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Erschienen in:
Analysis of Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy Kapitel lesen Erstes Kapitel lesen

2020 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Impure Public Good Models as a Tool to Analyze the Provision of Ancillary and Primary Benefits

verfasst von : Anja Brumme, Wolfgang Buchholz, Dirk Rübbelke

Erschienen in: Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Climate policies regularly have various effects of different degrees of publicness. Therefore, they constitute so-called impure public “goods.” Cornes and Sandler (Econ J 94:580–598, 1984) developed the standard approach to analyze such goods, which combines elements of Lancaster’s (J Polit Econ 74:132–157, 1966) characteristics approach and the rationing literature. The impure public goods approach has been extended in many respects in recent years and was applied to fields as diverse as climate protection, military alliances, agricultural research, terrorism, and performing arts. Yet, the complexity of the analysis often makes it difficult to observe the mechanisms that work in the context of impure public good provision and this chapter concludes that a further development of analysis tools is desirable in order to facilitate the understanding of the very important category of impure public goods.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Sustainable International Cooperation with Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy
Nächstes Kapitel Private Ancillary Benefits in a Joint Production Framework
Fußnoten
1
On joint production of effects exhibiting different degrees of publicness in the context of terrorism, see, e.g., Lee and Sandler (1989) and Rübbelke (2005).
 
2
Only in some rather special cases it may occur that public good provision in an efficient allocation is lower than in a Nash equilibrium what has been coined as “overprovision anomaly” (Buchholz and Peters 2001).
 
3
Lancaster’s (1966) characteristics approach is a meaningful tool in several fields of economics. For example, it is involved in the methodology of discrete choice experiments (see, e.g., Hoyos 2010).
 
4
Even though it was written in 1956, this paper was only published as late as 1980.
 
5
For impure public good modeling in the context of climate protection also see, e.g., Sandler (1996), Markandya and Rübbelke (2012), and Schwirplies and Ziegler (2016).
 
6
For a distinction between primary and ancillary/secondary benefits also see, e.g., Rübbelke (2006).
 
7
As Lloyd (1942, p. 49) puts it, “[i]n war, when the free play of the price mechanism has to take a secondary role in the allocation of resources, rationing tends to become the rule rather than the exception.”
 
8
Among the notable exceptions is Baumol’s (1982) analysis of fairness in the distribution of resources where he employs the issue of points rationing of commodities as an illustration.
 
9
The index i for the respective agent or country is omitted in the following expressions for simplicity.
 
10
On the use of the “full income” conception see, e.g., Cornes and Sandler (1994) and Vicary and Sandler (2002).
 
11
As Cornes and Sandler (1994, p. 405) put it: “To forge the link between the less orthodox impure public good model and the parameters of orthodox price-taking behavior, we find it helpful to introduce virtual prices and income.”
 
12
Bahn and Leach (2008) use an overlapping generations model to investigate co-effects of climate policy.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Impure Public Good Models as a Tool to Analyze the Provision of Ancillary and Primary Benefits
verfasst von
Anja Brumme
Wolfgang Buchholz
Dirk Rübbelke
Copyright-Jahr
2020
Buch
Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy

Print ISBN: 978-3-030-30977-0

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-30978-7

Copyright-Jahr: 2020

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30978-7_6

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