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Minds and Machines

Erschienen in:

01.05.2012

How to Build a Robot that is Conscious and Feels

verfasst von: J. Kevin O’Regan

Erschienen in: Minds and Machines | Ausgabe 2/2012

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Abstract

Following arguments put forward in my book (Why red doesn’t sound like a bell: understanding the feel of consciousness. Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2011), this article takes a pragmatic, scientist’s point of view about the concepts of consciousness and “feel”, pinning down what people generally mean when they talk about these concepts, and then investigating to what extent these capacities could be implemented in non-biological machines. Although the question of “feel”, or “phenomenal consciousness” as it is called by some philosophers, is generally considered to be the “hard” problem of consciousness, the article shows that by taking a “sensorimotor” approach, the difficulties can be overcome. What remains to account for are the notions of so-called “access consciousness” and the self. I claim that though they are undoubtedly very difficult, these are not logically impossible to implement in robots.

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Titel: How to Build a Robot that is Conscious and Feels
verfasst von: J. Kevin O’Regan
Publikationsdatum: 01.05.2012
Verlag: Springer Netherlands
Erschienen in: Minds and Machines / Ausgabe 2/2012
Print ISSN: 0924-6495
Elektronische ISSN: 1572-8641
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-012-9279-x

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