepted, but in other cases, it is not. In current political practice, however, compromise itself has become a central object of dispute. Some argue that we have lost the ability to compromise—an ability that is crucial for a functioning democracy and that we need in our times of polarization more than ever (e.g., Gutmann & Thompson, 2012; Weinstock, 2013). Others maintain that compromising is part of a type of politics that we should distrust. They relate it to elite politics and deal-making that obscures controversies and suppresses real political battles (e.g., Mouffe, 2005). In this controversy, one can recognize the often-witnessed ambiguity between compromising as something constructive or positive and compromising as treason.

However, the dispute goes deeper. Within the camps of those that welcome compromise and those that reject it, there is also disagreement. Advocates of compromise disagree on whether this practice is supported merely by pragmatic considerations or follows from some fundamental democratic value or principle (see, e.g., May, 2005 and Rostbøll, 2017). Some critics of compromise maintain that advocates of compromise underestimate societal diversity, while others argue that such advocates show little ambition and should aim for consensus instead of compromise (e.g., Habermas, 1984; Mouffe, 2005). Champions of these different positions criticize one another’s presuppositions. One blames the other, for instance, for invoking the idea of a political setting in which the winner takes it all, a setting that he feels is uninhabitable (Weinstock, 2013). The other retorts to attacks such as these that the basic characteristic of politics, being agonism, is thereby neglected (Mouffe, 2005). What becomes clear from these debates is that different valuations of compromise and compromising rely on different concepts and ideals of politics. The disagreement on compromise in current political practice expresses a deeper and more fundamental controversy.

This fundamental disagreement might block finding new answers to questions such as When is a compromise a good and proper compromise? Is compromising more suitable in national settings than in international contexts? Are compromises in politics more appropriate than in private life? If we want to surpass the current contradicting positions on the value of compromise in politics, then we have to move beyond conceptual analyses, compromise and focus on the question of whether and how the tensions between the underlying understandings of politics can be dealt with. Here, the work of Paul Ricoeur is particularly promising. Ricoeur, in many of his publications, deals with the notion of compromise. Compromise is always part of a broader analysis that focuses on subjects that are central to politics, such as justice, recognition or political virtue. Ricoeur, furthermore, emphasizes the plural or complex character of what politics is about. He does not attempt, however, to promote one understanding of politics at the expense of others but tries to find a position that gives the different understandings all their due.

Unfortunately, Ricoeur has not presented an encompassing theory of compromise and politics. His answer to our question, therefore, has to be reconstructed.¹

In this article, I will offer a reconstruction of Ricoeur’s understanding of compromise and of its relation to the many faces of politics. The central question is as follows: What can and should the role of compromise be in politics according to Ricoeur, and what guidelines for practical politics follow from his argument?

In the remainder of this article, I will first offer an overview of the different valuations of compromise and compromising and of the relations of these valuations to different understandings of politics. Next, I will show how Ricoeur, in different parts of his work, deals with compromise. He discusses compromise in relation to justice, recognition and responsibility. These three elaborations of compromise are, as will be made explicit in the following section, intrinsically connected. Together, they also show how Ricoeur understands the relation between the different perspectives on politics. The final section includes which guidelines for compromising follow from Ricoeur’s analysis.

According to some, making compromises means betraying values and principles, undermining basic interests or losing one’s integrity. Others maintain that compromising shows a willingness and ability to find creative and practical solutions, solve problems and move on. Scholars in the history of ideas have shown that this opposition of valuations has been around for a long time. In earlier times, but also today, compromise and compromising were and are often understood as related to individual integrity (or its absence) (See, e.g., Benjamin, 1990; Fumurescu, 2013; Tillyris, 2017).

In recent literature, the value (or downsides) of compromise is often linked to political practice. Some hold compromise (for reasons to be discussed later) of value for politics; they sometimes even call it a crucial element. Such a valuation clearly inspires Gutmann and Thompson’s (2012: 11) often cited definition: “[A compromise is] an agreement in which all sides sacrifice something in order to improve on the status quo from their perspective, and in which the sacrifices are at least partly determined by the other sides’ will”. Others take a completely different stand: Compromise is not the best but the worst in politics. Compromising, according to Mouffe is “to reconcile conflicting interests and values”(Mouffe, 2005: 3, 14). By doing so, she argues, the central characteristic of politics is neglected: conflict and disagreement. The compromising attitude, according to Mouffe, similar to consensus-orientation, feeds on a moralistic ideal and a view of human nature that encompasses unity, empathy and rational communication. It overlooks the fundamental agonism, antagonism even, between groups of people. The compromising attitude is utopian and even dangerous because it suppresses people’s true nature and might open the door to enmity and violent outbursts. Sometimes compromising is inspired by the idea that politics is a matter of deal-making. This must also be discarded, according to Mouffe. Such an economic perspective on politics also pacifies the political practice, and it neglects the affective relations that are also a basic element of politics (Mouffe, 2005: 14ff.).

A completely different type of critique of compromising rejects it, not because compromise neglects basic striving and disagreement but because it overstates it. Advocates of deliberative democracy, for example, give consensus a crucial role in politics. Their ideal is a practice in which people convince one another of the best position by only using rational arguments (Cohen, 1997; Habermas, 1984). Settling for a mere compromise means failure according to this ideal.

In addition, among those that value compromise and compromising, differences can be discerned. First, there are those that understand compromise as a profitable transaction. One compromises if one cannot realize all of one’s goals, but, as a balance, wins by striking this deal.² The consideration that compromise can keep the settlement of disputes peaceful and is, thus, to everybody’s advantage also belongs to this position. In opposition to this Pragmatic position stands a second position. This second type of advocate for compromise criticizes the first for its focus on individual advantage and pluralism. It emphasizes reasons for compromising on common values, such as respect and democratic principles. These common values support compromising, even in cases in which one might obtain everything one wants without compromising. The argument for compromise, here, is principled and does not refer to (desirable) consequences, similar to the Pragmatic position. This position, which might be called Principled, maintains that politics is neither captured by the idea that the winner takes all nor about maximizing the realization of given individual preferences. Politics is about realizing common values. According to some, the ground for compromising lies in recognizing the value of the position of others (sanguinic compromises in terms of Margalit (2009: 39–47), Weinstock (2013: 543, 552). Others refer to respect the equality of citizens (Bellamy et al., 2012: 280; Dobel, 1990; Ford, 2018; Gutmann & Thompson, 2012: 35, 109–117; Kappel, 2018; Kuflik, 1979), shared virtues of citizens (Moody-Adams, 2018) or respect for other citizens as co-rulers (Rostbøll, 2017). According to the Pragmatists, these demands are much too high. Is showing respect to one’s fellow citizens not already included in adhering to the democratic system of voting and accepting its outcomes, they ask (May, 2005). Compromising might, furthermore, have all kinds of effects, such as enhancing mutual understanding or generating a feeling of recognition. Such effects (that are welcomed by some) should, however, not be mistaken for reasons for compromising (Table 1).

This brief overview clearly shows that the different valuations of compromise that were distinguished entail different understandings of what a compromise is. The different positions also express different understandings of the nature of politics. The disagreements on the value of compromise mirror disagreements on what politics is all about. This implies that to gain in the standing debate on the value of compromise, in general and in more particular questions (such as when is it appropriate to compromise?), we should take the different underlying understandings of politics and their relation into account.

Compromise is an important theme in Ricoeur’s work. He repeatedly returned to this subject, albeit often in quite different contexts. Unfortunately, he did not integrate these analyses into a single encompassing publication on compromise. In this section, I will present three elaborations of compromise that Ricoeur presented, elaborations that are all connected to a particular aspect of social and political practice. In the next section, I will show how these three approaches are connected and that they contain Ricoeur’s answer to the issue of the plurality of perspectives on the political.

In Ricoeur’s understanding of politics, we can recognize all four approaches that were distinguished above. With Pragmatists, Ricoeur recognizes that politics means dealing with fundamental plurality and disagreements. In modern society, many orders of value exist that each have their own justification for their own priorities. To avoid conflicting claims in that pluralistic setting that lead to violence (“tragedy”), compromising can be a proper strategy. Ricoeur agrees with Agonists that “society is no Eden”. In modern societies, there is no harmonic and generally shared conception of the common good. On the proper way of dealing with specific situations, but also on the meaning and priority of general principles, people fundamentally disagree. This fundamental disagreement and adversity should not be masked by false compromises that suggest otherwise. Deliberationists find Ricoeur at their side when he envisions the possibility of integrative compromises that point to a future formulation of shared conceptions and valuations. “Learning one another’s language” in the course of a debate might bring mutual understanding and a common perspective on particular issues closer. With the Principled position, Ricoeur shares the idea that politics must answer to the basic values of recognition and respect for all citizens as equals. This is what capable persons in modern society need and deserve, and this is what prudent and responsible politicians should always take into account.

Ricoeur, however, also has points of disagreement with all four positions. In fact, the observation that elements of all four positions can be found in his work shows that he finds each of them individually incomplete or one sided. Furthermore, in his analyses, he explicitly criticizes positions that express one of the four approaches that I distinguished here. A Deliberative position overestimates the possibility of consensus and neglects the importance of rhetoric in political debate (Ricoeur, 1987: 36). The Principled position is naïve as it neglects the ever-looming threat of conflict turning into violence (Ricoeur, 1987, 1992: 258 ff.), something that the Pragmatists clearly understand. This latter position, however, is shortsighted on the point of goodwill towards other human beings. It is blind for cases in which maintaining peace (through compromising) is trumped by concern for the lives and dignity of particular individuals or groups of people (2005a, 2005b: 5).The Agonist position misses the importance of an idea of commonality in political life (Ricoeur, 1992, 2000, 2010).

Ricoeur does not choose between these four positions, he acknowledges the explanatory power and value that each has, nor does he try to conceal the tensions between them. In Ricoeur’s approach, these tensions are an essential part of what politics is all about. In his work, he repeatedly returns to this issue, introducing a particular vocabulary to distinguish between the different aspects of the political and their complex relation: la politique and le politique. This is the tension between politics as acting together and power to (as Arendt explains it) and politics as conflict and power over (as Carl Schmitt, for instance, expresses). Both aspects are essential, and they presuppose one another. This political paradox, as Ricoeur calls it, is what we as citizens in a modern democracy have to deal with, and it is what the responsible politician has to deal with. It is our ordeal.

Accepting this tension and responsibly acting upon it means acting from the presupposition of a common good, without actually having a shared conception of the common good from which we can deduce what the proper rules and actions in particular cases are. It means approaching others, even the ones with which we disagree, as individuals who deserve respect, although we have no objective guideline of what this exactly entails. Doing so might in particular circumstances mean that compromising is the best option, but it also might mean that compromise is to be avoided. Here, again, Ricoeur accepts both sides in our diagram. He does not take a definitive side in the controversy over whether compromising in politics is a good or a bad strategy. It is a matter of proper judgment in particular cases.

The tension between the different positions is loosened to some degree when one recognizes, as Ricoeur points out, that the relations of different aspects of politics are not static. The debate between Pragmatists and advocates of the Principled position on the priority of recognition and compromise dissolves if one sees that compromise can both be motivated by respect for the worth of others and have the effect of offering recognition. From a (cyclic) dynamic, instead of a static, perspective, the one stimulates the other. Something similar can be pointed out in the relation between compromising and the common good. Some vision of a common good can motivate compromising, and the process of compromising might lead the way to a future shared concept of a common good.

Compromising in politics can, thus, be understood as an important element of the way that Ricoeur brings different understandings of politics together. Might one also say that Ricoeur’s position itself is a compromise? His approach, indeed, has characteristics that fit his depiction of political compromise. His encompassing understanding of politics does not try to mask the tensions between the different positions that it integrates, and it could be called fragile because it lacks the simple basis of the ‘pure’ positions. His position, furthermore, entails practical answers to contemporary political disputes and problems.

Ricoeur’s work enables us to surpass the stalemate in the current discussions on the place and appropriateness of political compromise. He shows how the understandings of politics that underlie the different stances on compromise and compromising all express important aspects of politics but are all limited in their perspectives. Ricoeur prompts us not to take a one-sided perspective, such as Antigone and Creon did, but to try to combine the different perspectives without neglecting the tensions between them.

His approach contains or implies more specific answers to contemporary disputes on political compromise. One such dispute concerns the question of whether decision-making in a democratic society merely means that the winner takes all in majority voting or that more is demanded such as compromising with opponents even if one can win the vote without them. Pragmatists maintain that there is no reason for the latter. Compromises are only called for if one cannot realize one’s goals because one has no majority (May, 2005). Advocates for a Principled approach to compromises maintain that democracy demands much more than majority voting. Basic to a democracy is mutual respect, and that implies the duty to (try to) compromise (e.g., Bellamy et al., 2012: 280; Dobel, 1990; Ford, 2018; Kappel, 2018; Kuflik, 1979; Rostbøll, 2017; Weinstock, 2013).

Ricoeur agrees with the Principled approach that individual gain must not be the only motivation for compromising in politics. He rejects, however, a duty to compromise – that is much too strong of a claim. Compromising sometimes might not be the proper thing to do. His argument for a compromising attitude, furthermore, lies not in deontological considerations. It follows the Aristotelean tradition, as Arendt expressed it: political action as living the good life together with others under just institutions. A compromising attitude in this line is not a duty but something that follows from the responsibility that every member has for this common project. Following Arendt and others, Ricoeur argues that this project, especially under conditions of conflict and individual strife, is in danger. A society in which each individual or group merely looks for its own advantage and the realization of its current preferences lacks the mutual trust and the esprit public that is necessary for its own survival (Ricoeur, 1987, 1992, 1995, 2010). The flaw in the pragmatist position is that it does not see that, in the long run, compromising, even if one is on the winning side, is to one’s advantage if properly understood.

Ricoeur’s approach towards compromises also has implications for other issues currently under dispute. It makes clear, for instance, why and how there are differences between compromising in national and international settings. In both settings the (Pragmatic) concern for a peaceful solution of conflicts has its force, and in both, the recognition of others as human beings counts. In the national setting, however, there is the extra motivation following from the responsibility for the existing common project. If international cooperation intensifies, this distinction, of course, will dissolve.

Ricoeur’s understanding of political responsibility in this context can also help to answer the question of whether political representatives should be more compromise-minded than ordinary citizens (see, e.g., Bellamy, 2012). One’s responsibility for the fragile increases means one is actually more able to effectively contribute to its safety. As decision-making and compromising opportunities are in the hands of politicians, it follows that they have a special responsibility in this field.

A last issue to be addressed here is the question of when exactly compromising is appropriate or why a compromise is to be considered good or bad? Ricoeur does not offer any rules or principles to decide whether a compromise is rotten or not or which persons or groups cannot be partners in a compromise. What he does offer, however, is the concept of critical phronesis as an understanding of what it means to deal with hard questions in political practice (Ricoeur, 1992: 290). Phronesis, or practical wisdom, refers to the capacity for good judgment, as Aristotle described it: taking all relevant aspects into consideration in a specific situation to decide on the proper action, thereby keeping a keen eye on the goal of that activity. In political activity, that goal, Ricoeur explains, is living the good life together with others under just institutions. In the way that Ricoeur specifies this latter aspect of political action, he differs from Aristotle. Good political judgment, according to Ricoeur, means that one puts one’s intended action to the test of a Kantian sieve (the critical part): Does my intended line of action contradict the human dignity of others?

Critical phronesis does not provide any clear rules, neither on compromising nor on any other hard political choice. It is not a matter of deduction under general rules, nor is it cleverness or expediency. Its Kantian element, however, does allow for a general guideline. Employing the sieve means that intended lines of actions that in some way neglect the value of others as human beings must be discarded. This aspect of Ricoeur’s critical phronesis offers support for Margalit’s prohibition of rotten compromises (Margalit, 2009).

Typical of phronesis or practical wisdom, similar to any Aristotelian virtue, is that it can and must be developed. It is not an inborn capacity, nor can it be learned by theoretical study. Becoming expedient demands experience; it means ongoing involvement in practical matters of decision-making under conditions of disagreement. Learning from others and following exemplary behavior is also important. This is, of course, all the more difficult in times and circumstances in which compromising, by many, seems to be taken as something inherently bad that must be avoided.