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2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

4. Integration and Secession Under Threat of Third Region

verfasst von : Moriki Hosoe

Erschienen in: Regional Economic Analysis of Power, Elections, and Secession

Verlag: Springer Japan

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Abstract

In this chapter, we analyze mechanisms of integration and secession among several regions. In particular, we examine a three-region model using policy preference approach when there are policy conflicts among regions. By considering incentives of policy decisions in each region, we show the possibility of integration and secession and how the welfare of each region is realized through strategic determination of policy.

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Metadaten
Titel
Integration and Secession Under Threat of Third Region
verfasst von
Moriki Hosoe
Copyright-Jahr
2018
Verlag
Springer Japan
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55897-2_4