Regional Economic Analysis of Power, Elections, and Secession

herausgegeben von: Prof. Moriki Hosoe

Verlag: Springer Japan

Buchreihe : New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives

Enthalten in: Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" , Springer Professional "Technik" , Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

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Über dieses Buch

The main object of this book is to explain some of the mechanisms of integration and secession among regions from the point of view of game theory. To attain this goal, the incentives of regions in a country to unite or to secede and the conditions in the way for the member countries of a federation to leave peacefully are examined. Tensions over secession have become more and more serious, including separatist tensions in China, India, Iraq, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka. Studies included in this book stress differing preferences in the type of policy in each region and the influence of a third region on the power of secession. Decentralization strategies of tax-subsidy policy and governance policy in a political or economic group composed of two regions are shown to be important as a way to avoid wasteful conflict for the secession incentive of a minority region. How those incentives depend on heterogeneity costs associated with different preferences over the type of region and the relative size of the two regions is shown. Also provided is an analytical framework in which secessions are the equilibrium outcome of explicit civil conflict, where regions with different preferences invest in costly conflict activities. Finally, an empirical analysis is made of determinant factors of secession movements in many regions to verify the validity of our theories of secession. This book is recommended to researchers who are interested in a new economic geography and an interdisciplinary approach for regional economics.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Frontmatter

Chapter 1. The Issue of Regional Conflict and Secession

Abstract

Regional conflicts, which have persisted from ancient times to modern times, have included ethnic wars and wars of conquest. Secession has been the cause and result of regional conflicts. During the last few decades, many national breakouts have occurred. The most dramatic examples were the big bang in Eastern Europe after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Even today, from Catalonia and Scotland to South Sudan and Kashmir, secessionist movements demanding independence are occurring throughout the world under all kinds of political and economic circumstances. A short look at two histories in Asia is illustrative of the causes of the breakout and formation of states. One is related to Bangladesh. The other is related to Timor.

Moriki Hosoe

Chapter 2. Secession, Representative Elections, and Political Governance

Abstract

In this chapter, we analyze the endogenous determination of integration and secession by introducing policy preference and policy conflict cost, stressing on representative election and political governance.

Moriki Hosoe

Chapter 3. Regional Integration and Secession with Rent-Seeking

Abstract

These days, we have experienced many cases of the nationwide integration and separation, for example, from bloody conflicts of Balkan countries, to the collapse of Soviet Union, to the enlargement of the European Union. Though there are several nations with long-time political stability in history, considerably many countries periodically encounter some serious separation problem among ethnic or religious regions. This is not only a nationwide problem but also a regional problem. Especially the conflicts among several regions have broken up constantly. Multiracial nations are said to be destined to face the regional conflicts at any time.

Moriki Hosoe

Chapter 4. Integration and Secession Under Threat of Third Region

Abstract

In this chapter, we analyze mechanisms of integration and secession among several regions. In particular, we examine a three-region model using policy preference approach when there are policy conflicts among regions. By considering incentives of policy decisions in each region, we show the possibility of integration and secession and how the welfare of each region is realized through strategic determination of policy.

Moriki Hosoe

Chapter 5. Integration, Third Region Effect, and Policy Commitment

Abstract

In this chapter, we introduce a three-region model for integration and secession with policy preference and policy conflict cost. Under alternative assumptions of policy commitment of third region and integrating two regions, we show how the difference in policy preferences in two regions and the policy conflict cost influences the possibility of secession. Furthermore, we show how the policy preference in the integrated minority region affects the third region’s utility. We assume that the integration agreement works as a commitment device; therefore, integrated regions play as the first mover, and the independent region reacts to the policy agreement of the integrated regions. We consider that the policy agreement is not altered in the future because it is international treaty and announced to the public.

Shigeharu Sato

Chapter 6. Secession and Fiscal Policy

Abstract

Recently, discussions of difficulties related to regional secession have arisen worldwide. For example, one might examine independence issues related to Scotland. Why would people of Scotland desire separation of their nation from the United Kingdom? The salient motivations for Scottish independence include the following.

Tadahisa Ohno

Chapter 7. Voting and Secession

Abstract

In recent years, quite a few sub-national regions such as Scotland (UK) and Catalonia (Spain) have held referendums seeking independence from their respective nations, and/or are intend to do so in the future. The Scottish referendum took place in September 2014, and was agreed to in advance by both the Scottish and UK governments. The Scottish referendum was thus democratic. Furthermore, the UK government held a referendum on independence from the EU on June 2016. As a result, the UK government has decided to secede from the EU. Is this decision efficient for the British nation? What would be the case if the EU government had the right to forbid the referendum for independence?

Shigeharu Sato

Chapter 8. Resource Sharing, Civil Conflict, and Secession

Abstract

We consider a secession problem with vital resource allocations under the possibility of civil wars. Several examples suggest that natural resource allocation matters. High-value resources such as oil and minerals are often unequally distributed among regions. When the presence of a local ethnic group coincides with large natural resource abundance concentrated in its region, this local ethnic group could be better off if it were independent, and may have incentives to start secessionist movement. Secessionist movements have been linked to large local natural resources, including Angola, Myanmar, Democratic Republic of Congo, Morocco and Papua New Guinea (see Ross [15], for a discussion).

Moriki Hosoe

Chapter 9. Empirical Analyses of Secession and Integration: What Determines National Size?

Abstract

Secession movements have occurred throughout the world by democratic or violent means. As might be readily apparent for Cataluña, Scotland, and Quebec, some European and North American subnational regions have had referendums for independence from their mother countries. In the Middle East and Africa, civil wars and terrorism occupying subnational areas have been continuing or expanding.

Takashi Kihara

Backmatter

Titel: Regional Economic Analysis of Power, Elections, and Secession
herausgegeben von: Prof. Moriki Hosoe
Verlag: Springer Japan
Electronic ISBN: 978-4-431-55897-2
Print ISBN: 978-4-431-55895-8
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55897-2