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2017 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Incoercible Fully-Remote Electronic Voting Protocol

verfasst von : Wafa Neji, Kaouther Blibech, Narjes Ben Rajeb

Erschienen in: Networked Systems

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Civitas is the first fully remote e-voting protocol which ensures verifiability and coercion resistance at the same time. In 2011, Shirazi et al. found a security flaw on the credential management process during Civitas’ registration phase and proposed solutions to avoid this drawback.

In this paper, we describe some attacks found during the Civitas’ registration phase. We show that Shirazi’s solutions cannot be used in practical situations and/or doesn’t ensure coercion-resistance. Then, we present a fully remote e-voting protocol that addresses these drawbacks.

Our protocol aims to separate voter’s registration data from voter’s vote into two different bulletin boards. Merging this data will only be done by tallying authorities to identify and tally valid votes. Moreover, our protocol uses a new ballot’s encryption function that ensures coercion resistance in a different manner. Compared to Civitas, we use a secure registration phase and we reduce the computational complexity of tallying phase from quadratic to linear time.

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Vorheriges Kapitel AdaGraph: Adaptive Graph-Based Algorithms for Spam Detection in Social Networks

Nächstes Kapitel A Comparative Study of Software Testing Techniques

A bulletin board is a public broadcasted channel in which anyone can read and verify data and no one can erase any information from it.

Each registration authority will authenticate voters using their registration keys. Note that we do not detail identification and authentication mechanism used in Civitas protocol.

The voter uses his private designation key to provide, to an adversary, a fake DVRP proof proving the validity of his fake credential.

If voters can re-vote, then only the last ballot with valid credential is counted, the other ones, submitted with duplicate credentials, are eliminated. If voters cannot re-vote, then all ballots casted with the same credential are eliminated.

Given a pair of encrypted credentials \(Enc_G(C_1)\) and \(Enc_G(C_2)\), PET checks if \(C_1=C_2\) without revealing any information on \(C_1\) or \(C_2\).

Compared to Civitas, \(RA_i\) doesn’t compute an additional encrypted share \(S1_{i,j}^\prime \) and \(V_j\) doesn’t have to verify later the validity of \(S1_{i,j}^\prime \).

Note that the voter is the only one who can determine the subset QUAL. This is due to the DVRP proof which convinces only the voter that the credential share is valid.

In the first case, the coercer knows it and wants to prevent voter from registering, and in the second case, the voter can use fake credentials without being caught by the coercer.

\(Enc(\widetilde{index_j})\) will be used to eliminate invalid ballots with invalid votes or invalid authentication credentials. Note also that the use of this index during the tallying phase reduce the tallying process from quadratic to linear complexity in the number of casted ballots [3].

To prevent a coercer from re-using the authentication credential to submit another vote, it will be assumed that the first valid ballot casted into BBB will be considered. The other ones will be eliminated.

Note that we keep only the first ballot \(B_{V_j}\), the other duplicated ballots with the same authentication credential are eliminated.

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Titel: Incoercible Fully-Remote Electronic Voting Protocol
verfasst von: Wafa Neji
Kaouther Blibech
Narjes Ben Rajeb
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Networked Systems
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-59646-4

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-59647-1

Copyright-Jahr: 2017
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59647-1_26

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