2006 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Industry Dynamics á La Stackelberg with Stochastic Capital Accumulation
verfasst von : Luca Lambertini
Erschienen in: Entrepreneurship, Growth, and Innovation
Verlag: Springer US
Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.
Wählen Sie Textabschnitte aus um mit Künstlicher Intelligenz passenden Patente zu finden. powered by
Markieren Sie Textabschnitte, um KI-gestützt weitere passende Inhalte zu finden. powered by
I have described a stochastic differential game in which firms invest to increase productive capacity, following time-consistent open-loop Stackelberg strategies. The equilibrium of the model highlights different growth rates along the saddle path. Accordingly, the analysis carried out in this paper is clearly in contrast with
Gibrat’s Law
. Moreover, it appears that there are admissible cases where the followers’s growth rates are larger than the leaders’, e.g. when the representative leader is indeed bigger than the representative follower in terms of installed capacity. This may ultimately lead to situations where equilibrium profits are larger for followers than for leaders.