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2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

8. Individual Vessel Quotas in Germany and Denmark: A Fair Distribution Process?

verfasst von : Katharina Jantzen, Ralf Döring, Leyre Goti, Lorena Fricke

Erschienen in: Fisheries, Quota Management and Quota Transfer

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Sustainability is one of the main focuses of the European Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). Drawing on the definition of Brundtland (Our common future: world commission on environment and development, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987) the evaluation of a fishery management regime calls for the investigation of its impact on sustainability of the fishery. An important aspect of that is inter- and intra-generational fairness in the distribution of access rights. Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) schemes are widely discussed management systems that allow for economic rationalization and are expected to entail increased economic efficiency in the fishery. In order to analyze the impacts of ITQs on sustainability, we focus on three major concerns of inter- and intra-generational fairness connected to ITQs, using the examples of the German and Danish quota systems: the initial allocation of quota shares, changes in the fleet structure, and the implications for newcomers in the fishing industry. In this chapter, we investigate the just use of quota management exemplified by ITQ systems in Germany and Denmark. The methodology of investigating intra- and intergenerational fairness is first explained before this approach is applied to the German and Danish fisheries quota management systems. The last section discusses the results and examines whether ITQs can be classified as a sustainable and thus inter- and intra-generationally just management tool.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Swedish Fishing in the Wake of ITQ

Nächstes Kapitel “Free Enterprise” and the Failure of American ITQ Management

In the meantime, however, the number of stocks at risk decreased substantially and also the number of vessels decreased. The main reason for that was the introduction of long-term management plans and not so much the changes in access rights systems (Cardinale et al. 2013).

The theoretical framework of justice and its application to the ITQ system is further explained in the paper on ‘Equity and ITQs’ (Doering et al. 2016) In this paper we refer to the instruments of fairness, concentrating on the initial allocation of quota shares, market inrferences, and newcomers to a fishery.

For example in New Zealand (Mace et al. 2014), and Nova Scotia (Townsend et al. 2008) where the fishing sector pays for monitoring fishing activities and partly for the assessment of fish stocks.

See for example Copes and Charles (2004) for an overview over criticism of ITQs. Other concerns regarding quota regimes are the incentives for highgrading, discarding and quota busting (Copes 1986).

Basically due to a more vulnerable economic position (low profits and low possibilities for renewal of the capital stock, see Lucchetti et al. 2014).

Denmark distributed the majority of quota shares for free (see Sect. 8.3.2.). See Shotton (2001) for an overview over initial distributions of tradable quota shares in fisheries.

There are empirical studies about the effect of ITQs on the market structure. Adelaja et al. (1998) investigate the mid-Atlantic surf clam and quahog fisheries for signs of monopoly power after implementation of an ITQ regime. They find a strong reduction in fishing vessels but do not find evidence for monopoly power in the industry. Brandt (2005) showed for the mid-Atlantic clam fishery that small scale fishers were not disproportionately affected by the introduction of ITQs.

See Olson (2011) for an overview.

There is evidence for economies of scale for Norwegian cod and pelagic fisheries (Nøstbakken 2006; Sandberg 2006).

Many applied ITQ regimes use such measures to address equity concerns and prevent the development of excessive market power of large firms. (See for example Asche et al. 2008).

There is evidence for a short term sharp reduction of employment from various fisheries (Geen and Nayar 1989; Casey et al. 1995; Wang 1995). See Olson (2011) for an overview over empirical evidence of employment reduction in fisheries as a result of the adoption of ITQ regimes.

Information for this part is also taken from an interview with Marina Lapetina and Sybille Möller (Federal Office for Agriculture and Food, BLE, Department for Fisheries, Hamburg) which took place in January 2012. We would like to thank both experts for the kind support.

Generally, this was a fishing vessel that was employed in the fishery by someone in 1986/1987. If such a vessel suffered a total loss, it may be replaced by a ‘smaller’ vessel. Also, a new vessel may be licensed if it replaces one or more licensed vessels.

This is true for Baltic cod, North Sea cod, Saithe, plaice and Baltic herring. For Baltic sprat, individual full-time and part-time fishers receive each a total quota.

This chapter is based in part on information from Mogens Schou (at that time in the Danish Ministry for Fisheries) given in an interview in January 2012. We thank Mogens for the possibility to talk with him.

Personal interview Mogens Schou.

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Titel: Individual Vessel Quotas in Germany and Denmark: A Fair Distribution Process?
verfasst von: Katharina Jantzen
Ralf Döring
Leyre Goti
Lorena Fricke
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Fisheries, Quota Management and Quota Transfer
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-59167-4

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-59169-8

Copyright-Jahr: 2018
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59169-8_8

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