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2017 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

Interpretation and Application of the New York Convention in the United States

verfasst von : Louis Del Duca, Nancy A. Welsh

Erschienen in: Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Foreign and non-domestic arbitration agreements and awards are enforceable in the United States under the New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards as implemented by Congress’ addition of Chapter 2 to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). Supporters vigorously encouraged enactment of the FAA in 1925 to achieve prompt, informed, and fast-track resolution of commercial disputes in the marketplace. The silence of the FAA on many issues has required U.S. courts to produce a very large and rich jurisprudence on the recognition and enforcement by U.S. courts of foreign and non-domestic arbitration agreements and arbitral awards.

This chapter does not reflect legal developments that have occurred since completion of the manuscript in October 2015.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Interpretation and Application of the New York Convention in United Kingdom

Nächstes Kapitel Interpretation and Application of the New York Convention in Uruguay

The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Art. I (1), Jun. 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]

9 U.S.C. §201 (2012).

9 U.S.C. §208 (2012)

Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2011).

ibid at 1262–1263 (citing to Czarina, L.L.C. v. W.F. Poe Syndicate, 358 F.3d 1286, 1290–91 (11th Cir. 2004)).

Intergen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 141 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting Scherk v. Alberto–Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n. 15, 94 S.Ct. 2449, 41 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974)).

ibid at 141.

La Societe Nationale Pour La Recherche v. Shaheen Natural Res. Co., 585 F. Supp 57, 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); See also E.A.S.T., Inc. of Stamford v. M/V Alaia, 876 F.2d 1168, 1172 (5th Cir. 1989).

Note that the terms “states” here and throughout this report generally refers to nation-states. This chapter refers to the smaller units of government that exist in the United States as “American states.”

Jugometal v. Samincorp, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 504, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (court enforced an arbitration award decided in France (a member country) between a Yugoslavian party (non-member state) and a wholly-owned subsidiary of a Panamanian company).

Jugometal, 78 F.R.D. at 505–506.

ibid at 505–506.

Lander Co. v. MMP Invs., 107 F.3d 476 (7th Cir. 1997)

9 U.S.C. § 202 (2012).

Lander Co. v. MMP Invs., 107 F.3d at 482; Trans Chem. Ltd. v. China Nat’l Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp., 978 F. Supp. 266, 293–295 (S.D. Tex. 1997).

Arthur J. Gemmell (2006) “Commercial Arbitration in the Islamic Middle East” 5 Santa Clara J. Int’l L. 169, 187; but see S. I. Strong (2012) “Arbitration of Trust Disputes: Two Bodies of Law Collide” 45 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1157, 1186 (observing that even noncommercial trusts are likely to come within many jurisdictions’ broad definition of commercial activity).

Siderius, Inc. v. Compania de Acero Del Pacifico, S. A., 453 F. Supp. 22, 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See also Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 528 F. Supp. 243, 245 (D.P.R. 1981) (“The complaint shows on its face that it involves a transaction involving foreign commerce. The dispute, as the one in Siderius v. Compania de Acero del Pacifico, 453 F. Supp. 22 (S.D.N.Y., 1978), arose out of classical commercial relationship, one involving the purchase and sale of goods by two corporations.”).

Henry v. Murphy, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 227 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2002) aff’d, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 23199 (2d Cir. Nov. 6, 2002).

ibid

ibid; but see Diag Human W.E. v. Czech Republic-Ministry of Health, 2014 WL 3956747, __ F. Supp.2d__ (D.D.C 2014) (citing to the Convention generally and Section 202 of the FAA in refusing to confirm an arbitral award related to defendant’s alleged tortious and defamatory interference with a business relationship between plaintiff and third party; finding that before plaintiff and defendant entered into an arbitration agreement, they had no commercial relationship—or any legal relationship of any kind).

Faberge Int’l Inc. v. Di Pino, No. 23387N, 1985 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 45265 (N.Y. App. Div. July 2, 1985) (applying the commercial reservation in the context of a “non-domestic” award).

Amizola v. Dolphin Shipowner, S.A., 354 F. Supp. 2d 689, 695–697 (E.D. La 2004); Bautista v. Star Cruises, 286 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (S.D. Fla. 2003), aff’d, 396 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Freudensprung v. Offshore Technical Servs., Inc., 379 F.3d 327, 339 (5th Cir.2004) (Consultant’s Agreement to “perform ‘hook-up, engineering, planning, inspection, ... [and] pipeline work’ ” represented a commercial legal relationship).

Francisco v. M/T Stolt Achievement, No. 00-3532 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3902 (E.D. La. March 23, 2001) aff’d, 293 F.3d 270, 273–75 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Neither the Convention nor the limiting language ratifying the Convention contemplate any exception for seamen employment contracts or employment contracts in general. While the ratification language expresses an intent to limit the reach of the Convention to commercial relationships, there is no indication that employment contracts or seamen employment contracts are not considered “commercial . . .”).

See Section IV(I) below.

1976 A.M.C. 2514, 2517 (1976) (involving arbitration clause in Lloyd’s Open Form salvage agreement); see also Diag Human W.E. v. Czech Republic-Ministry of Health, 2014 WL 3956747, __ F. Supp.2d__ (D.D.C 2014) (refusing to confirm an arbitral award related to defendant’s alleged tortious and defamatory interference with a business relationship between plaintiff and third party after finding no pre-existing commercial relationship between the parties).

New York Convention, above n 1 at Article 1(1), first sentence (“This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought, and arising out of differences between persons, whether physical or legal.”)

ibid n 1 at Article 1(1), second sentence.

9 U.S.C §202 (2012) (“An arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a legal relationship, whether contractual or not, which is considered as commercial, including a transaction, contract, or agreement described in section 2 of this title, falls under the Convention. An agreement or award arising out of such a relationship which is entirely between citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall under the Convention unless that relationship involves property located abroad, envisages performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one or more foreign states. For the purpose of this section a corporation is a citizen of the United States if it is incorporated or has its principal place of business in the United States.”).

See eg, Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte v. Indus. Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d 1434, 1441 (11th Cir. 1998) (joining First, Second, Seventh and Ninth Circuits in holding that arbitration agreements and awards involving a non-domestic party are “non-domestic” even if the arbitration was conducted in the United States).

The Ministry of Defense and Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic Defense Systems, Inc., 665 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2011).

Chinmax Med. Sys. Inc. v. Alere San Diego, Inc.,10CV2467 WQH NLS, 2011 WL 2135350 (S.D. Cal. May 27, 2011).

ibid at 5.

See Section 3.2.5.

See Section 3.2.5 (discussing Pacific Reins. Mgmt. Corp. v. Ohio Reinsurance Corp. and Island Creek Coal Sales v. City of Gainesville, Florida).

The Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, 1438 U.N.T.S. 245 [hereinafter Panama Convention] available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-35.html.

Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (description of signatory countries and reservations) available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-35.html.

9 U.S.C. §301–307 (2012).

Currently, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the United States of America, Uruguay, and Venezuela are signatory nations. Of OAS member-states, only the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua have not signed the Panama Convention. Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, (providing a list of signatories) available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-35.html.

See 9 U.S.C. §305 (2012) (“When the requirements for application of both the Inter-American Convention and the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958, are met, determination as to which Convention applies shall, unless otherwise expressly agreed, be made as follows: (1) If a majority of the parties to the arbitration agreement are citizens of a State or States that have ratified or acceded to the Inter-American Convention and are member States of the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Convention shall apply. (2) In all other cases the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958, shall apply.”). See also Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, (providing the choice of law reservation made at the time of the signing of the treaty) available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-35.html (“Unless there is an express agreement among the parties to an arbitration agreement to the contrary, where the requirements for application of both the Inter-American Convention [and the Convention] on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards are met, if a majority of such parties are citizens of a state or states that have ratified or acceded to the Inter-American Convention and are Member States of the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Convention shall apply. In all other cases, the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards shall apply”).

9 U.S.C. §302 (2012).

9 U.S.C. §202 (2012).

9 U.S.C. §203 (2012).

9 U.S.C. §204 (2012).

9 U.S.C. §205 (2012).

9 U.S.C. §207 (2012).

See eg, Termorio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 933 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing to district court which found that “codification of the Panama Convention incorporates by reference the relevant provisions of the New York Convention (see 9 U.S.C. § 302), making discussion of the Panama Convention unnecessary” and noting “We need not decide whether 9 U.S.C. § 302 incorporates the New York Convention, as opposed to other provisions of law related to the New York Convention, because the relevant provisions of the Panama Convention and the New York Convention are substantively identical for purposes of this case and neither party challenges the District Court’s analysis. We therefore resolve this matter with reference to and using the language of the New York Convention”).

Panama Convention, above n 35 at Article 1.

ibid

9 U.S.C. §303 (2012).

Mercury Telco Grp., Inc. v. Empresa De Telecommunicaciones De Bogota S.A. E.S.P., 670 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2009).

Rep. of Ecuador v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 376 F. Supp.2d 334, 347–349.

Freudenspring v. Offshore Technical Serv., Inc., 379 F. 3d 327, n. 7 (5th Cir. 2004).

In Re Ferrara S.p.A., 441 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).

ibid at n. 2 (citations omitted).

Freudensprung, 379 F. 3d at 341; see also Sedco, 767 F.2d at 1146 (quoting Convention, Article II(3)).

Apple & Eve, LLC v. Yantai N. Andre Juice Co., 610 F. Supp. 2d 226 (E.D.N.Y 2009).

ibid at 234.

Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005).

ibid at 1302 (quoting DiMercurio v. Sphere Drake Ins. PLC, 202 F.3d 71, 80 (1st Cir.2000)) (refusing to find agreement null and void on unconscionability grounds).

See Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 573 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir. 2009) (refusing to enforce arbitration agreement contained in a seamen employment contract because while the NY Convention does apply, the affirmative defense of violation of public policy permitted the court to not enforce the clause; here the court determined that compelling foreign arbitration that would follow foreign law is adverse to the public policy of the United States) (abrogated in Brown v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 549 F. App’x 861, 863–64 (11th Cir. 2013)); Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2011) (resolving the intra-circuit split generated by Thomas by following the reasoning in Bautistia and limiting the null and void affirmative defense to bases that would be internationally recognized); see also, Paucar v. MSC Crociere S.A. et al., 552 Fed.Appx. 872 (2014).

Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co., Ltd., 77 N.Y.2d 225 (N.Y. 1990).

New York Convention, above n 1 at Article II(3).

New York Convention, above n 1 at Article II(1).

Corcoran, 77 N.Y.2d at 232–233.

ibid at 233.

Margaret L. Moses, The Principles and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, (Cambridge, 2008) 91.

First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 946 (1995).

9 U.S.C. § 203 (2012).

China Minmetals Materials Import and Export Co. v. Chi Mei Corp., 334 F.3d 274 (3rd Cir. 2003)

Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983).

Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. 24–25.

BG Group PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S.Ct. 1198 (2014).

Buckeye Check Cashing v. Cardigna, 546 U.S.440 (2006).

ibid at 444–445.

ibid at 445.

Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403–404 (1967).

Advance Am. Servicing of Ark., Inc. v. McGinnis, 375 Ark. 24, 37–8 (Ark. 2008).

This can be understood as simply a matter of meeting statutory requirements, or as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction.

Intergen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 141 (1st Cir. 2003). (citing Scherk v. Alberto–Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n. 15 (1974)); New York Convention, above n 1 at Article II(2).

Intergen N.V., 344 F.3d 134 (1st Cir. 2003).

The signatories in the InterGen case were corporations related to the parties, but were distinct entities. Without the signatures of the distinct entities who were parties to the dispute, the arbitration agreement was not enforceable. See ibid 150.

See FR 8 Singapore Pte. Ltd. V. Albacore Maritime Inc., 754 F. Supp. 2d 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) reversed on other grounds (failure to state a claim for piercing the veil under English law), FR 8 Singapore Pte. Ltd. v. Albacore Maritime Inc., 794 F.Supp.2d 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).

Iran Ministry of Def. of Islamic Rep. of Iran v. Gould Inc., 887 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1989).

See Nielson v. Seaboard Corp., 129 S. Ct. 624 (2008), cert. denied; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Nielson v. Seaboard Corp., 08-65 2008 WL 2773349 at i (July 14, 2008) (stating the question presented was “the proper scope and application of article II(2) of the Convention, relating to when an arbitration clause must be ‘signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams’”).

See Sarhank Grp. v. Oracle Corp., 404 F.3d 657, 660 n. 2 (2d Cir. 2005); Standard Bent Glass Corp. v. Glassrobots Oy, 333 F.3d 440, 449 (3d Cir. 2003); Kahn Lucas Lancaster, Inc. v. Lark Int’l Ltd., 186 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 1999).

Sphere Drake Ins. PLC v. Marine Towing, Inc., 16 F.3d 666, 669 (5th Cir.1994).

See Sourcing Unlimited, Inc. v. Asimco Int’l, Inc., 526 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2008); Regent Seven Seas, Nos. 06–22347–CIV, 06–22539–CIV, 2007 WL 601992 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2007); Sarhank, 404 F.3d at 660; Kahn Lucas Lancaster, 186 F.3d 210.

G.A. Res. 61/33, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/33 (Dec. 18, 2006), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/a61-33-e.pdf; G.A. Res. 61/17, at 61 U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/17 (Nov. 20, 2006), available at http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V06/558/15/pdf/V0655815.pdf?OpenElement [hereinafter 2006 UNCITRAL Recommendation].

Glencore Ltd. v. Degussa Engineered Carbons L.P., 848 F.Supp.2d 410, 436–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding that an exchange of emails going both ways was sufficient for the “agreement in writing” requirement).

See Cornell & Co., Inc. v. Barber & Ross Co., 360 F.2d 512, 513 (D.C.Cir. 1966); see also Apple & Eve, LLC v. Yantai N. Andre Juice Co., 610 F. Supp.2d 226, 228 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).

Apple & Eve, LLC., 610 F. Supp.2d at 228.

Morewitz v. W. of Eng. Ship Owners Mut. Prot. & Indemnity Assoc. (Luxembourg), 62 F.3d 1356, 1366 (11th Cir. 1995).

Hodgson v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1258 (S.D. Fla. 2009).

In re Ferrara S.p.A., 441 F. Supp. at 781–782.

ibid at 782.

ibid

ibid at 782.

See eg, Karen Mar. Ltd. v. Omar Int’l Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 224 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (enforcing arbitral award after finding that even though parties’ contract contained a clause violating U.S. law and public policy barring participation in Arab boycott of Israel, the award dealt with a breach of contract claim that had nothing to do with such boycott); Northrop Corp. v. Triad Int’l Mktg. S.A., 811 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that public policy had not clearly been violated in case involving award of commissions to marketing representative responsible for soliciting armaments contracts, even though such commissions were unlawful under Saudi Arabian law).

100

See eg, Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cableries de Lens, S.A. v. Southwire Co., 484 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (enforcement of award except for portion attributable to escalating interest rate that was determined to be penal).

101

Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim v. Toys “R” Us, 126 F.3d 15, 23 (2d Cir. 1997); see Karaha Bodas Co., LLC v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Nnegara, 364 F. 3d 274, 287–88 (5th Cir. 2004); M&C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH, 87 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 1996).

102

See Yusuf Ahmed, 126 F.3d at 21–23; Ario v. Underwriting Members of Syndicate, 618 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 2010).

103

Convention, article V(1)(e) (emphasis added).

104

See eg, Corp. Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, S. de R.L. de C.V. v. Pemex-Exploracion y Prod., 962 F. Supp. 2d 642 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

105

ibid at 657 n 22.

106

Thai-Lao Lignite (Thail.) Co., Ltd. v. Gov’t of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 997 F. Supp. 2d 214, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), appeal docketed, No. 14-1497 (2d Cir. May 7, 2014) (citing Termorio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).

107

ibid. See also Baker Marine, Ltd. v. Chevron, Ltd., 191 F.3d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that no “adequate reason” had been shown to refuse to recognize the judgment of Nigerian court).

108

Chromalloy Aeroservices, a Division of Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996).

109

ibid at 912, 913 (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 518 n.15 (1974), reh’g denied, 419 U.S. 885).

110

ibid at 912.

111

See eg, Four Seasons Hotels and Resorts, B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1341–42 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (questioning Chromalloy’s reliance on Article VII of the Convention and Chapter 1 of the FAA), vacated on other grounds, 377 F.3d 1164 (11th Cir. 2004) (requiring consideration of whether Venezuelan court’s ruling merited denial of confirmation of the award).

112

Corporacion Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral v. Pemex-Exploracion y Produccion 962 F. Supp. 2d 642, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (interpreting the Panama Convention, but noting that the Panama Convention and New York Convention are “largely similar” and that “precedents under one are generally applicable to the other.”).

113

ibid at 658.

114

ibid at 658–660.

115

Thai-Lao Lignite (Thail.) Co., Ltd. v. Gov’t of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 997 F. Supp. 2d 214, 222–23 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), appeal docketed, No. 14-1497 (2d Cir. May 7, 2014). See also Termorio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 939 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (affirming district court’s dismissal of action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted or, in the alternative, on the ground of forum non conveniens, and finding no evidence that the nullification proceedings before Colombian court or its judgment violated “any basic notions of justice to which we subscribe.”); Baker Marine, Ltd. v. Chevron, Ltd., 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming district court’s denial of petitions to enforce arbitral awards; Nigerian court had set aside the awards in two cases, finding in the first case that the arbitrators improperly awarded punitive damages, went beyond the scope of the submissions, incorrectly admitted parole evidence, and made inconsistent awards, and finding in the second case that the award was not supported by the evidence).

116

Thai-Lao, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 227.

117

ibid

118

See Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Banco de Seguros del Estado, 199 F.3d 937, 943 (7th Cir. 1999).

119

ibid

120

Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985).

121

ibid at 637 n 19. In a series of cases involving claims by seamen against cruise ship companies under the federal Seaman’s Wage Act and Jones Act, courts repeatedly cited to this footnote, observing more specifically that if an arbitration agreement provides no opportunity for judicial review of an arbitral award and a U.S. court is persuaded that choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses will “ ‘operate[] in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies,’” the court will “‘have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy.’ ” (quoted in Krstic v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1281 n. 5 (S.D. Fla. 2010); Bulgakova v. Carnival Corp., No. 09-20023, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39231, at *8 n. 3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2010); Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 573 F.3d 1113, 1121 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (holding that because the arbitration clause specified that the arbitrator had to apply Panamanian law, the clause effectively waived and foreclosed on the plaintiff’s rights under the Seaman’s Wage Act)). All of these cases involved challenges to judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements, rather than arbitral awards. In Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257, 1274 (11th Cir. 2011), the Eleventh Circuit clarified that an objecting party could assert the affirmative defense of violation of public policy only after the issuance of the award, when challenging the recognition or enforcement of such award.

122

AAOT Foreign Econ. Ass’n (VO) Technostroyexport v. Int’l Dev. & Trade Servs., Inc., 139 F.3d 980 (2d Cir. 1998).

123

ibid at 982 (quoting Ilios Shipping & Trading Corp. v. Am. Anthracite & Bituminous Coal Corp., 148 F. Supp. 698, 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff’d, 245 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1957) (per curiam)). In cases involving grounds for vacatur under the FAA rather than grounds for defenses under the Convention, the Ninth Circuit has held that a party’s failure to make a timely objection after gaining constructive knowledge of an arbitrator’s potential conflict of interest represents waiver of the applicable defense. See Fid. Fed. Bank, FSB v. Durga Ma Corp., 386 F.3d 1306, 1308 (9th Cir. 2004). Notably, in another case involving the same defense, the Ninth Circuit did not find waiver because the objecting party did not have constructive knowledge of the potential conflict. See Metalmark Northwest, LLC v. Stewart, No. 06-35321, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 10339 (9th Cir. May 6, 2008). But see Stone v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 872 F. Supp. 2d 435 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (applying “should have known” approach, finding that objecting party waived objections regarding arbitrator conflict or bias because he failed to research potential for bias until after issuance of award).

124

See below Section 3.2.2.

125

See Am. Constr. Mach. & Equip. Corp. v. Mechanised Constr. of Pakistan, Ltd., 659 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (waiver of objection to jurisdiction due to signing terms of reference in ICC arbitration).

126

See below Section 3.2.3. See also Exportkhelb v. Maistros Corp., 790 F. Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (waiver due to failure to object in arbitration to arbitrability of counterclaim).

127

See below Section 4.1.

128

See China Minmetals Materials Imp. & Exp. Co., Ltd. v. Chi Mei Corp., 334 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2003) (party that objects to jurisdiction based on alleged forgery of the underlying agreement does not waive objection by participating in the arbitration in order to argue jurisdiction, to which it consistently objected).

129

See Section 2.2. In Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 573 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir. 2009), a case involving a seaman required to arbitrate outside the United States and with the application of another country’s laws, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit found that the combination of forum selection and choice of law clauses compelled a prospective waiver of the seaman’s U.S. statutory rights and violation of American public policy. The panel therefore refused to enforce the arbitration agreement on the ground that it was null and void. Ibid at 1124. More recently, however, another panel of the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision to enforce an arbitration agreement in a similar situation, observing that judicial review by a U.S. court remained available at the award enforcement stage. Lindo v. NCL (Bah.) Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257, 1268 (11th Cir. 2011) (referencing Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995)). Therefore, the court found no prospective waiver, and the seaman was limited to asserting the affirmative defense of violation of public policy at the second stage of enforcement. See ibid at 1280–81, 1291. The analysis in Lindo v. NCL now dominates understanding of the relationship between the two stages of enforcement. See also Vera v. Cruise Ships Catering & Servs. Int’l, N.V., 594 Fed. App’x. 963, 968 n.3 (11th Cir. 2014) (concluding that Peruvian citizen who was a galley steward and had brought suit under the Jones Act could not pursue Article V public policy defense until award enforcement stage and noting that courts have failed to use the “effective vindication” exception to invalidate arbitration agreements) (citing Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013); Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1303 (11th Cir. 2005) (Jones Act claims arbitrable).

130

Aggarao v. MOL Ship Mgmt. Co., Civ. No. CCB-09-3106, 2014 WL 3894079 (D. Md. Aug. 7, 2014).

131

ibid at 14.

132

ibid. After detailing the seaman’s very extensive injuries, as well as his history of operations, medications, setbacks and financial need, the court specifically observed that the arbitrator’s decision to limit the seaman’s remedies to those provided by the POEA [Philippine Overseas Employment Administration] contract “destroyed” his right to maintenance and cure and “cut off” his potential causes of action against other defendants. Ibid.

133

ibid (citing Am. Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274, 285 (1980) (quoting Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 387 (1970) (explaining that “[a]dmiralty jurisprudence has always been inspirited with a ‘special solicitude for the welfare of those men who under[take] to venture upon hazardous and unpredictable sea voyages.’”))). But see Asignacion v. Rickmers Genoa Schiffahrtsgesellschaft MBH & CIE KG, 783 F.3d 1010, 1020 (5th Cir. 2015) (distinguishing Aggarao, 2014 WL 3894079, and reversing denial of enforcement of arbitral award due to lower court’s failure to make findings regarding the adequacy of the arbitral award in relation to seaman’s injuries and unmet medical expenses).

134

See Section 3.2.7.

135

BG Grp. PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014).

136

Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding, 895 F. Supp. 2d 513, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), rev’d on other grounds, 750 F.3d 221 (2d Cir. 2014).

137

SEI Societa Esplosivi Industrali SPA v. L-3 Fuzing & Ordnance Sys. Inc., 843 F. Supp. 2d 509, 514–15 (D. Del. 2012).

138

Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L’industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 976 (2d Cir. 1974).

139

See eg ibid at 976–77; Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Mgmt., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948, 958–61 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Thai-Lao Lignite (Thai.) Co., Ltd. v. Gov’t of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, No. 10 Civ. 5256(KMW), 2011 WL 3516154, at *15 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2011) (commenting on relationship between arguments regarding arbitrability and the defense available under article V(1)(c)).

140

See Section 3.1.1.

141

See Section 3.2.5.

142

See Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd. v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd., 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999); Termorio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Spier v. Calzaturificio Tecnica, S.p.A., 71 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Thai-Lao Lignite (Thai.) Co., Ltd. v. Gov’t of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 997 F. Supp. 2d 214 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).

143

See Section 4.3.

144

See eg, Seung Woo Lee v. Imaging3 Inc., 283 Fed. Appx. 490, 493 (9th Cir. 2008)

145

See Section 2.1.

146

See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (antitrust); Shearson/American Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (securities and RICO).

147

See Rhone Mediterranee Compagnia Francese Di Assicurazione e Riassicurazoni v. Lauro, 712 F.2d 50, 54 (3rd Cir. 1983).

148

New York Convention, above n 1 at article V(1)(b).

149

9 U.S.C. §208 (2012); Zeiler v. Deitsch, 500 F3d 157, 164 (2d Cir. 2007).

150

9 U.S.C. §10(a)(3) (2012).

151

See, eg Abu Dhabi Inv. Auth. v. Citigroup, No. 12 Civ. 283(GBD) 2013 WL789642, n. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16 (2nd Cir. 1997) (vacating district court’s confirmation of arbitral award and remanding for further consideration after finding that arbitral panel had refused to hear testimony from one witness who could testify regarding facts that only he could know); Karaha Bodas Co., LLC v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Nnegara, 364 F. 3d 274 (5th Cir. 2004); Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale de L’Industrie Du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974); Sonera Holding, B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S., No. 11 Civ. 8909 (DLC) 2012 WL 3925853 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Rive, S.A. v. Briggs of Cancun, Inc., 82 Fed. Appx. 359 (5th Cir. 2003); Generica, Ltd. v. Pharmaceutical Basics, Inc., 125 F.3d 1123 (7th Cir. 1997).

152

ibid.

153

Sonera Holding, B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S., No. 11 Civ. 8909 (DLC) 2012 WL 3925853 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) reversed on other grounds, Sonera Holding, B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S., No. 11 Civ. 8909 (DLC) 2014 WL 1645255 (2d Cir. 2014).

154

Rive, S.A. v. Briggs of Cancun, Inc., 82 Fed. Appx. 359 (5th Cir. 2003).

155

ibid at 364 (the court also pointed out that “it is not uncommon in the United States for criminal and civil proceedings involving the same matter to run concurrently” which may result in “difficult litigation choices” for a party).

156

See generally, Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale de L’Industrie Du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 975 (2d Cir. 1974) (citing Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild, Local 35 v. The Washington Post Co., 143 U.S.App.D.C. 210, 442 F.2d 1234, 1238 (1971)); but see 9 U.S.C. §7 (providing for subpoena power for arbitrators)..

157

Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16 (2nd Cir. 1997).

158

Karaha Bodas Co., 364 F.3d at 302; see also Abu Dhabi Inv. Auth, v. Citigroup, No. 12 Civ. 283(GBD) 2013 WL789642, n. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). (describing the testimony as “crucial and non-cumulative”).

159

The court cited to Hoteles Condado Beach, La Concha and Convention Center v. Union De Tronquisias Local 901, 763 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1985), in which a court decided to vacate a domestic arbitral award because “the arbitral panel refused to give any weight to the only evidence available to the losing party.”

160

See Abu Dhabi Investment Authority v. Citigroup, 2013 WL 789642 at 8 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting that party complaining about tribunal’s refusal of discovery request failed to call witness who could have testified regarding basis for his statement in an email; party also did not cross-examine other witnesses about the issue).

161

See eg, Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 301 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding that even though the arbitral tribunal denied the discovery that had been requested, the complaining party was able to cross-examine adverse witnesses).

162

Abu Dhabi Inv. Auth., 2013 WL 789642, at 8.

163

See AO Techsnabexport v. Globe Nuclear Services and Supply GNSS Limited, 404 Fed. Appx. 793, 798 (4th Cir. 2010).

164

ibid at 302; Generica, Ltd. v. Pharmaceutical Basics, Inc., 125 F.3d 1123 (7th Cir. 1997) (court limited its reliance on testimony of witness whose cross-examination had been curtailed).

165

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). (involving governmental deprivation of a citizen’s benefits without first providing a pre-termination in-person proceeding and finding that under the circumstances presented, the citizen was not entitled to such pre-termination in-person proceeding); see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268–69 (1970) (interpreting Due Process Clause to require procedures to be tailored to “the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard”).

166

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976), (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965)). Interestingly, and somewhat confusingly, the courts do not cite to the more concrete three-part balancing test also established in Mathews for determining whether a procedure sufficiently meets the guarantee of procedural due process.

167

Karaha Bodas Co., at 298–299 (quoting Slaney v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 244 F.3d 580, 592 (7th Cir. 2001) which was quoting Sunshine Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers, 823 F.2d 1289, 1295 (9th Cir. 1987); Generica, 125 F.3d at 1130 (quoting same). It is somewhat surprising that the focus here is on an impartial “decision,” rather than an impartial “decisionmaker.” See Goldberg v. Kelly, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 1022 (1970) (calling for impartial decisionmaker as an essential component of due process).

168

Karaha Bodas Co., 364 F.3d at 302.

169

ibid at 300–303

170

Iran Aircraft Indu.s v. Avco Corp., 980 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1992).

171

Abu Dhabi Inv. Auth. v. Citigroup, No. 12 Civ. 283(GBD) 2013 WL789642, n. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

172

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950)

173

ibid at 314

174

Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Banco de Seguros Del Estados, 199 F.3d 937, 944–46 (7th Cir. 1999)

175

ibid at 945.

176

Sea Hope Navigation Inc., v. Novel Commodities, S.A., No. 13 Civ. 3225 2013 WL 5695955 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2013)

177

ibid at 6.

178

Encyclopaedia Universalis S.A. v. Encyclopedia Britannica, 403 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Avis Rent A Car Sys. Inc. v. Garage Employees Union, Local 272, 791 F.2d 22, 23 (2d. Cir. 1986).

179

Encyclopaedia Universalis S.A.,403 F.3d at 90; see also Yusuf Ahmed, 126 F.3d at 19–20.

180

ibid; International Trading and Industrial Investment Company v. Dyncorp Aerospace Technology, 763 F.Supp.2d 12 (D.C. App. 2011).

181

Four Seasons Hotels and Resorts B.V. v. Consorcio Bar S.A., 613 F.Supp.2d 1362, (S.D. Fl. 2009).

182

Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding, 2012 WL 3925853 (S.D. NY 2012).

183

SEI Societa Esplosivi Industrali SPA v. L3 Fuzing and Ordnance Systems Inc., 843 F.Supp.2d 509 (D. Del. 2012).

184

Parsons & Whittemore Overseas v. Societe Generale De Lindustrie Du Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2nd Cir. 1974).

185

SEI Societa Esplosivi Industrali, 843 F.Supp.2d at 509.

186

See eg, Parsons 508 F.2d at 976–77; Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Mgmt., Inc., 517 F.Supp. 948, 958–61 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Thai-Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co., Ltd. v. Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 2011 WL 3516154, n. 8 (2011) (commenting on relationship between arguments regarding arbitrability and the defense available under Article V(1)(c)).

187

See eg, Zeiler v. Deitsch, 500 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2007).

188

Karaha Bodas Co., LLC v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2004).

189

New York Convention, above n 1 at article V(1)(e).

190

See Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Rep. of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907, 910 (D.D.C. 1996); see also Europcar Italia v. Maiellano Tours, Inc., 156 F.3d 310, 314 (2d Cir. 1998) (examining the effect of Italian arbitrato irrituale and distinguishing an award that is “binding on the parties” from an award that is “judicially binding”).

191

9 U.S.C. §10(a)(4) (West 2012).

192

See New United Motor Mfg., Inc. v. United Auto Workers Local, 617 F.Supp.2d 948, 954 (N.D.Cal. 2008) (citing ConnTech Dev. Co. v. Univ. of Conn. Educ. Prop., Inc., 102 F.3d 677, 686 (2nd Cir.1996)); Millmen Local 550, United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., AFL–CIO v. Wells Exterior Trim, 828 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir.1987).

193

Quixtar Inc. v. Brady, 2008 WL 5386774 at 13 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 17, 2008) (quoting Michaels v. Mariforum Shipping, S.A., 624 F.2d 411, 414 (2d Cir. 1980)). Although there is no case law directly on point, it appears that advisory awards are unlikely to be entitled to judicial review. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Qiagen Gaithersburg, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 318, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (reasoning that an arbitral award is entitled to deference because, “an arbitration panel’s conclusions are more than advisory opinions for the federal courts—rather, they are thoughtful analyses made by adjudicators steeped in the facts and law”).

194

See Smart v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 702, 315 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2002) (not interpreting Section 10(a)(4) as a jurisdictional statute, but only as providing grounds for vacatur); Hart Surgical Inc. v. Ultracision, Inc., 244 F.3d 231, 233 (1st Cir. 2001) (relying on FAA’s Section 10(a)(4) to provide subject matter jurisdiction).

195

Publicis Commc’n v. True N. Commc’ns, Inc., 206 F.3d 725, 728 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Pac. Reins. Mgmt. Corp. v. Ohio Rein. Corp., 935 F.2d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir.1991) (“finality should be judged by substance and effect, not by superficial technicalities.”).

196

Publicis Commc’n v. True N. Commc’ns, Inc., 206 F.3d at 729; see also Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. Co. of Europe v. Continental Cas. Co., 37 F.3d 345 (7th Cir. 1994), Pac. Reins. Mgmt. Corp. v. Ohio Rein. Corp., 935 F.2d at 1023.

197

Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 264 F. Supp. 2d 926, 937 (N.D. Ca. 2003); Sojitz Corp. v. Prithvi Info. Solutions Ltd., 921 N.Y.S.2d 14 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (also referencing New York statute authorizing attachment to permit securing finality of arbitral award).

198

Pac. Reins. Mgmt. Corp., 935 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1991).

199

ibid at 1023 (but vacating the confirmation as to one party).

200

ibid; see also Ecopetrol S.A. et al. v. Offshore Exploration and Production LLC, 46 F.Supp.3d 327, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (interim arbitral awards that required reimbursement for taxes paid and barred use of escrowed funds for such purpose represented final awards because they “required specific action, resolved the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the interim period at issue, and did so without in any way affecting future decisions of the arbitral panel”).

201

Island Creek Coal Sales v. City of Gainesville, Fla., 729 F.2d 1046 (6th Cir. 1984) (abrogated on other grounds, in Cortez Byrd Chips v. Bill Harbert Constr., 529 U.S. 193 (2000)).

202

ibid at 1049.

203

Orion Pictures Corp. v. Writers Guild of Am., W., Inc., 946 F.2d 722, 724 (9th Cir.1991) (interpreting the Labor Management Relations Act rather than the FAA; finality requires that arbitrator must intend the arbitration award to be a “complete determination of every issue submitted”).

204

See Hart Surgical, Inc. v. Ultracision, Inc., 244 F.3d 231, 233–34 (1st Cir. 2001); Providence Journal Co. v. Providence Newspaper Guild, 271 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2001).

205

Sperry Int’l Trade v. Israel, 689 F.2d 301, 304 n. 3 (2d Cir.1982); Hyosung (America) Inc. v. Tranax Tech. Inc., Case. No. C 10–0793 VRW, 2010 WL 1853764, at 4 (N.D.Cal. 2010); Hart Surgical, 244 F.3d at 234.

206

Compare Marron v. Snap-On Tools, Co., No. 03-4563, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 523 (D.N.J. Jan. 9, 2006) with Genus Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Jones, No. JFM-05-3028, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16933, at 4 (D. Md. April 6, 2006).

207

New York Convention, above n 1 at article V(1)(e).

208

See Section 3.1.1.

209

See eg, Chromalloy Aeroservices 939 F. Supp. 907 (recognizing and enforcing arbitral award even though arbitral seat had been in Egypt and award had been nullified by an Egyptian court).

210

Corparacion Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral v. Pemex-Exploracion Produccion, 962 F. Supp.2d 642 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

211

ibid at 648.

212

See Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd. v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd., 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999); TermoRio S.A. E.S.P., 487 F.3d 928; Spier v. Calzaturificio Tecnica, S.p.A., 71 F. Supp.2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Thai-Lao Lignite, 2014 WL 476239, (S.D.N.Y. 2014).

213

See Section 3.1.1.

214

See VRG Linhas Aereas S.A. v. MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners II L.P., 717F.3d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 2012) ( “Whether a given dispute is arbitrable—and the resulting award enforceable—is therefore a question to be decided under United States arbitration law.”); see also New York Convention, article II(1), Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co., Ltd., 77 N.Y.2d 225 (N.Y. 1990), above n 61 (referencing article II(1)).

215

See eg, Arbitration Between Exceed Intern. Ltd. v. DSL Corp., 2014 WL 1761264 (S.D. Tex. 2014) at 5 (in the context of a confirmation proceeding, discussing Article V(2)(a) and finding that the absence of a valid agreement to arbitrate represents a defense under Article V(2)); see also Corocran v. Ardra Ins., Co., Ltd., aboven. 85; VRG Linhas Aereas S.A. v. MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners II L.P., 717F.3d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 2012) (relying in part on Article V(2)(a) to vacate district court’s denial of confirmation of award as beyond scope of arbitration agreement, and remanding for determination of whether parties had agreed that arbitral panel would decide scope of arbitration agreement).

216

Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc., 508 F.2d 974 (quoted in Changzhou AMEC Eastern Tools and Equipment Co., Ltd. v. Eastern Tools & Equipment, Inc., 2012 WL 3106620 (C.D. Calif. 2012)).

217

See CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012) (observing in the context of domestic arbitration that pursuant to Section 2 of the FAA, courts are required to enforce arbitration clauses according to their terms even when public law is involved, “unless the FAA’s mandate has been ‘overridden by a contrary congressional command.’ ”) (quoting Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987)); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 639, n. 21.

218

See eg, Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (foreclosing arbitration of motor-vehicle-franchise contract disputes unless consent is given by all parties, in writing, after dispute arises); Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–118, § 8116(a), 123 Stat. 3409 (2009) (defense-contractor recipients of certain government funds, inter alia, may not require employees or contractors to arbitrate “any claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or any tort related to or arising out of sexual assault or harassment”); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 26(n); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e) (making pre-dispute arbitration agreements unenforceable as to certain whistle blower claims). See also Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Executive Order (to be implemented in 2016, prohibiting certain prospective federal contractors from entering into pre-dispute agreements with employees or independent contractors providing for arbitration of disputes over certain civil rights violations).

219

28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(H); see also Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.Ct. 2594 (2011) (based on Article III of the Constitution, limiting bankruptcy courts’ authority to enter final judgment on certain claims designated as “core”); Wellness International Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S.Ct. 1932 (2015) (permitting bankruptcy courts to adjudicate Stern claims with the parties’ knowing and voluntary consent.)

220

See Payton Constr. Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 399 B.R. 352 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009) (arbitration agreement not enforceable because dissipation of estate’s resources would undermine bankruptcy system and would be “at the expense of the real parties in interest”); but see In re Statewide Realty Co., 159 B.R. 719 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1993) (arbitration permitted to proceed even though matter before the court was a core proceeding), Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149 (3rd Cir. 1989) (no inherent conflict between arbitration and bankruptcy non-core proceedings).

221

See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (federal age discrimination claims in domestic context), Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (securities and RICO claims in domestic context), CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012) (Credit Repair Organization Act claims in domestic context).

222

See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (antitrust claims in international context); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (1934 Securities Exchange Act claims in international context); but see B.V. Bureau Wijsmuller v. U.S.A. as Owner of the Warship Julius A. Furer, 1976 A.M.C. 2514, 2517 (1976) (finding that Congress did not intend to waive sovereign immunity by enacting the Public Vessels Act and thus was not bound by arbitration clause in Lloyd’s Open Form salvage agreement, in dispute over payment for salvage services rendered to warship; holding that such waiver and submission to arbitration would be “entirely inconsistent” with statutory scheme); see also Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 356 F.Supp. 1, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (speculating that the commercial reservation was intended to “exclude matrimonial and other domestic relations awards, political awards, and the like”).

223

See Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2009) (New York Convention allowed to govern); Antillean Marine Shipping Corp. v. Through Transp. Mut. Ins., Ltd., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26363 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2002) (non-arbitrability rule of the McCarran-Ferguson Act “does not apply to international insurance contracts made under the Convention”).

224

Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).

225

See Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 639, n. 21.

226

ibid at 638–39 (“The controversies that international arbitral institutions are called upon to resolve have increased in diversity as well as in complexity. Yet the potential of these tribunals for efficient disposition of legal disagreements arising from commercial relations has not yet been tested. If they are to take a central place in the international legal order, national courts will need to ‘shake off the old judicial hostility to arbitration,’. . . and also their customary and understandable unwillingness to cede jurisdiction of a claim arising under domestic law to a foreign or transnational tribunal. To this extent, at least, it will be necessary for national courts to subordinate domestic notions of arbitrability to the international policy favoring commercial arbitration.”)

227

New York Convention, above n 1 at article V(2)(b).

228

Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638.

229

Parsons & Whittemore Overseas, 508 F.2d at 973–74.

230

See Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1975); Rive v. Briggs of Cancun, 82 Fed.Appx. 359, 364 (5th Cir. 2003); Karaha Bodas Co., LLC, 364 F.3d at 3; Parsons & Whittemore Overseas, 508 F.2d at 974; Agility Pub. Warehousing Co. K.S.C., Prof’l Contract Adm’rs, Inc.v. Supreme Foodservice GmbH, 495 Fed.Appx. 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2012).

231

Ackerman v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 841 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 864 (D.C.Cir.1981)).

232

Banco de Seguros del Estado v. Mut. Marine Office, Inc., 344 F.3d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987)); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983); Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte v. Indus. Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d 1434, 1445 (11th Cir. 1998).

233

9 U.S.C. 2 (emphasis added).

234

See Republic of Argentina v. BG Grp. PLC, 764 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2011) reversed on different grounds 665 F.3d 1363 (D.C. Cir. 2012) reversed sub nom. BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 188 L. Ed. 2d 220 (U.S. 2014).

235

See Karaha Bodas Co., LLC v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364 F.3d 274 (5th cir. 2004); Chevron Corp. v. Rep. of Ecuador, 949 F.Supp.2d 57 at 71 (D.D.C. 2013) (offering no opinion on whether arbitral tribunal’s proposed remedy was erroneous but noting that an error of law would not be represent sufficient grounds to refuse to recognize or confirm award).

236

See Rive v. Briggs of Cancun, Inc., 82 F. App’x 359, 363–64 (5th Cir. 2003).

237

See Telenor Mobile Commc’ns v. Storm LLC, 584 F.3d 396 (2d Cir. 2009); Four Seasons Hotels and Resorts B.V. v. Consorcio Bar S.A., 613 F.Supp.2d 1362 (S.D.Fla. 2009).

238

See Agility Public Warehousing Co. K.S.C., Prof’l Contract Adm’rs, Inc.v. Supreme Foodservice GmbH, 495 Fed.Appx. 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2012).

239

See China Nat. Bldg. Material Inv. Co., Ltd. V. BNK, 2009 WL 4730578 (W.D. Tex., 2009).

240

See Indus. Risk Insurers 141 F.3d at 1444–45 (1998) (also noting that the objecting parties had not cited to any laws or precedents supporting their “invocation of ‘the well-established public policy protecting. . . fundamental principles of fairness and professional conduct’” that they claimed to be violated by hearing an expert witness’ testimony that was adverse to the interests of the parties who had formerly retained him).

241

See Chevron Corp. v. Rep. of Ecuador, No. 12–1247 2013 WL 2449172 at 11 (D.D.C. June 6, 2013).

242

Changzhou Amec E. Tools and Equip. Co. v. E. Tools & Equip., No. EDCV 11-00354 VAP 2012 WL 3106620 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2012).

243

See ibid; see also Aggarao v. MOL Ship Management Co., Ltd., Civ. No. CCB-09-3106, 2014 WL 3894079 (D. Md. Aug. 7, 2014) (refusing to enforce arbitral award for violation of public policy).

244

See Sarhank Grp. 404 F.3d at 661–62 (“Under American law, whether a party has consented to arbitrate is an issue to be decided by the Court in which enforcement of an award is sought. An agreement to arbitrate must be voluntarily made, and the Court decides, based on general principles of domestic contract law, whether the parties agreed to submit the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrators. . . . As arbitrability is not arbitrable in the absence of the parties’ agreement, the district court was required to determine whether Oracle had agreed to arbitrate. . . . Merely arguing non-arbitrability to the arbitrators and then to the Egyptian courts does not amount to consent by Oracle to having the arbitrators decide the issue. . . . It is American federal arbitration law [rather than Egyptian] that controls. A U.S. nonsignatory cannot be bound to arbitrate in the absence of a full showing of facts supporting an articulable theory based on U.S. contract law or U.S. agency law. . . . to hold otherwise would defeat the ordinary and customary expectations of experienced business persons.”).

245

See China Minmetals Materials Imp. & Exp. Co., Ltd. v. Chi Mei Corp., 334 F.3d 274, 289–90, n. 12 (3d Cir. 2003) (because one of the parties claimed forgery of the signatures on the agreements containing arbitration clauses, Third Circuit vacated enforcement order of the district court and remanded for court to determine whether parties had reached a valid agreement to arbitrate; the court specifically expressed no opinion regarding the applicability of Article V(2)(b)).

246

See Europcar Italia 156 F.3d at 315.

247

See Karaha Bodas Co., 364 F.3d at 306

248

See ibid at 306–307 (analyzing protesting party’s claim that opponent should have revealed political risk insurance policy and using case law to distinguish between a party’s presentation of perjured testimony, on one hand, and a party’s failure to present evidence favorable to the opponent’s case when the opponent could have offered such evidence itself).

249

Some commentators have derided this choice as “regrettable.” See Hans Smit, “Comment on Public Policy in International Arbitration” (2002) 13 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 65 (cited in Linda J. Silberman, “Civil Procedure Meets International Arbitration: A Tribute to Hans Smit” (2012) 23 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 439, 447).

250

Agility Pub. Warehousing Co. K.S.C., Prof’l Contract Adm’rs, Inc.v. Supreme Foodservice GmbH, 495 Fed.Appx. 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2012).

251

ibid at 152 (employees had refused to testify after recent unsealing of indictment against their employer).

252

Changzhou Amec E. Tools and Equip. Co. v. E. Tools & Equip., No. EDCV 11-00354 VAP 2012 WL 3106620 at 13 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2012).

253

New York Convention, above n 1 at article III.

254

See Ank A. Santens, “Difficulties Enforcing New York Convention Awards in the U.S. Against Non-U.S. Defendants: Is the Culprit Jurisprudence on Jurisdiction, the Three-Year Time Bar in the Federal Arbitration Act, or Both?” Kluwer Arbitration Blog (December 23, 2009), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2009/12/23/difficulties-enforcing-new-york-convention-awards-in-the-us-against-non-us-defendants-is-the-culprit-jurisprudence-on-jurisdiction-the-three-year-time-bar-in-the-federal-arbitration-act-or-bot/ (citing as analogous, but not endorsing, Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M. v. NAK Naftogaz of Ukraine, 311 F.3d 488 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that the doctrine of forum non conveniens was applicable as a “rule of procedure” under Article III of the New York Convention); Aristides Diaz-Pedrosa, “Shaffer’s Footnote” 109 W. Va. L. Rev. 17, 24 (assuming that the due process jurisdictional requirement falls within the local “rules of procedure” in Article III); also citing as contrary authority, William W. Park & Alexander A. Yanos, “Treaty Obligations and National Law: Emerging Conflicts in International Arbitration” (2006) 58 Hastings L.J. 251, 262 (maintaining that such approach is not supported by the drafting history of the New York Convention)).

255

See eg, STX Pan Ocean Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Progress Bulk Carriers Ltd., Slip Copy, no. 12 Civ. 5388(RJS) 2013 WL 1385017 (S.D.N.Y., March 14, 2013) (examining a State of New York long arm statute).

256

See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).

257

See Burnham v. Sup. Ct. Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990).

258

See eg, Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952); see also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751–52, 187 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2014) (finding that California could not assert general jurisdiction because foreign country’s corporation was not sufficiently at home there, in case involving ATS and TVPA claims arising out of the actions of corporation’s wholly-owned Argentinian subsidiary); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., et al. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011) (finding that North Carolina could not assert general, or “all-purpose jurisdiction” over defendants that were foreign companies).

259

It should be noted that this result is somewhat surprising in light of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence that excluded affiliates’ contacts from personal jurisdiction analysis. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2851, 2857 (2011) (finding that foreign subsidiaries of U.S. parent company did not have sufficient contacts for specific or general jurisdiction in forum state, but also noting that the respondents belatedly urged treatment of the parent and subsidiaries as a “single enterprise” or “unitary business” and thus forfeited the contention).

260

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316; see First Inv. Corp. of the Marshall Islands v. Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, Ltd., 703 F.3d 742, 746 (5th Cir. 2013) (relying on the Due Process Clause and the potential for significant deprivation to affirm lower court’s dismissal of an award confirmation action for lack of personal jurisdiction when the award debtor was neither present nor in possession of property in the United States).

261

See Int’l Shoe Co. 326 U.S. at 316; First Inv. Corp. of the Marshall Islands, 703 F.3d at 746.; World-wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1118, 1123, 188 L. Ed. 2d 12 (2014); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476–477 (1985) (also observing that after examining the sufficiency of minimum contacts, courts must determine the reasonableness of exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant, including considering burdens placed on defendant, the interest of the forum state in adjudicating the dispute, the interest of the plaintiff in “obtaining convenient and effective relief,” “the interstate judicial system’s interest in “obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,” and the “shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies”); Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Sup. Ct. Cal., Solano Cnty, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).

262

See eg, Telcordia Tech Inc. v. Telkom SA Ltd., 458 F.3d 172, 177–78 (3d Cir. 2006) (long-term relationship, visited the forum state); see generally Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 476, (1985).

263

See Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S., 895 F.Supp.2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

264

See eg, First Investment Corp. of the Marshall Islands, 703 F.3d at 746 (5th Cir. 2013) (describing the procedural history after commencement of the second confirmation proceeding).

ibid

ibid at 751.

ibid at 749–50.

ibid at 752.

See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846 (2011).

270

First Inv. Corp. of the Marshall Islands v. Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, Ltd., 703 F.3d at 748.

271

Telecordia Tech Inc. v. Telkom SA Ltd., 458 F.3d 172, 179 (3d Cir. 2006).

272

See Linda J. Silberman, “Civil Procedure Meets International Arbitration: A Tribute to Hans Smit” (2012) 23 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 439, 442 (noting that “[u]nder this analysis, due process is not dispensed with but rather due process is satisfied” and citing to Hans Smit, “Comment on Public Policy in International Arbitration” (2002) 13 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 65).

273

See First Investment Corp. of the Marshall Islands, 703 F.3d at 746 at 748.

274

See Carnival Cruise Lines Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991) (finding forum selection clause fundamentally fair and enforcing it, but suggesting that a motive of discouraging the pursuit of legitimate claims would represent bad-faith and be inconsistent with fundamental fairness); see also Atlantic Marine Const. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Western Dist. of Texas,134 S.Ct. 568, 581–83 (2014); Nat’l Equip. Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964) (involving consent to jurisdiction clause); D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972) (cognovit, and requiring informed consent and consideration).

275

See First Inv. Corp. of the Marshall Islands v. Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, Ltd., 703 F.3d 742, 746 (5th Cir. 2013); Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82 (D.C. Cir. 2002), (foreign states are not “persons” protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment); Frontera Resources Azerbaijan Corp. v. State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic, 582 F.3d 393, 399–401 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing agencies and corporate entities).

276

Where there is an agreement to arbitrate by a foreign state or instrumentality and the agreement or award is governed by a treaty in force in the United States, the foreign state has no immunity—and is thus subject to both personal and subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(6) (2012) (“in which the action is brought, either to enforce an agreement made by the foreign state with or for the benefit of a private party to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between the parties with respect to a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration under the laws of the United States, or to confirm an award made pursuant to such an agreement to arbitrate, if (A) the arbitration takes place or is intended to take place in the United States, (B) the agreement or award is or may be governed by a treaty or other international agreement in force for the United States calling for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, (C) the underlying claim, save for the agreement to arbitrate, could have been brought in a United States court under this section or section 1607, or (D) paragraph (1) of this subsection is otherwise applicable”); see also Linda J. Silberman, “Civil Procedure Meets International Arbitration: A Tribute to Hans Smit” (2012) 23 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb 439, n 15. Courts have found that the New York Convention is exactly the sort of treaty Congress intended to include in the FSIA’s arbitration exception. Therefore, if service of process has been made upon a sovereign state under Section 1608 of the FSIA, any court with subject matter jurisdiction over a claim will also have personal jurisdiction over the debtor state. See Continental Transfer v. Federal Government of Nigeria, 697 F.Supp.2d 46, 56–57 (D.D.C. 2010).

277

See Santens above n 254.

278

See 9 U.S.C. §207 (2012); Alto Mar Girassol v. Lumbersmen Mut. Cas. Co., No. 04 C 7731, 2005 WL 947126 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 2005).

279

See First Inv. Corp. of the Marshall Islands v. Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, Ltd., 703 F.3d 742, 748 (5th Cir. 2013).

280

ibid at 751 (discussing confirmation of an arbitral award).

281

9 U.S.C. §207 (2012).

282

In re Arbitration between Monegasque De Reassurances S.A.M. v. NAK Naftogaz of Ukraine, 311 F.3d 488 (2d Cir. 2002).

283

ibid at 501.

284

See In re Arbitration between Monegasque De Reassurances S.A.M. v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukraine, 311 F.3d 488, 495 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting N.Y. Conv. art. III)).

285

See ibid at 498; Figueiredo Ferraz E. Engenharia de Projeto Ltda. v. Rep. of Peru, 665 F.3d 384, 390 (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming “somewhat reduced deference”); see also Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S., 895 F.Supp.2d 513, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (regarding sliding scale) reversed on other grounds, 750 F.3d 221(2d Cir. 2014) (reversing for lack of personal jurisdiction).

286

See Norex Petroleum Ltd. V. Access Indus., 416 F.3d 146 (2d Cir. 2005); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 (1981) (“Although the relatives of the decedents may not be able to rely on a strict liability theory, and although their potential damages award may be smaller, there is no danger that they will be deprived of any remedy or treated unfairly”).

287

Norex Petroleum, 416 F.3d. at 158; see Piper, 454 U.S. at 247, 254 n. 6 (citing Phoenix Canada Oil Co. Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 445 (Del.1978) (court refuses to dismiss, where alternative forum is Ecuador, it is unclear whether Ecuadorean tribunal will hear the case, and there is no generally codified Ecuadorean legal remedy for the unjust enrichment and tort claims asserted)); In re Arbitration between Monegasque De Reassurances S.A.M. v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukraine, 311 F.3d 488, 499 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting reluctance to find foreign courts inadequate because they are corrupt or biased, and suggesting that such finding would require “complete absence of due process or an inability of the forum to provide substantial justice to the parties”).

288

Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 416 F.3d 146, 153 (2d Cir.2005).

289

Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. at 241 n. 6.

290

ibid; Sonera Holding, 895 F.Supp.2d at 523 reversed on other grounds, Sonera Holding, B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S., 750 F.3d 221 (2d Cir. 2014); In re Arbitration between Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M. v. NAK Naftogaz of Ukraine, 311 F.3d 488, 500.

291

In re Arbitration between Monegasque De Reassurances S.A.M. v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukraine, 311 F.3d 488, 495 (2d Cir. 2002); Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981)

292

PT United Can Co., 138 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 1998).

293

Sonera Holding, 895 F.Supp.2d at 525 reversed on other grounds, Sonera Holding, B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S., 750 F.3d 221 (2d Cir. 2014)

294

Cont’l Transfert v. Fed. Gov’t of Nigeria, 697 F.Supp.2d at 58.

295

TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Prop. Fund of Ukraine, 411 F.3d 296, 303–04 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Sonera Holding, 895 F.Supp.2d at 524 reversed on other grounds, Sonera Holding, B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S., 750 F.3d 221 (2d Cir. 2014).

296

Sonera Holding, 895 F.Supp.2d at 525 reversed on other grounds, Sonera Holding, B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S.,750 F.3d 221 (2d Cir. 2014).

297

Cont’l Transfert Technique Limited v. Federal Government of Nigeria, 697 F.Supp.2d 46, 57 (D.C. 2010) (quoting Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 447–48 (S.Ct. 1994)).

298

See, Santens, above n 254; see also, Sonera Holding, 895 F.Supp.2d 513; TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Property Fund of Ukraine, 411 F.3d 296, 303–04 (D.C.Cir. 2005).

299

Figueiredo, 665 F.3d 384.

300

Figueiredo, 665 F.3d at 407–08 (Lynch, J., dissenting).

301

ibid at 395. The district court in Sonera Holding v. Cukurova Holding quoted Judge Lynch approvingly as it explained its decision to refuse to dismiss an award enforcement case based on forum non conveniens, and observed: “To strengthen international commerce and, indeed, to enable businesses to enter into international commercial agreements, the drafters of the New York Convention crafted a “document that would carefully circumscribe the bases on which the courts of a signatory nation could disregard an arbitration provision or refuse to enforce an arbitral award.” Given this backdrop, before dismissing a petition based on a forum non conveniens argument, a court should be alert to the context in which such an application is made. Arguments that may have some weight or even considerable weight in the context of a lawsuit in which the merits of a claim will be decided may have limited appeal when the context is the enforcement of an arbitration award governed by the New York Convention.” ibid at 524 (quoting Figueiredo 665 F.3d at 396) (citations removed). Indeed, the Sonera court went on to note that the courts of New York have a public interest in “convincing the international business community of the benefits of selecting New York law and a New York forum in order to ensure fairness and predictability in their commercial relationships.” ibid at 525. Importantly, the Second Circuit vacated this judgment and reversed the district court’s refusal to grant a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S., 750 F.3d 221 (2d Cir. 2014).

302

TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Property Fund of Ukraine, 411 F.3d 296, 303–04 (D.C.Cir. 2005).

303

Cont’l Transfert v. Fed. Gov’t of Nigeria, 697 F.Supp.2d 46, 53 (D.C. 2010).

304

M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., KG, 87 F.3d 844, 847 (6th Cir. 1996).

305

Vaden v. Discover Bank et al., 129 S.Ct. 1262, 1273 (2009)

306

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).

307

ibid

308

See 9 U.S.C. § 204 (2012).

309

Canada Inc. v. N. Country Natural Spring Water, Ltd., 210 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. Pa. 2002)

310

28 U.S.C. §1391(b) (2012).

311

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1).

312

See eg, Banco De Santander Central Hispano, S.A. v. Consalvi Int’l. Inc., 425 F. Supp.2d 421, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

313

9 U.S.C. § 205 (2012)

314

9 U.S.C. §§203, 205 (2012).

315

See Ario v. Underwriting Members of Syndicate, 618 F.3d 277, 289–90 (3d Cir. 2010).

316

See Telcordia Tech Inc. v. Telkom SA Ltd., 458 F.3d 172, 179 (3d Cir. 2006).

317

New York Convention, above n 1, at article VI.

318

See Telecordia Tech Inc., 458 F.3d at 180.

319

Europcar Italia, S.p.A. v. Maiellano Tours, Inc., 156 F.3d 310, 317 (2d Cir. 1998).

320

The D.C. Circuit has approvingly cited to the Second Circuit’s development of a list of six factors to be weighed by a district court to determine whether adjournment is the appropriate course of action: “(1) the general objectives of arbitration-the expeditious resolution of disputes and the avoidance of protracted and expensive litigation; (2) the status of the foreign proceedings and the estimated time for those proceedings to be resolved; (3) whether the award sought to be enforced will receive greater scrutiny in the foreign proceedings under a less deferential standard of review; (4) the characteristics of the foreign proceedings, including (i) whether they were brought to enforce an award (which would tend to weigh in favor of a stay) or to set the award aside (which would tend to weigh in favor of enforcement); (ii) whether they were initiated before the underlying enforcement proceeding so as to raise concerns of international comity; (iii) whether they were initiated by the party now seeking to enforce the award in federal court; and (iv) whether they were initiated under circumstances indicating an intent to hinder or delay resolution of the dispute; (5) a balance of the possible hardships to each of the parties . . . ; and (6) any other [relevant] circumstances . . . .” Cont’l Transfert v. Fed. Gov’t of Nigeria, 697 F.Supp.2d 46, 60 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Europcar, 156 F.3d 310 at 317–16).

321

Telecordia Tech Inc., 458 F.3d at 181 (suggesting this as a benefit of dismissal without prejudice and citing to Stonington Partners, Inc. v. Lernout & Hauspie Speech Prod. N.V., 310 F.3d 118, 126 (3d Cir. 2002)).

322

See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Arbitration Study: Report to Congress, Pursuant to Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §1028(a), Section 3.4.3. (2015); Jeff Sovern, Elayne E. Greenberg, Paul F. Kirgis & Yuxiang Liu, “ ‘Whimsy Little Contracts’ with Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Understanding of Arbitration Agreements” (2015) 14-0009 St. John’s School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series.

323

See above Sections 3.2.1., 3.2.6., 3.2.7.

324

See AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); see also CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012); Nancy A. Welsh, “Mandatory Predispute Consumer Arbitration, Structural Bias, and Incentivizing Procedural Safeguards” (2012) 42 Sw. L. Rev. 187; Jean R. Sternlight, “Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice” (2012) 90 Or. L. Rev. 703.

325

Arbitration clauses also currently provide, or have provided, for payment for the costs of private arbitration, shifting of attorney’s fees, restrictions on discovery, and distant forums for the arbitration proceeding. See Hiro N. Aragaki, “The Federal Arbitration Act as Procedural Reform” (2014) 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1939, 1960–61 (describing use of unconscionability doctrine to address concerns about the quality of arbitration procedures that occur pursuant to arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion); Imre Stephen Szalai, “More Than Class Action Killers: The Impact of Concepcion and American Express on Employment Arbitration” (2014) 35 Berkeley J. emp. & Lab. L. 31, 43–44 (providing examples of arbitration provisions that courts have found unconscionable); Imre S. Szalai, “A Constitutional Right to Discovery? Creating and Reinforcing Due Process Norms Through the Procedural Laboratory of Arbitration” (2015) 15 Pepp. Disp. Res. L. J. 337.

326

See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013); see also CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 671 (2012) (determining that “right to sue” provided in consumer protection statute was “without regard to whether the suit in court [for review or enforcement] has to be preceded by an arbitration proceeding”); Nancy A. Welsh, “Mandatory Predispute Consumer Arbitration, Structural Bias, and Incentivizing Procedural Safeguards” (2012) 42 Sw. L. Rev. 187, 190–92.

327

See above Sections 1.2, 2.1, 3.1.3.

328

See above Section 3.1.2.

329

See Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2011).

330

See above Section 2.1.

331

See above Sections 1.2, 3.2.6.

332

See above Section 3.2.7.

333

See above Section 3.2.2.

334

See above Section 4.1.

335

See eg, J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2790 (2011) (finding that even though foreign manufacturer’s product ended up in New Jersey and allegedly injured plaintiff there and even though manufacturer “knew or should have known” that national distribution of its product could result in sale in New Jersey, this was insufficient to demonstrate that foreign corporation had purposely availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within New Jersey and, therefore, New Jersey court could not assert personal jurisdiction over foreign corporation; further noting that “[t]he defendant’s conduct and the economic realities of the market the defendant seeks to serve will differ across cases, and judicial exposition will, in common-law fashion, clarify the contours of that principle”).

336

See above Section 4.3.

337

See above Section 4.1.

338

See above Sections 3.1.1., 3.2.5.

339

See above Section 4.3.

340

See Nancy A. Welsh, Andrea Kupfer Schneider, “The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation into Bilateral Investment Arbitration” (2013) 18 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 71 (examining different approaches to mandating the use of mediation or various elements of the process).

341

ibid

342

See Catherine A. Rogers, “The Arrival of the ‘Have-Nots’ in International Arbitration” (2007) 8 Nev. L. J. 341, 375 (observing that the Hague Conventions have successfully excluded areas involving consumer and employees—i.e., “forum selection clauses in contracts involving consumers and employees are permitted but can only be entered into after a dispute has arisen”). Professor Rogers also observes that consumers and employees have been protected by the New York Convention’s writing requirement, but such writing requirement has been eliminated. ibid at 375.

343

See Nancy A. Welsh, “Mandatory Predispute Consumer Arbitration, Structural Bias, and Incentivizing Procedural Safeguards” (2012) 42 Sw. L. Rev. 187; see also Miles B. Farmer, “Mandatory and Fair: A Better System of Mandatory Arbitration” (2012) 121 Yale L.J. 2346.

G B Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2nd edn (Kluwer Law International, 2014)

G W Haight, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: Summary Analysis of Record of United Nations Conference May/June 1958 (New York, United Nations Economic and Social Council, 1958)

A J van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958, Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation (Kluwer Law International, 1981)

S I Strong, International Commercial Arbitration: A Guide for U.S. Judges (Washington DC, Federal Judicial Center, 2012)

Titel: Interpretation and Application of the New York Convention in the United States
verfasst von: Louis Del Duca
Nancy A. Welsh
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-50913-6

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-50915-0

Copyright-Jahr: 2017
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50915-0_42

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