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2018 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

2. Secession, Representative Elections, and Political Governance

verfasst von : Moriki Hosoe

Erschienen in: Regional Economic Analysis of Power, Elections, and Secession

Verlag: Springer Japan

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Abstract

In this chapter, we analyze the endogenous determination of integration and secession by introducing policy preference and policy conflict cost, stressing on representative election and political governance.

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Metadaten
Titel
Secession, Representative Elections, and Political Governance
verfasst von
Moriki Hosoe
Copyright-Jahr
2018
Verlag
Springer Japan
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55897-2_2