Indonesia’s Engagement with Africa

This chapter studies the reformulation and operationalisation of Indonesia's foreign policy towards Africa under President Jokowi. The Indonesia-Africa Forum (IAF) and its birth in April 2018 are looked into, notably its justification through academia. The decisive actors responsible for operationalising the new African policy in the Jokowi era are portrayed; the President, his closest ally, powerful General Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, and foreign minister Retno Marsudi and Kemlu’s (Indonesia’s MoFA) Directorate for African Affairs. The formidable Jokowi–Luhut political tandem managed to set aside Indonesia’s abstract and nostalgic approach to Afro-Asia to focus on a more realist and tangible engagement with Africa based on bilateralism and economic diplomacy, notably introducing the IAF and a special, ad hoc Task Force for Indonesian Infrastructure in Africa headed by Luhut in his commando style. Initially focusing on seeking infrastructure projects in Africa, yet impeded by funding limitations, Luhut’s Task Force shifted its primary focus, especially to promote Indonesia’s successful domestic commodity-based downstream industrialisation (hilirisasi policy), supported by Chinese investments and know-how, through the formation of a Global South minilateral coalition of resource-rich developing nations using an Afro-Asian solidarity discourse, aiming at facing Western challenges to its hilirisasi policy in the WTO. Indonesia’s new Africa policy can be seen as participating in a consolidation of Jokowi–Luhut’s power towards their prominent political patrons, notably former President Megawati and Nasdem Party Chairman Surya Paloh. The China factor and its related benefits also play a significant role in Indonesia’s increased involvement with Africa, given China’s importance on the continent, and for Indonesia and its elites who compete for Chinese material favours. The roadmap of the Indonesian Ambassador to Senegal is presented as a tangible example of on-the-ground diplomatic objectives. This book confirms Indonesia as an ambitious, aspiring great power; denying the middle power label, which does not correspond to the highest leadership’s vision; showing that Indonesia implements a dual foreign policy with Luhut, a senior emanation of Indonesia’s powerful security apparatus, directly representing the president, and Kemlu dealing with “normal” diplomacy with a middle power narrative. Continuity following the 2024 presidential elections remains uncertain.

This chapter succinctly compares the African foreign policies of other major Asian powers—China, Japan, South Korea and India—and Indonesia’s African foreign policy to refine the perspective on the essence and positioning of Indonesia’s African foreign policy. For analytical reasons, the various Africa + 1 forums organised by Asian powers in the twenty-first century are specifically examined as the incarnation and spearhead of their overall African foreign policy. The reasons for Indonesia’s late contemporary African engagement vis-à-vis other Asian powers are of particular concern. These analogies help underscore correlations and differences, strengthening explanatory power relating to Indonesia’s own African approach; while fostering thoughts on potentially new Asian triangular partnerships in Africa.

After studying Indonesia’s African approach’s redefinition and its main instigators, then making parallels between Indonesia’s African foreign policy and that of other major Asian powers, this chapter reevaluates the multiple drivers and conceptions of Indonesian foreign policy in general and towards Africa in particular, while interrogating the possibility for Indonesia of being a model in Africa, the necessity of holistic approaches to co-construct meaning and long term success in Africa, and the road to great power for Indonesia as passing through Africa. Before being able to develop a comprehensive African strategy, Indonesia will need to enrich its engagement with Africa, making it more holistic, which means learning more while producing more knowledge on the continent to fulfil its ambitions; otherwise, Indonesia’s African engagement risks bringing disappointment in Africa. Indonesian infrastructural promises made in Africa have, for example, not been delivered, given Indonesia’s lack of financial capacities.

The final chapter concludes the overall research by summarising the main arguments of the book, recalling key identified foreign policy determinants. The place of Africa for Indonesia’s foreign policy and its global ambitions is reassessed, as well as Indonesia’s absence of a solid knowledge ecosystem to study Africa, negatively impacting its foreign policy. Overall, the powerful political couple formed by President Joko Widodo and General Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan has changed Indonesia’s perception and engagement with Africa, putting an end to Africa’s insignificance in Indonesian foreign policy. However, they have lacked intellectualism to act better and more meaningfully in the long run. General Luhut’s weaponisation of Afro-Asian discourse to defend Indonesia’s Chinese-backed domestic commodity-based industrialisation; promising to assist resource-rich African nations in industrialising based on their resources; is risky if Indonesia cannot provide tangible benefits for Africans and if non-resource-rich African nations feel neglected. It does underline the primacy of domestic concerns in Indonesia’s foreign policy. The issue of continuity after Jokowi, whose presidency will end in 2024 after the presidential elections, is emphasised.